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I have dedicated my life’s work trying to make a positive difference in the industries I have 
served over a span of forty-five years. Whether as a member of an engineering staff or a 
management team at a manufacturing facility, as a teacher, or as a consultant for the 
University of Tennessee Center for Industrial Services (UT CIS), my belief has always 
been unwavering and simple: a person can make a difference.  
Making a difference can mean a lot of things: taking time to dig deep into real world 
problems; spending a few extra moments to ensure someone was understood; allocating 
extra time to a report for clarity’s sake or thoroughness; adding something “extra” as value 
for a customer; taking a moment to double check a calculation; or just reaching out to 
someone when it is needed. With perseverance and dedication to a cause, any person 
can make a difference.  
For that reason, this dedication goes to my wife Lydia and my two sons, Graeme and 
Logan. Their having started this journey over a period spanning a decade, they were there 
when I was unable to see journey’s end. They were there when my job and student work 
load seemed as though it would overwhelm me. They were there with congratulations 
when I succeeded and encouragement when I failed.  
They were urging me to finish what I started. I owe my spouse more than words can say. 
She put up with my sleep deprivation (full time job and part-time student), the extra work 
she did when I was studying, my grumpiness, my impatience, my inattention to the world 
around me, my sicknesses, and even my old age. She made this journey with me in a 
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different way, but it was also her journey, nonetheless. She remarked, “This is just as 
much my doctorate as it is yours!” I couldn’t agree with her more. 
Lydia, I thank you for your devotion and belief in my aspirations to fulfill a life-long dream 
and you have my undying love and gratitude for taking this decade long walk with me. My 
only regret is I did not start it earlier in life. To my best friend in the world and life-mate – 





• To Dr. Andrew Yu (UTSI) for your willingness to chair my Faculty Committee and the 
intuitive thinking you provided into the actual analysis and reporting on the case study 
results. Your assistance in this area was invaluable and very much appreciated. 
• To Dr. James Simonton (UTSI) for your wisdom, suggestions, and insights in the 
oversight of my initial work and for your feedback on my thought processes as the 
work continued.  
• To Dr. Jamie Coble (UTK), and Dr. Anahita Khojandi (UTK), for your willingness to 
participate as Faculty Committee members and for sharing your ideas, knowledge and 
insights regarding this work. Please know it was appreciated. 
• To my dad and my uncle who taught me the importance of hard work and dedication 
to any effort undertaken. And, most especially, to my mom, who taught me the 
importance of education even though it took me a lifetime to complete it. I only wish 
they were still present to see the journey’s end. 
• To the company I worked with and its leadership (specifically, Mr. T. Stroh and Mr. D. 
McCowan) for their willingness to entertain the initial proposal and for their expertise 
and knowledge of their processes, including steering me through the paperwork to get 
the research started.  
• A special thanks goes to the data analyst, Mr. J. Graves, who wrestled the information 
from the supplier databases which was central to this research case study. 
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• To my research expert at the University of Tennessee Library, Ms. J. Williamson for 
her work in finding articles on the benefits of workplace training. Thanks so much for 
the help and assistance you provided. 
• To my close friend and boss, Keith Ridley, for his encouragement to complete this 
doctoral journey. He is more like a brother than a friend or boss. Thanks for always 
being there and someone who listened and encouraged me. 
• To mentors long since departed and to those still around; to other professors,  
teachers, friends, acquaintances, and the many, many professionals I have met over 
the years, thanks so much for your knowledge and insights so kindly shared with me.  
• A special thanks to my wife, Lydia, for her editorial comments in the preparation of this 
manuscript. Thanks for the assistance in making this a better product.  
• And, finally, to those taking the time to read this dissertation and the conclusions of 
the research. It is my hope this effort sufficiently pushed the edge of the envelope far 





Learning is an amalgam of a student’s desire to understand, the willingness of an 
instructor to educate, the subject taught, its quality, and the delivery environment. 
Most importantly, a learning goal, both actionable and investment worthy, must exist 
for effective learning to take place. The ability to learn and then implement new 
concepts and ideas is the significant difference separating our species from other life 
on this planet. It has led to diverse discoveries such as disease vaccines, nuclear 
energy, the automobile, electronics, and rocket planes to name just a few.  
Science advances in small steps and big leaps. Inventions increase daily to improve 
the quality of life for this planet’s population. At the center of all these ideas are 
researchers looking to tease out the next piece of information for our world’s 
knowledge base. This body of knowledge (BOK) grows at an ever-expanding rate, 
doubling every few years. This doubling period is shrinking rapidly as more knowledge 
is accumulated. 
In the manufacturing world of products, this BOK is brought to bear on products that, 
hopefully, stand above their competition. If a product is excellent, consumers and 
producers are satisfied. The consumer gets the best quality for the price while the 
producer gets the best price for the quality offered. If product quality and price are 
right, there is someone willing to buy it. 
However, what happens when the opposite is experienced and the product, at its 
asking price, is of poor quality? Buyers are less willing to spend and quick to mention 
the lack of quality or defects found. Defects can impact the maker’s selling price and 
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translate into extensive efforts to make the customer whole through warranty. The 
producer also risks the loss of their customer (brand loyalty) if the product is deficient 
in quality.  
Within this dissertation, training methods, useful practices, experiences, and the body 
of training knowledge will be presented in defense of developmental training and will 
conclude with a case study exploration into the connections between supply chain 
developmental training and defect reductions at an Original Equipment Manufacturer 





This dissertation was written for partial completion of graduation requirements for the 
Industrial Engineering PhD Program (Engineering Management) at The University of 
Tennessee Space Institute. Within this dissertation, “Statistical Study of Supply Chain 
Developmental Training on Original Equipment Manufacturer’s Defect Rates,” is an 
exploration of the effects of supplier development training on defect reduction. The 
primary question being explored is does supplier development training change or impact, 
in a positive way, defect reductions in a supply chain? 
Most trainers would postulate training creates a unique and lasting difference when it 
comes to individual or organizational improvements. But what about a larger supply chain 
with multiple companies and development training’s impact on the larger chain? 
Intuitively, we would agree that effective training at a site level should produce tangible 
improvements and, as the individual organizations improve, the results should eventually 
spill over into the larger supply chain.  
However, is this simple line of thinking always true? How do we know? How do we prove 
it to others? Alternatively, do we just accept it as, “YES…...training most definitely has a 
positive impact!” Has this become such a “cut-in-stone” premise no one is willing to argue 
to the contrary? These are questions being asked more and more by senior managers as 
they look for proof as a condition for doing expensive supplier developmental training. 
While there is a wealth of information on benefits in the workplace and individual or group 
benefits, there is limited to no research data on supply chain developmental effects. 
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This dissertation provides perspectives on the above questions and the reader with some 
answers as to why employee training is so important to the companies they work for and 
the larger supply chain in general. While this researcher remains decidedly “pro-training,” 
these lines of questions initially struck me as difficult to answer. However, the researcher 
began to think about his own training, education, and work experiences.  
Eight years of grammar school, four in high school, five in undergraduate school, ten 
years in graduate school, plus forty-five years of on-the-job training and experience 
brought me to this moment in time. Every piece of learning and experience, stacked and 
built one upon the other, played a role in what is written here to answer a simple question. 
Remove any piece, and this engineer and this dissertation would be the lesser for it.  
Accordingly, it would seem logical that most, if not all, learners go through a similar 
process with their training and education, each according to their individual gifts. The 
learning process plays and will always play a significant role in who we are, who we 
become, and what we are capable of in terms of societal or industrial contributions. If 
there were no capacity for human learning, society would still be in the stone-age. 
Civilization and inventions that enhance the human quality of life at home and in our work-
places are all results of hundreds, if not thousands, of years of learning and progress. 
Central to this dissertation will be a review of lessons taught through the “learning 
process” extracted from years of training and written experiences of educators, their 
recorded information obtained through research on the subject, and a detailed look at the 
researcher’s Case Study to explore whether supply chain training positively impacts 
defect reductions.   
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A Manufacturer’s Connection to its Supply Chain 
Major manufacturing sites go by many names (manufacturer, producer, or maker), but 
their most common moniker is OEM or Original Equipment Manufacturer. As with all major 
manufacturers, supplier selection is extremely important. The suppliers to these facilities 
are normally vetted (audited by the OEM) before being offered any opportunity to bid on 
making parts for their assembly plants. Quality being equal, the lowest bidder usually wins 
the prize.  
Successful bidders become recipients of substantial contracts to make parts and material 
as part of a much larger supply chain that consists of hundreds or even thousands of 
suppliers. Provision of quality parts, on time, and at cost allows the supplier to develop a 
long-standing positive relationship with their customer (the OEM). Failures in quality lead 
to trouble for the supplier and their customer business relationship. 
These supply chains typically have multiple levels (or Tiers) with the closest supplier in 
terms of direct contact with the OEM being a Tier 1. Other Tier “N” suppliers where N = 
2,3,4…., supply the suppliers, on up the chain, that, ends with a Tier 1 supplying the final 
part or component to the assembly plant. The OEM can even decide to purchase and 
own suppliers, especially if a part is a critical component. This collection of supplied parts 
and material end their journey at the OEM’s assembly plant where they are methodically 
pieced together to make products sold in the commercial and private business sectors.  
Assembly plants can trace most of their roots back to the days of Henry Ford and the 
Model A at the turn of the 20th Century. Product quality, on the other hand, is traceable to 
ancient times where apprenticeships were common, and the worker was obligated for 
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years to a master craftsman to learn a skill or trade. In the 21st Century, a product and its 
quality continue to be just as inseparable from each other as they were in ancient times, 
the days of Henry Ford, and today. In an age where multiple options are now available 
for most products, discerning customers are always looking for the best product available 
for the lowest price.  
Like the OEM, suppliers continually look to improve their products and quality. This effort 
is a competition of the fittest suppliers for the customers they serve. As an example, 
consider, for a moment, the automotive industry. The complexity of vehicles made today 
are beginning to take on unimaginable characteristics. Cars in the world today provide 
features that enhance ride, drive-ability, safety, passenger comfort, and style.  
It may be surprising to know automobiles are comprised of as many as 30,000 or more 
individual parts [1] and components. Supplier part complexity is also increasing with each 
passing year. Nowadays, an automobile would be described as a “quantum leap” in 
technology if it were compared to Ford’s Model-A design. Regardless of the year in which 
the product is made, the OEM depends on suppliers to create a quality product that, in 
many ways, define the personas of the people that buy them. From cars, to clothes, to 
airplanes, to electronics, quality must always be a central supplier focus. 
Consequently, good supply chains are one of the critical determining factors of success 
or failure in the OEM’s production world. In the case of automobiles, who would have 
thought in the second decade of the 21st Century, car makers would be talking about 
building autonomous vehicles where today’s driver will, one day, just be a normal 
passenger for the trip enjoying the scenery while traveling to a destination or, sleeping 
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while the vehicle does the driving. Complex, driverless vehicles will one-day be a driving 
norm; hopefully, making transportation both safer and easier.  
Up until just a few years ago we would have called this concept more fiction than fact 
belonging to some science-fiction movie. And yet, Google has had a self-driving car on 
the road for several years now. Transportation services already have driverless car routes 
in large cities such as Pittsburgh, San Francisco and Phoenix. [2] This is just the 
beginning. To accomplish this driverless feat on a grander scale in the future, cars must 
become even more reliable, free from critical defects, and devoid of failures that place 
people’s lives in jeopardy or risk vehicle damage. This requirement is no different for any 
sophisticated mode of transportation or other advanced product made in today’s global 
economy. 
Science and engineering advancements continually change the world in which we live. 
Not unexpectedly, as technology advances and products become more highly 
customized, the demands on today’s suppliers grow. Though the specifics are different 
for every supplier, the focal point always comes back to three common elements (quality, 
cost and delivery), and, at unprecedented levels.  
Science has advanced the body of knowledge for materials, electronics, and control 
systems. Manufacturing processes and techniques have advanced and with a much 
greater sophistication compared to just ten years ago. State-of-the-art computers can now 
be purchased with learning algorithms that have the beginnings of rudimentary artificial 
intelligence that learn by doing. Advances have led to supplier products that can be rapidly 
produced, made uniformly, and with a quality good enough to last a decade or more 
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without major problems or failures. Mathematics has even created modeling algorithms 
that can estimate the likelihood of a product’s failure.  
Based on news reports, some might argue that quality has declined, giving way to a larger 
emphasis on cost and delivery. There are many who would disagree. As one Senior 
Quality Manager remarked to this researcher,  
“Customers in the United States are some of the most discerning customers in 
the world and it takes more to please them.”  
That’s not expected to change soon. If a supplier delivers poor quality, delivers the wrong 
quantities, or over-charges for the item, the supplier is soon out of business with no 
customers. No OEM will carry poorly performing suppliers for great lengths of time 
because it places their future customer business at risk. 
In this fast-paced world of manufacturing, suppliers have found many ways to be creative 
and innovative through technological advancement. It is a timeless and age-old game of 
competition in the pursuit of being the best at what they do. Get it right, and every party 
involved are winners. Get it wrong, and the downside can be enormously bad. 
It is intuitive that products with the better-quality are ones that tend to get and keep 
customers over time. In the automotive world, it would be rare to see a modern-day family 
buy just one vehicle in a lifetime. Therefore, car makers strive to get and keep their 
customers loyal to their product brands. When a second or third vehicle is purchased, 
they want to be first-in-line, again. If a significant number of mistakes are made during the 
manufacture of the product, customer loyalty is impacted. It is easy to get a customer the 
first time out but far harder to keep them. To maintain this customer, brand loyalty requires 
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world-class suppliers. As in a steel chain where the chain is only as strong as its weakest 
link, so goes the manufacturing and assembly world. Product quality is only as good as 
the weakest supplier in the chain. 
Supply Chain Performance Metrics 
Suppliers and OEMs both have access to performance metrics used in making quality 
parts to meet customer needs. Perception of quality is always determined by the end 
customers that buy and use the products, so suppliers are very interested in measuring 
customer feedback. One of the most important metrics used to gauge customer 
satisfaction is to measure quality after the sale. Most if not all major manufacturers track 
their warranty cost which is a key indicator of product quality and performance.  
In the world of automotive manufacturing, one of the key supplier performance metrics 
used is defining how well the vehicle is performing three months into service (3MIS). 
David Sargent, a Vice President at J.D. Power [3] expressed it this way: 
"J.D. Power also found that car buyers who experienced fewer problems were 
more brand loyal. By combining data from last year’s dependability study with 
trade-in data, the firm [J.D. Power] determined that 56% of owners who reported 
no problems stayed with the same brand when they purchased their next new 
vehicle. For those who reported three or more problems, brand loyalty dropped 
to 42%.” 
This statistic represents a fourteen-point swing in brand loyalty and auto-makers are 
fighting each other for every percentage point they can get (a term called market-share). 
Take for example the statistics on global annualized production of automobiles in 2017. 
According to the International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers, that number 
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was 97,302,534 vehicles [4] comprised of 73,456,531 cars and 23,846,003 commercial 
vehicles (vans and trucks). A one percentage point shift (up or down) in customer loyalty 
for just the cars means the difference between a Tier I and its other lower level suppliers 
staying in business and expanding or shutting down with loss of jobs and the impact on 
the community where the supplier is located. 
A one percentage point increase in customer loyalty can double the product demand for 
a Tier I supplier based on the worldwide production of cars (approaching 73.5 million 
annually). This one percent increase in demand translates to 735,000 automobiles. The 
largest assembly plant in the United States is presently only capable of making 650,000 
vehicles annually at a single assembly location. It is easy to see the effect a one percent 
point increase has on a single supplier and the supply chain – suppliers would have to 
double production. Consequently, quality is a central focus for all parties and tracking 
vehicle reliability remains a significant metric of interest for the entire supply chain. 
The Failure Process 
In the part failure process, most failures follow what is known as the “Bath-tub Curve.” 
(Figure 1.1) is a pictorial representation of this failure process. If a part is substandard, it 
usually fails early in its service life. If not, the part typically has a long and useful life until 
such time that it wears out and fails. The automotive “3 months in service” (3-MIS) metric 
tracks these early failures after the car sale and reflects quality and performance.  
However, 3-MIS data does not include defects found during the assembly process? 




Figure 1.1 – Bath-tub Curve for Product Failure 
 
check points in order for them to make their way to the assembly plant. These defects are 
parts which do not fit properly, fail to function, arrive with incorrect specifications, or are 
poorly designed. This metric (labeled PPM) tracks the automotive failures captured at the 
assembly plant before vehicle incorporation and, likewise, reflects quality and 
performance. Left undiscovered and incorporated into the vehicle, the OEM, at some 
point, will have to deal with the faulty part as a warranty issue and it becomes part of 3-
MIS. The only exceptions are parts that make their way through the warranty period prior 
to failing. At that point, the customer now has liability for the repair cost.  
Any defect type can negatively impact future brand loyalty and the worst is failure after 
warranty expiration (it is now the customer’s money spent to repair the issue – not the 
OEM). Hopefully, the assembly plant discovers these flaws to avoid the down-line 
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warranty cost. However, unless the part has a visible flaw, does not function correctly, or 
does not fit, more times than not, it becomes part of the final product. 
All manufacturing facilities want product failures kept at a minimum. To do this, the OEM 
tracks both supplier defective parts discovered at their plant and culls them from the 
assembly process to prevent a future warranty claim in the early part of vehicle ownership. 
Two defect databases (PPM & 3MIS) are normally maintained by the OEM and used to 
initiate parts containment (more on this later). Data of this type provide warning signals 
of problems and are indicators of suppliers in trouble or in need of assistance. 
These poorly performing suppliers become targeted companies the OEMs must work with 
to improve performance through activities such as supplier development training events 
or supplier site containment. Make the suppliers better and the entire supply chain, the 
OEM, and the end-customer all benefit. If they can’t be improved, the alternative is to cull 
the supplier from the chain and all that is involved with that process (finding, vetting and 
on-boarding a new supplier). Many times, suppliers are so dug-in with the OEM (supplying 
multiple parts) that it is difficult, if not impossible, to “fire” a supplier in favor of an alternate. 
This is especially true when new product-lines are being launched.  
Supplier Quality Management Systems & Methods 
The need for assured quality is one of the reasons that quality standards have become 
so popular. In an automotive environment, Tier 1 suppliers are normally required to 
register to the IATF-16949-2016 Quality Management Standard. In the case of the Tier N 
(N = 2, 3, 4, etc.) suppliers, their standard, in most cases, can be a simpler version – ISO-
9001-2015. New and existing Tier 1 suppliers are audited by the OEM’s quality team and 
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rated against the OEM’s quality management system expectations. Most if not all OEM 
auditors will exclude a supplier from the chain when a quality management system is 
found missing and / or inadequate. The logic underpinning validation of the quality system 
is simple - assure they (the OEM) get parts and material of high quality, on time, every 
time, and, at an agreed cost.  
Assembly plants simply can ill-afford to waste time on poor suppliers and defects. There 
is a simple reason behind this need. Defects in an OEM assembly plant spell bad news. 
The clock is ticking. Defects shut the line down (stopping production) while an effort to 
determine the cause is made. If not a line problem, many times, the source is traced back 
to a supplier. Shutdowns cost millions of dollars in lost revenue every hour. On an 
automotive production line for example, it’s not uncommon to see a vehicle come off the 
line every minute.  
So, loss of one hour’s production at this rate translates to $1,800,000 in revenue for a 
vehicle retailing for $30,000 (a common sales price). This revenue is not recoverable 
assuming the vehicles not made could all be sold. Many times, the lost revenue is 
“charged back” to the supplier who pays for the assembly plant down-time ($30,000 a 
minute). It is easy to understand why quality at the OEM level is so important. Some 
suppliers have gone “bankrupt” dealing with this issue. 
In terms of product or part’s quality, we know, full well, nothing lasts forever. However, 
we also know it should not fail before it rolls off the assembly line or before the customer 
gets it home. Consumers want high quality at the lowest cost possible, whereas the 
producer wants product sold at its highest price for the given quality. These goals are at 
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odds with each other. Somewhere in this continuum lies the quality sweet spot (quality 
and cost). But, just how good is “good enough?” From a review of past disasters in this 
industry, many might agree that it needs to improve. 
Manufacturing’s storied past is littered with multiple and sometimes disastrous failure 
examples. These incidents resulted in loss of life, large monetary expenditures to correct 
the problem, liability suits, and needless wasted time. Most damaging to the OEMs 
financially, we see loss of reputation, loss of brand loyalty, and more importantly, loss of 
the customer’s trust. Once lost, the customer rarely, if ever, comes back. All the customer 
wants is an assurance their hard-earned cash is spent on a product that is safe, reliable, 
easy to use, and aesthetically pleasing. Add to all this the fact that OEMs are compelled 
to “make it right with the customer” or risk losing the customer altogether and you have 
the fundamental concept behind warranty.  
Looking again at the automobile vehicle example, (Figure 1.2) reflects recent warranty 
history over five years (2012 to 2016) as reported by Automotive Weekly. [5] The graph 
in 2016 which was 92.1 million vehicles [6], warranty cost would average between $412.60 
and $521.20 per vehicle in the cost of poor quality. OEMs and suppliers would be relieved 
if this could be lowered. Cars would also be cheaper. 
While the above is an automotive example, many OEMs and assembly plant locations 
experience similar trends. Despite a supplier’s best efforts at getting a part right, supply-
side failures are common. Someone fails to correctly communicate at the right time,  
somebody misses a warning signal or trend suggesting an impending problem, a key 




Figure 1.2 – Total Worldwide Automaker Warranty Claims Paid per Year 
 
and the unthinkable happens. Worse yet, someone becomes so obsessed with supplier 
issues like profit, cost, time, or schedule, that quality does lose focus, and disaster strikes. 
One innocent mistake and the worst imaginable occurs.  
Everyone has heard of Murphy’s law named after an engineer by the name of Edward 
Murphy in the heady days of space exploration at Edward’s Air Force Base in California. 
His basic law was, “If anything can happen, it will!” As a corollary to Murphy’s law, failure 
usually happens at the most inopportune location, in the worst possible way, causing the 
most chaos, and, at the worst possible moment in time.[7]  
For example, consider (Figure 1.2) again. When car manufacturing is at its peak, warranty 
cost is also at its peak. The lowest numbers in this graph were during the period 2012 
and due to the “Great Recession” where car demand was down with better performing 
suppliers having more time to get it right. Fewer automobiles were sold with a greater 
13 
 
emphasis on supply chain quality. Now that the industry is peaking again, we see the 
corresponding rise in warranty costs. As to Quality, producers can easily check to see if 
a supplier has the necessary elements in place to address quality (in other words, do they 
have a quality management system). However, it is more difficult to determine, longer 
term, if a supplier can effectively implement and improve their system to deliver quality. 
Supplier contracts all specify the supplier deliver on their quality promise. Saying “yes” to 
these contractual promises can sometimes be more than the supplier bargained for. If 
suppliers were effective in delivering quality, there would be no defects and every product 
would be just as good as every other product. However, this is not real-world reality. 
Sadly, not all suppliers are created equal. 
A supplier’s true performance can be masked and hidden from the OEM’s view. Suppliers 
can substitute multiple inspections (200 or 300% inspections – that is, inspect parts 2, 3 
or more times) as a way of demonstrating capability. Deming was very direct in the third 
of his 14 points [8] about quality saying quality cannot be inspected into product – it must 
be built in and constitutes the only reasonable way to make parts meeting customer 
expectations.  
As an example, by most industrial standards, companies agree visual inspections are 
only considered 80% effective at finding defects in a manufactured part. (Table 1.1) 
illustrates the futility of visual inspections. Carrying this to the extreme, a simple set of 
calculations suggest that 6-sigma level product defect rates in the 2 to 3 ppm level would 
need seven to eight inspections to achieve acceptable product quality. Each successive 
inspection catches only 80% of the remaining product defects not discovered from the  
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Table 1.1 – Six-Sigma Defect Rate through Inspections (80% effective) 
Inspection Good (ppm) Cumulative (ppm) Suspect (ppm) 
Prior to Inspect  --- --- 1,000,000 
Inspect # 1 800,000 800,000 200,000 
Inspect # 2 160,000 960,000 40,000 
Inspect # 3 32,000 992,000 8,000 
Inspect # 4 6,400 998,400 1,600 
Inspect # 5 1,280 999,680 320 
Inspect # 6 256 999,936 64 
Inspect # 7 52 999,988 12 
Inspect # 8 10 999,998 2 
Basis: Inspect 1,000,000 parts for defects 
prior inspection. Using inspection processes like the above, both the supplier and the 
producer pay the price in labor and warranty cost because the supplier did not choose to 
prevent defects. Multiple inspection processes lead to more warranty and recall as shown 
in (Figure 1.2) above. The bottom line is a decidedly higher cost for finished goods. 
Clearly, this kind of inspection practice is a waste of resources, something the customer 
would never be willing to pay for, and an impossible task for suppliers. Deming was right 
about inspection – quality is not inspected into product – it is built in. Inspection does not 
change the outcome; it only catches some percentage of the mistakes. Deming’s friend, 
Harold Dodge said, “Quality is either there or it is not after the product is made.”  
Producer’s Last Resort – Supplier Site Containment 
Manufacturers have always had a fallback position to advance their agenda for higher-
quality parts, but it is reactive by its very nature. Built into contracts, the OEM has a right 
to place the supplier on what is termed “Supplier Site Containment” (SSC). This action 
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requires product inspections by an external party on the supplier’s premises, and it must 
be completed prior to parts delivery to the OEM plant. “SSC” is expensive and time 
consuming. Getting back into the good graces of the OEM (buyer of parts) can require 
months of effort. It can also foster adversarial relationships between the assembly plant 
and supplier and is not a relationship desired by either side. 
Additionally, after exiting SSC, suppliers can return to containment at a future date either 
with the same or a different defect. The reason is the supplier’s methods were never good 
to start with and never changed because SSC was used to cull the defects and never 
corrected the problem’s cause. Consequently, SSC becomes a reactive process 
mandated by the customer and not welcomed by the supplier. Unless the lessons learned 
from SSC are incorporated into the manufacturing system (making the process better, 
improving inspection, and creating a better predictive model), the supplier will, often 
times, experience a future repeat failure.  
Within most, if not all suppliers, there is a level of product inspection that is part of any 
company’s quality assurance program. While these companies readily admit inspections 
are not value-added (that is, they do nothing to generate product- or part-value), most 
companies have no answer as to how to dispense with them. Workers that conduct 
inspections are highly trained in what to watch for; and, many of them are very 
experienced and capable employees. However, they are human, and mistakes can be 
made that were never intentional. 
As mentioned before, many of these processes are again dependent on checks that are 




Figure 1.3 – Normal Manufacturing Process [9] 
product passes the final quality control check, it is assumed “customer-ready.” (Figure 
1.3) shows a multi-step manufacturing work-cell using raw materials with a quality check 
at the end of parts assembly. The finished product from the line is then packaged, 
warehoused, and shipped based on an OEM delivery schedule. This arrangement is 
typical for most if not all suppliers in the modern production world. Suppliers assume that 
since their product passed a final inspection and was packed, it is “good-to-go.” Any 
defects from that point forward have a very high probability (close to 100%) of not being 
caught until they arrive at the OEM’s assembly plant. If not identified and caught there at 
the assembly plant level, it will be incorporated into the final product.  
Mentioned earlier, defects found at the assembly plant are tracked and reported to the 
supplier immediately for corrective action and at the end of the month as part of their 
monthly scorecard assessment showing the results of the supplier’s parts quality. To the 
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detriment of the OEM assembly plant, defects incorporated into the vehicle show up as 
part of 3MIS assuming the product fails prior to the owner’s warranty expiration. Some 
automotive recalls also occur after warranty expiration if the National Transportation 
Safety Board decides it is a bad or poor design but fairly infrequent compared to the 
number of vehicles produced annually. This defect information comes from the product 
distributor and is also reported on supplier report cards on a monthly basis. 
The OEM quality department can mandate Supplier Site Containment (SSC) as part of 
their rights under their supplier contract using either of these defect histories as 
justification. Infrequently, the supplier may be able to use its own internal staff for SSC 
but, more times than not, the containment activity utilizes an expensive, independent third 
party approved by the OEM. In either case, the supply-chain process has failed to meet 
customer expectations. This added external party inspection corrects the defect problem 
by culling the bad product from the good and allows only good materials to flow to the 
OEM assembly plant. This reactive process does not necessarily correct the supplier 
problem, although, admittedly, it should do so. Corrective action at this point becomes the 
responsibility of the supplier. 
Practically speaking, this constitutes a 200% inspection with the second inspection being 
more rigorous than the supplier’s final check. (Figure 1.4) shows the difference in SSC. 
Comparing (Figure 1.4) to a normal manufacturing cell shown in (Figure 1.3), we see the 
added step labeled SSC inset in the upper right corner of the figure. SSC’s goal should 
be defect discovery and correction. However, assessing root cause and implementing 





Figure 1.4 – Manufacturing Process with SSC [9] 
whatever is necessary to exit mandated SSC as quickly as possible. When SSC is 
considered, the supplier has actually failed on three fronts and must fix three causes for 
a permanent corrective action. The failures are in three distinct areas:  
1. Manufacturing Process Failure – The Process made a defective part. 
2. Inspection Process Failure – Quality Control failed to catch it (escaped). 
3. PFMEA Process Failure – Never Predicted in order to prevent it. 
Not only did the supplier have a process that, for some reason, made a bad part, the 
supplier inspections allowed the product to pass through quality control without capture 
and escaped the plant with the normal product run. To make matters worse, the supplier 
failed to rank the risk of this failure high enough to warrant error proofing that would have 
prevented the failure. In some cases, a failure mode is never included as part of the risk 
assessment, while, in others, the risk has been correctly assessed but it lacked an 
adequate control plan robust enough to prevent recurrence (insufficient action taken). 
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In the end, these three failure modes collude together to cause the defect to leave the 
facility. All three causes must be corrected for “SSC” to be effective in stopping future 
shipments of defective parts to the OEM. Typically, it takes one to three months, to correct 
supplier discrepancies before being allowed to stop “SSC.” Additional failures during the 
SSC period normally resets the clock to zero, meaning the supplier must restart the 
preventive and corrective actions over again.  
It is common for suppliers on “SSC” to experience five to seven figure expenses to satisfy 
the OEM the problem was permanently corrected. This researcher is aware of suppliers 
that have been in containment for over a year. “SSC” can quickly turn a supplier operating 
at a loss into bankruptcy, a marginally profitable company into one running at a loss, or, 
a highly profitable company into one that is marginally profitable. Suppliers experiencing 
“SSC” have an overriding monetary incentive to exit the requirement as soon as possible.  
However, when SSC is done correctly, the causes behind the defects are iteratively 
improved, and the supplier becomes capable of delivering a higher quality part. After 
successful achievement of lower defect rates, the supplier can then be approved for 
release from the containment activity and return to its regular manufacturing activity with 
a more robust process. This proactive approach will always deliver higher quality parts 
for the assembly plant and without ever returning to mandated SSC because the 
supplier’s processes are now much improved.  
Albert Einstein was once said to have defined insanity as: 
   “Doing the same thing over and over again expecting different results.”  [10] 
Einstein was also quoted as saying, 
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“The problems that exist in the world today cannot be solved by the same 
level of thinking that created them.”  [10] 
As SSC has been assembly plant’s fallback position for years, it is still the most common 
action taken by the OEM. However, it is clear that better alternatives are necessary. 
There are two types of action (alternatives) available in supplier intervention: 
1. Direct Intervention - OEM is directly involved with the supplier. 
2. Indirect Intervention - OEM mandates a solution to the supplier. 
An example of a direct intervention includes supplier development training while indirect 
intervention includes activities such as mandated supplier site containment using an 
independent third party. Both are useful but highly dependent on the time frame the OEM 
wishes to employ to create change and the type of change desired. If the assembly plant 
wants a quick-fix, then indirect methods are better. For longer term permanent fixes with 
improved long-term supplier relationships, direct methods are better. This is discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 2 – Literature Search. 
Summary 
Included within this chapter, the reader should realize the importance of the supply chain 
to an OEM and why quality is and will remain such an important issue to manufacturers. 
The high cost of warranty in many manufactured products remains one of the biggest 
opportunities in cost reduction for every company involved in making a product. The 
reader should also be aware of the importance a quality management system makes in 
the creation of value in product manufacture and the poor substitute inspection provides 
for assuring product quality. The reader should also be aware that immediate action, while 
21 
 
necessary, in stopping product failures is not a long-term solution to supply chain defect 
corrections.  
Quality standards mandate permanent corrective measures and assembly plant quality 
departments have limited resources they can use to address supply chain defects. 
Proactive measures become increasingly important as we move into the 21st Century 
where suppliers must accept a larger role in defect detection, correction and prevention. 
If the trend continues that technology and products become more and more sophisticated, 
then suppliers must accept and shoulder a bigger share of the defect prevention burden. 
This need will require OEM (assembly plant) quality teams to be viewed by suppliers as 
an improvement resource rather than an adversary. Supply chains are only as strong as 
the weakest supplier. Intervention starts with the Tier I supplier and moves down the 
chain, creating a more robust supplier at each tier with objectives to lower costs, lower 
defects, and improve product quality and reliability. Direct supplier / customer intervention 
is the answer to defect reduction even though, most suppliers know indirect methods are 
unavoidable when a defect initially occurs.  
The methods currently used by poorly performing suppliers must change to  be more 
proactive. In Chapter 3, the readers will see how prevention, correction, and “SSC” have 
been changed from a “reactive” process to a “proactive” process through supplier 
developmental training. The proactive answer to the problem lies in discovering and 
learning from supplier mistakes made in actual manufacturing, inspection and prediction 
processes. The better the suppliers are at discovery and permanent correction, the more 
robust their processes and products will be. Improved supplier capabilities should result 





























The purpose of this chapter is to include and discuss relevant research on training. Some 
parts of this chapter are responses to questions asked in written exams preceding the 
preparation of this document. Still, others are borrowed from past documents this 
researcher wrote but never published [11] or taken from his capstone project [12] for his 
Master of Science degree. Most of the discoveries are from literature that was read or 
reviewed for purposes of learning more about the educational process and its impact on 
quality. All sections discussed are relevant to defects and quality failures with several 
questions focused on discussions in the opening preface of this manuscript. 
In the enumerable hours spent reading and reviewing journals, books, dissertations, 
capstones, and web-articles written about the effects of training, this researcher came 
away with three immutable facts about training and developing organizational capacity: 
1)   “Competency” rarely (if ever) is created in workers with no training. 
2)   An important key to “world-class” operations is “continuous learning.”  
3) More work is needed in studying long-range statistical results of training.  
The Need for Competency 
It matters not what a company or organization produces. It can be making a part for an 
automotive assembly plant or providing a service. Whether a company ascribes to the 
ISO-9001-2015 or the IATF-16949-2016 quality standard, personnel “competency” is 
most certainly one of the keys to business success. These international standards and 
the standards before them have existed for over half a century and continue to be revised 
as the quality body of knowledge grows.  
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Competency is discussed, stated, and / or directly implied in most of the journals and 
books studied on training impacts. Simply stated, training is critical to job performance 
and there is no substitute for it. At some point, readers should transition from the word 
“training” and migrate toward the word “learning” if competency is the end-goal. A 
company can train all it wants but if the training is not effective, the result is the same as 
if no training were done at all. The ISO-9001-2015 standard [13] speaks clearly to this 
need with four fundamental statements about competency and learning. Paraphrased, 
the standard says the following: 
1) The organization (meaning management) decides what job skills are needed. 
2) The organization will assure these job skill capabilities are provided and will 
evaluate the effectiveness of the employee learning outcomes. 
3) The organization will ensure each employee is “competent” based on either 
training, education or experience to execute those required job skills. 
4) Finally, they will maintain documented training evidence for each employee. 
The more recent IATF-16949-2016 standard [14] provides some supplemental additions 
to the ISO-9001-2015 standard by saying the following: 
1) The organization ascribing to the automotive standard will document their 
training methods starting with quality awareness training and continuing with 
the necessary skill sets effectively taught (learned) to those who directly 
interface with customer quality and requirements. 
2) The organization will train each time when something new or modified occurs 
on the job. The training will be based on the employee’s level of education 
and the complexity of the task being performed.  
3) The employee will be informed of the consequences of their failure in job 
performance which extends beyond management-imposed sanctions of a 
disciplinary nature. Examples might be “increased cost or liability.” 
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When management looks at new employees, temps, or employee job duty changes, it 
benefits the company or organization to teach these individuals what they need to know 
expediently. That’s both a logical and financially sound practice – time is a resource that 
once lost is never recovered. In the real world, the addition of staff or an existing employee 
assuming new duties seems to always occur when there is the least time to learn and get 
the employee ready for the new task or job position.  
This is one of the reasons why so much “On-the-Job Training” is encountered in the 
workplace day-to-day. At the very least, while being taught, the employee is performing 
some level of useful work while they learn. One of the underlying themes found in much 
of the materials this researcher read was the need to make training a “learning event” or 
a “teaching moment in time” between the student and instructor. Without it, the training 
benefit is lost and difficult, if not impossible, to recover. 
To assure competent employees in the workplace, there must be a commitment on the 
part of management to assure training activities are properly undertaken to achieve the 
outcomes desired by the company. And, it never stops. After any training event is 
completed, there is always an opportunity to learn and improve more. This training 
concept in the automotive industry is certainly central to any supplier as it works to 
outperform its competition. It is an unending struggle to achieve quality, speed and cost, 
and, at the same time, do it better than the others. 
A book titled, “The 10 Commandments of Leadership” [15] explains this struggle very 
simply while talking about “The Real Enemy.” The following is a common question and a 
consistent response given during interviews with multiple companies: 
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“ It’s a question we’ve asked business leaders hundreds of times over the past 
several years: 
“What’s the biggest threat your organization faces?” 
By far, the most consistent response we’ve received: 
Competition! 
And while there is validity to that answer, there’s an even greater threat that you 
as a leader, must address – and it does not come from the outside. It’s internal. 
And it goes by many names such as “Business as Usual,” “The Way We Do 
Things,” and “Same Ol’ Same Ol.” Its most common moniker: THE STATUS 
QUO. Its implication – sameness.” 
It is also a common response this researcher has heard to quality audit questions. For 
example, “Well, that is the way we’ve always done it!” or, “If it’s not broke, don’t fix it!” A 
deeper analysis of the above is if “The STATUS QUO” is the real enemy, then “STATUS 
CHANGE” is your real friend or ally. Said another way, organizations must change. If one 
digs to the bottom of change management, one always finds “ employee learning” playing 
an important and crucial role in change – the implementation of new concepts and ideas. 
If an OEM wants better quality and lower product defects, then supplier training and 
change must be foundational to the effort. One cannot make a change improving a 
process or activity without having understanding and a vision of what needs to change. 
World-Class Outcomes from Continuous Learning 
This researcher is convinced learning plays a pivotal role in any organization’s goal of 
becoming “world–class”. While there are several important parameters involved in an 
organization becoming the envy of its competition, for example, leadership, technology, 
corporate vision, workable strategies, and teamwork to name just a few, there is no 
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substitute for employee training, learning, and know how. An organization can buy or 
deploy the very best of all the above but without well-trained employees committed to 
execution of the company’s strategy, it will fail. Regardless of whether the need is for an 
individual, group, or groups within a facility, employees need training when they are 
impacted by work requiring an improvement to a condition or when they must take 
department action to create an altered reality (stated another way – workplace or 
organizational change).  
Workplace change is mostly resisted until workers understand the need (the why) relative 
to how it affects them. Workers can backslide to an older way of doing things if the change 
is not monitored sufficiently until it becomes a part of their new culture. In the real world, 
employees are creatures of habit and change is unwelcome unless the “why” is reinforced 
until it becomes a new habit.  
Training involves some level of change preparation, an intimate knowledge of the new 
process, along with new expectations and requirements. It is a given, that training and 
learning must precede change but be late enough in the change cycle such that the 
learning is not forgotten or lost. It must be planned as part of a larger organizational 
strategy that involves both management and the worker.  
If there is a plan for organizational change, then there must also be a corresponding 
schedule running parallel and ahead of the implementation. It is the experience of this 
researcher in leading real-world operational startups (over 20 of them) that the more the 
operating team knows entering the start-up, the easier the start-up becomes. Training 
needs are defined by department managerial and supervisory staff working in 
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collaboration with their training development managers. The who, what, where, how, and 
when in addition to the “why” must be defined and this information integrated into a master 
plan and executed. Without the right learning outcomes tailored to each employee within 
the organization, an opportunity for failure exists. If a company wants to be “world-class,” 
it should be prepared to embark on a continuous learning cycle for every employee.  
This philosophy does not come without risk. The company could lose the capabilities of 
their best and brightest employees by being hired away by their competition. However, it 
is this researcher’s belief that employees stay with jobs they are passionate about. A job 
that provides them with a living wage, freedom to do their work without fear of making 
mistakes, that allows them to grow and learn for advancement purposes, increased 
benefits, and other intangibles helping them achieve their goals in life is usually something 
most employees stick around for.  
More Statistical Studies needed to Show Training Results 
One of the more interesting findings in the literature search was an apparent lack of 
studies done in testing and validating results of training and learning outcomes such as 
those related to supply chain development. This was a bit surprising in the sense that 
proof of training results should carry a high level of interest within any major corporation, 
and, senior management. There were reams of information about the needs to assure 
learning was effective with such things as pre- and post-tests as described in the 
Kirkpatrick Model. This model also pointed to the need for assessment of learning 
outcomes (Level IV) by comparing them to some level of performance relative to process 
or product deliverables. However, the researcher found little relevant information on 
supply chains at Level IV. If this has been done on some holistic basis, it is not readily 
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available or easily accessed in the research published by the manufacturing sector or 
students working in these sectors. 
The Kirkpatrick model states the student’s perspective of the class (Level I or II) is an 
important part of being able to accurately assess learning outcomes. The training always 
begs a question, “How does the company know the training was an improvement in the 
employ’s capabilities?” Examples of improvement should be increased levels of 
throughput, faster times in completing tasks, or a reduction in bad parts (defects).  
What was found during the literature review were multiple statistical studies where a 
researcher sent a survey form to groups involved with employee training asking a series 
of questions about the training and then statistically analyzing the results. Invariably, the 
statistical outcomes all were pointedly in favor of training, leading to the conclusion it is a 
key component for workplace quality outcomes. The Kirkpatrick model at level four places 
a great deal of emphasis on the need to measure learning outcomes. The ISO and IATF 
standards both require this performance assessment as part of employee competency. 
The biggest question faced by all trainers and teachers is how one can be sure the 
message stuck. How do we assure it becomes so engrained in the employee that they 
follow the change from that point forward and never back-slide to an older way of doing 
things out of convenience? Yes, one can observe the employee to make sure it is done 
correctly, and one can document the observations. A more telling result is knowing the 
training received is followed when the employee is not observed, or, said another way, 
what does the employee do when no one is looking? The only way to know this is to take 
a measurement of a process output not involving employee observations and correlating 
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the results to the training and education each employee received. Only then can one know 
if the training is followed when no one is looking – a permanent culture change. 
Voice of the Customer & Voice of the Process 
There are always two voices in any operational system speaking to management – one 
is the voice of the process while the other is the voice of the customer. The voice of the 
process is usually managed through statistical efforts to measure specific process 
performance and efficiency metrics and, in turn, uses results from this voice to adjust the 
resources consumed, managed or directed for the purpose of quality optimization (some 
would call this fact-based decision making - a Phillip Crosby Principle of Quality).  
Similar, but different, is the voice of the customer. While this voice may or may not include 
statistical studies, it is, nonetheless, an important voice that must also be listened to 
because customers (the final recipients of a product) always have the final say in the 
marketplace. (Figure 2.1 and 2.2) [16] below shows how these voices work in collaboration 
to achieve a product meeting the customer’s expectation and how they can be modified 
through direct supplier intervention. The end customer is not in this picture. (Figure 2.1) 
was originally developed by the “Big Three” in U.S. automotive manufacturing  (Ford, GM, 
and Chrysler). This model has existed since the first publications of the AIAG (Automobile 
Industry Action Group) standards on Statistical Process Control, PFMEA and 8-D. It was 
heavily modified in (Figure 2.2), to reflect the model the researcher is using to validate 
supplier training development’s connection to supplier defects. In (Figure 2.2), the end 
customers are represented in a short chain (the assembly plant to the final customer). As 












processes) are managed to effect and control customer quality. These two feedback 
loops are important to a manufacturer (OEM) or a supplier for it affects long-term 
outcomes (that is, permanent defect correction). In the case of the first figure, the 
customer is the OEM assembly plant – the buyer of supplier goods or services. It can also 
be seen why statistical analysis is not necessarily done attempting to tie downstream 
customer results to supplier development training. Specifically, it is difficult to do, takes a 
great deal of time, and is a step removed from the supply chain. The OEM gets the 
feedback from the end customer. 
For a company that is reactionary to problems, these two voices have little bearing on 
customer quality. The reactionary company’s basic premise is, “If there is a problem with 
the part (assembly plant or vehicle buyer), our customer (the OEM) will let us know and 
we will deal with it!” The classical tool to correct this is normally the SSC (Supplier Site 
Containment) process discussed earlier that did not always result in acceptable OEM Tier 
1 quality afterwards. Reduction in defect rates at assembly (PPM) or at the buying 
customer (3MIS) must be taken seriously by the OEM and the supplier to create change.  
For any suppliers that were listening, the feedback voices should change the nature of 
their processes and systems. If direct supplier intervention training is added (supplier 
development), one additional way has been provided to create further positive impacts 
on the process inputs at the supplier level that does rely on the old ways. This is especially 
true with supplier that lack the necessary knowledge to improve. The supplier now has 
been taught to effectively use improvement tools and their “Voices (Process and 
Customer)” for permanent improvements to processes, inspections and prediction.  
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However, connecting training results to supply chain defect rates is something rarely, if 
ever, done by OEM assembly plants. Defect rates are watched for specific suppliers and 
reported on scorecards and the suppliers are asked to make efforts to improve. This is 
about as far as the steps go for the OEM as their quality teams work harder and harder 
at defect reduction. Without accounting for the Net Present Value (NPV) of money, the 
global warranty costs seem to be getting worse, not better (see Figure 1.2 for details).  
This researcher found no evidence of published research on supply chains. There are 
several factors this researcher believes are an influence to publish their results: 
1) One reason behind this is a push to address individual suppliers. If the OEM can 
change the worst individual suppliers, the longer-range result should improve. 
But that requires a lot of individual one-on-one interventions with each and every 
poorly performing supplier remembering the OEM has limited resources. 
2) It is difficult to connect supply chain defect rates in a meaningful way to supplier 
developmental training. Multiple databases are required, some of which are 
inadequately formatted (designed for other purposes) and some of which the 
assembly plant does not own or have access to when developmental training is 
outsourced to third parties (a fairly common practice).  
3) There is also the factor of “time.” This type of analysis crosses several years of 
time. The data collection itself was as much as 80 to 90% of the effort. It also 
takes time for suppliers to implement what they learned (a year or more), and it 
takes time to analyze and study results (the actual Case Study research spanned 
17 months just to do the investigation of the results). 
4) The actual down-stream defect results (PPM and 3MIS data) has information of 
a proprietary and sensitive nature. This makes sharing information difficult to 
prevent disclosures to competitors.  
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5) Individual suppliers use internal process defect statistics and customer feedback 
(OEM) to govern their employee developmental efforts. The supplier may have 
little to no access to the larger picture – that is, the whole supply chain. They also 
do not always implement the correct developmental training necessary to correct 
the problem. Additionally, the supplier defect root cause(s) can be hidden by 
normal process variation making it difficult to extract information from their data. 
6) It is not uncommon for different assembly plants or home office departments to 
manage and keep data needed for this type of assessment (for example, data 
analysts manage supplier scorecards while the Supplier Quality Department 
manages supplier quality databases. Sales mandate the quality goals and OEM 
quality assurance is responsible for achieving them. This type of effort is starting 
to become important in manufacturing circles and the subject of organizational 
“data mining” and / or the analysis of “Big Data.” This type of work is still in its 
infancy with many companies and, for others, not even started. 
7) Many producers have not considered how to conduct such an analysis, or, 
dismissed it as too difficult. Simply said, a lot of time is involved with no guarantees 
of meaningful information extracted from the databases.  
8) With the voice of the process and customer not having formal methods in many 
supplier companies, direct involvement by the OEM produces mixed results. 
The research completed in this dissertation will position others to be able to explore the 
training impacts on their portion of the larger supply chain and help to answer the over-
arching question of developmental training’s impact on supplier quality.  
“Over-Training” & Negative Impacts on Suppliers 
Acknowledgement is appropriate to one of my faculty committee members (Dr. James 
Simonton) for asking some questions that forced a look at the other side of training and 
consideration of issues that were not all positive. A few of them are listed below:  
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1. Is there such a thing as “over-training”? 
2. What are the experts’ experiences with training needs? 
3. Are there any key takeaways every learning organization should know about?  
These are interesting questions managers wrestle with every day. Surprisingly, an article 
on training, “The Disadvantages of Over-Training in the Workplace,” [17] spent little time 
discussing training negatives. Rather, it spent most of the time talking about positives. 
Reading about and considering the  above questions leads one to seriously ponder just 
how much training is enough? When do we stop? Or, do we ever stop?  
Without doubt, good training is foundational to a competent and happy employee in the 
workplace. One of the reasons why many employees leave companies is poor training 
experiences. Most managers and leaders agree a capable, trained employee, working in 
a good environment, with enough freedom, without fear, will, more times than not, provide 
excellent performance results.  
As a case in point, this researcher once heard the owner of PAL’S Sudden Service speak 
about his interaction with a group of managers concerning how his privately-owned 
company won the National Malcolm Baldrige Quality Award. The Baldrige Award is an 
award given yearly to U.S. based companies that provide excellent customer quality or 
service. It was named after an employee (Malcolm Baldrige) who worked for the U.S. 
Department of Commerce who was an avid quality supporter.  
PALS is a small, fast food chain in northeast Tennessee serving hamburgers and 
hotdogs. PALS Sudden Service won this national award not once, but twice, in different 
years. Pal’s owner was speaking to a group of business managers about his business 
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success. These managers were considering a future application for the award. The owner 
had finished his presentation to his visitors and asked for questions.  
One of the managers present in the audience asked him,  
“So, what is the secret to your success?”  
Without hesitation, Pal’s owner said,  
“Well, I do a lot of training for my employees. I train all my employees on every 
job in my stores using standard work instructions. I even train the floor employees 
on how to do their boss’s job.”  
That seemed a good answer, pointing to training as a centerpiece for success and 
the importance of understanding work above and below one’s pay grade. Another 
manager in the back, not to be outdone, asked a follow-up question which was, in 
many ways, in opposition to this level of training. He asked the following:  
“OK then, what happens if the employee is trained on all these jobs and then 
decides, for some reason, to leave? You’ve lost all your investment!”  
Pal’s owner said he considered the question a few moments and then answered,  
“That’s a good question. I will answer it with another question to you. What 
happens if I don’t train the employee and, for some reason, that person decides 
to stay?”  
It was a memorable answer provided in defense of training and its impact on business 
performance. The story hammers home the fact all companies must train. However, the 
question of “Can there be too much training?” remains. Also, what is the difference 
between training and learning? In any learning environment, there is the teacher and the 
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student. So, what is the difference between the two? One delivers and the other receives 
– it’s that simple. 
One of the best answers to this question on learning outcomes was found in a book titled 
The Leader of the Future. [18] The section of the book was titled, “Working Through 
Others.” The quote tells us exactly what the difference is: 
“Teachers, particularly the best teachers, understand that teaching and learning 
are two different and, believe it or not, empirically disconnected processes. By 
different processes I mean that teaching is something the instructor does, 
learning is something the students do. By empirically disconnected I mean that 
the evidence shows that there is no relationship between the quality of the 
instruction, as measured for instance by instructor ratings and the amount the 
student learns, as measured for instance by performance on standardized tests. 
In a similar fashion, leaders only lead successfully when others follow – leading 
is an activity that the leader does, but it amounts to nothing if others [the followers] 
aren’t motivated and convinced about what they themselves need to do.” 
Although the book used teaching and learning as an example to connect leaders to the 
ones who are led, we can make a similar analogy about learners. Learners must also be 
motivated. The instructor can be “world-class”, the venue top-tier, and the material first 
class; but, if the student is not motivated to accept the teaching, nothing is delivered or 
understood, and the teacher’s voice goes unheeded.  
In the case of supplier training, both student comprehension, the instruction quality and 
environment should all be measured as mentioned in the Kirkpatrick Model (discussed 
later). If there are high marks in all these categories, this is an excellent indication 
(evidence) both teacher and student were motivated, and the student left the session with 
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understanding and the instructor did his or her job teaching. This point is very important 
to the learning process. A student cannot implement what he or she never understood. 
That said, information learned must still be implemented to be effective. The question 
remaining after training and education completion is, “Was it implemented on the factory 
floor after the student returned to the workplace?” What does the student do after the 
teacher is gone and management is not looking? To the researcher’s way of thinking 
there are at least two methods to assess effective implementation in a supply chain: 
1) Assess (audit) the supplier and identify visible signs of implementation. 
2) Look for signs of defect reduction in supply chain performance. 
Quality Expert’s Experience with Training Needs 
Quality expert Edwards Deming, a quality and training authority, had far more experience 
with training than most. In his 90’s, he was still teaching, and thousands attended his 
lectures and seminars. A statement in one of his books titled, “The New Economics for 
Industry, Government and Education,” [19] said,  
“Experience by itself teaches nothing......Without theory, experience has no 
meaning. Without theory, one has no questions to ask. Hence, without theory, 
there is no learning.”   
There is a cognitive connection between theory and learning (not training) and it must 
include the “what and how” for a job and, the “theory” or “why” behind it. As an elementary 
student in school, we rarely questioned a teacher’s authority and the “why” never seemed 
a big or important issue – it just was because the teacher said so.  
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As young children, learning was less concerned with the “why” behind a basic piece of 
information and more about what or how. Early school years contain a lot of factual 
learning and memorization. As a case in point, consider how we learned the basic math 
skills of addition, subtraction, multiplication and division. It was through memorization. 
This style of teaching works for a while until the student gets older and, then, it stops. As 
we reach the age of reason, a student starts to ask “why” something works. Just providing 
the “what” is no longer enough.  
At some point in all our lives, a transition occurs from accepting what we are told to 
suddenly possessing an inquiring-mind, wanting to know “why”. And, it stays that way for 
the rest of our lives. We become suspicious of anything not containing a proper 
explanation. Consequently, employees need not only the “what and how” but the “why” 
behind what they do in order to grow, develop, and be productive. 
Key Takeaways every Organization should Consider 
As managers, we might argue about training retention (learning), even discuss student 
aptitude, do research on past educational student experiences, or, explore the business 
culture / environment in which the student is employed and trained. All these impact 
learning. We can argue costs, tangible benefits, or, if the juice is worth the squeeze. We 
might even question when and where to stop.  
Good managers, no exceptions, will not spend money when a payback is not evident or 
clearly understood. We would all agree; do not train if there is zero benefit seen by either 
the student or management. Knowledge imparted builds organizational capacity and the 
capability of the trained individual to accept larger roles. The knowledge transferred or 
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taught has some key ingredients to it. From a book titled “The Rational Manager,” [20] a 
quote describes these key ingredients: 
“….. Furthermore, no matter how much effort is expended on learning, managers 
[or workers] cannot carry useful knowledge and increased skill from any [learning] 
experience unless it provides them [the learner] with the three essentials of 
learning – new ideas, practice in using them, and feedback on the results….” 
Still another book, “The Theory and Practice of Training” [21] discusses training and the 
importance of becoming a learning organization. It’s about turning “lessons learned” by 
the organization and individuals into knowledge that is used for the benefit of the 
organization allowing it to grow and, ultimately, to become “world-class.”  Written in 2009, 
the opening paragraph of the introduction states what all of industry knows to be true: 
“As we approach the second decade of the 21st century, change remains an 
enduring theme. In order to survive and prosper, organizations in the private and 
the public sectors will need to respond in a timely and flexible way to social, 
technological, economic and political change. This means that an organization’s 
survival and growth will depend on its ability to cope with the external and the 
internal requirements that these changes will demand. This implies that existing 
and new staff will need to acquire new knowledge, skills, attitudes and 
perspectives on a continual basis.” 
The book continued by linking the importance of training and learning to employee 
development. Corporate and organizational training departments must stay current with 
the times with new strategies and techniques in experiential learning. Advancements in 
training technologies are moving as fast as manufacturing technology is in most fields. 
The book described trainers as the “agents for change.” Chapter 1 of the book defines 
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what a learning organization is and gives the reader an idea of what it will take to develop 
people. 
“ …… At the individual level, learning is the process whereby knowledge, skills, 
and attitudes are acquired through experience, reflection, study or instruction. 
Development refers to the general enhancement and growth of these [individuals] 
through conscious and unconscious learning. …….. should help to improve and 
enhance an individual’s competence and potential.” 
These quotes are very relevant to the strategy undertaken for the Case Study involving 
direct supplier intervention in this dissertation. There must be a foreseen need for supplier 
development, a collaboration with others to develop quality training programs to address 
these specific supplier needs, and a ready-made student base – supplier professionals 
willing to learn. The training must be well received as evidenced of pre- and post-training 
results and evaluations. The only unanswered question still is validation of the training 
results – is it (the training) making a difference and at what level?  
Managing Variation in Workplace Manufacture 
This short book Understanding Variation – The Key to Managing Chaos [22] was written 
for business managers unschooled in statistics and presents some fundamental 
perspectives on data and its conversion to information in order to run a business. In the 
book, the author describes the conversion of data into information as a process – a 
“transformation” (in his words) or the analysis of inputs (data) and the conversion of the 
inputs into outputs (information).  
In the book the author talks about specifications being described as  the “Voice of the 
Customer” and variation of processes or systems being called the “Voice of the Process.” 
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The book offers a manager a basic understanding of when to be concerned about “special 
cause” variation and when the process is just exhibiting normal variation as part of the 
process design (sometimes known as signal noise). Normal variation can even hide 
special cause variation if the signal noise is large enough. 
Normal variation can’t be meaningfully changed through process adjustments, policy 
changes or asking a worker to try harder. Deming called this “tampering.” Both voices 
(customer and process) are important to understanding and making improvements to any 
system. Humorously, the author notes three ways to meet targets set before a 
professional and two of them are useless: 
1. Work to improve the system (understand underlying causes and get better) 
2. Distort the system (blame/change the system in hopes of improvement) 
3. Distort the data (misrepresent performance to show false improvement)  
Obviously, the latter two are not desired and working to improve the system the correct 
choice. The author imparts the need for understanding both voices to give the manager 
a starting place to create meaningful improvements relative to a manufacturing system. 
These are basic statistical tools that can see beyond the data and provide information on 
process performance. In many ways, this book validates the “Big Three” model shown in 
(Figure 2.1).  
However, it does not discuss beyond specific company levels how to measure 
performance at an enterprise or supply-chain level. The book does discuss at great length 
the need for business metrics to monitor quality performance. 
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The author also notes the importance of using graphical tools such as process behavior 
charts (histograms, flow charts, Cause & Effect Diagrams, Pareto graphs, etc.) to gain 
critical insight that might otherwise be lost by simply looking at numbers. Presenting data 
in an enlightening and revealing way is noted by the author as one of the keys to continual 
improvement.  
Another noted quality expert (Phillip Crosby) wrote about his eight principles of quality 
management. Over the years, refinement left him with only seven as two were combined. 
These principles are incorporated into current and past ISO standards and still are pillars 
upon which the quality standards are built upon. One of them is “FACT BASED DECISION 
MAKING” and holds true to the theme of this book on variation. Facts are important in the 
guidance of any effort to make a change. In the end, figuring out what to work on is just 
as important as being aware there is something that needs to be worked on.   
The Juran Institute – Research on the Cost of Poor Quality  
This article [23] was found on the Internet several years ago and published by the Juran 
Institute promoting a better understanding of the Cost of Quality. According to the author’s 
article (De Feo 2005) and from Dr. Juran’s 1st edition of his Quality Control Handbook, 
Juran refers to the cost of poor quality as the “gold in the mine.” Within the quality 
management domain, Juran links continual improvement to poor costs of quality and 
discusses the approach to continual improvement. The article speaks about realizing the 
financial rewards associated with addressing improvement opportunities found through 
improved cost of quality metrics (cost measurements). This article fits nicely with the need 
for process and system metrics to measure performance discussed previously. 
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Within the article, it said American companies were lacking in their ability to develop 
performance metrics involved with cost of quality (Voice of the Process). This statement 
implies more is needed in this area – for example, things such as connecting the training 
results to cost of quality and / or defect rates. The article cites a survey of American 
companies that revealed only about four companies in ten (40%) claim to have any sort 
of quality cost system in place. Phillip Crosby stated in his experience with industry, he 
had never found a company that got “the cost of quality right.” 
The De Feo article cites other surveys that indicate while companies are aware of the 
importance of quality management and mathematical tools like six-sigma, far fewer of 
them practice the principles and techniques they offer. For a large OEM, they may have 
a metric they watch such as defect rates but digging into why these overall rates go up or 
down is a difficult, if not an impossible, task considering the size of most supply chains. 
There are many variables at play.  
If more companies were connected to the need for supplier development, and, many are 
beginning to realize its importance, there would be fewer major mistakes made in the 
manufacturing industry. This is one of the significant driving forces behind supplier 
development initiatives. There is an increased emphasis on stopping a basic reactionary 
approach to supply chain problems and proactively doing something different (that is, 
changing the level of thinking that Einstein spoke of). 
Further, the article speaks to another disparity in cost of poor quality – cost as a 
percentage of sales. Varied opinions exist on what this number is. When organizations 
were asked about quality costs, they admit that it does cost them something, usually 
45 
 
somewhere around five to seven percent of sales – a significant number in itself. Based 
on ten million dollars in sales, that equates to in excess of $500,000 annually. However, 
the Juran Institute thinks the cost is more likely around twenty to thirty percent of sales 
producing a significant gap between the two numbers. So, which is correct?  
Considering the size of warranty and recall (Figure 1.2) in the automotive area which is 
somewhere in the 48-billion-dollar range and the world automotive industry output being 
approximately 80 million cars in 2016, some math on warranty cost indicates the defect 
rate cost is somewhere in the 3% range assuming a typical car cost is $30,000. But this 
excludes hidden costs – things such as liability suits, customer loyalty losses, recalls, etc. 
Consequently, the cost of quality must be higher than 3%. 
The difference in these numbers is explained in that manufacturers do little in cost of 
quality aside from measuring scrap and defect rates from operations and the amount of 
rework involved with off-specification product, and their direct warranty costs. They may 
even include the cost of their quality inspections and their quality department as part of 
the cost. However, the Juran Institute’s view of poor cost of quality is deeper than that. 
Very similar to an iceberg floating in the ocean – only 15% floats above the water line.  
Consequently, the stuff below the water-line can be quite substantial – that is, as much 
as six times the visible costs. Multiplying this 3% by six and the number gets appallingly 
large. An actual cost of as much as 18% of sales would not be surprising at all. (Figure 
2.3) [24] demonstrates this condition in industry very nicely. Juran referred to this cost of 
poor quality as the “hidden factory” and that to produce everything perfectly, the company 
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expiration and the fact it is normally excluded from the cost of quality calculations because 
the customer foots the bill. However, it is cost, and it affects the customer’s opinion of the 
company the purchase was made from (brand loyalty). They may or may not buy another 
piece of product based on that opinion. Juran was concerned less with the differences in 
the numbers than he was with the company’s leadership failing to do anything about it – 
chalking it to the “cost of doing business” – maintaining the “status quo” or, “that’s the way 
it has always been done.” It appears Juran may have been correct in his assessment.  
In a quote from his interview with Juran, De Feo [25] put the issue into perspective: 
“By probing deeper into the cost of poor quality, a company can realize that it 
should allocate its resources to the prevention of a defective product, not to its 
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repair or rework. Empirical research supports this concept. In 1994, a study by 
Shank and Govindrajan showed that when companies spend a majority of their 
quality expenses on failure costs [Reactive], their total cost of poor quality is 
around twenty-five percent of sales. However, when companies spend a 
majority on prevention costs [Proactive], their total cost of poor quality is only 
around five percent of sales.”  
This is a three to five-fold reduction in cost of quality and worthy of pursuit by any company 
with a large cost of quality. Juran promoted analysis and the presentation of cost of quality 
metrics, not in defect rates, rework, or scrap rates but in the language of money. Therein, 
lies the opportunity to get a senior manager’s attention to solve bigger and more serious 
problems. Juran likened it to peeling away the layers of an onion – each time one layer is 
removed, the cost of quality improved but there was always another layer hidden just 
underneath pointing to further improvement work. Thus, we have the concept of “continual 
improvement.” To be world-class at continual improvement requires a talented and 
trained workforce and this level of competence is not achieved without some serious 
workforce training and learning. 
Questions Every Company Should Know the Answer To 
The book Developing Effective Engineering Leadership [26] is filled with stories of both 
business mistakes and successes, results related to proper training, education and 
learning plus the need to create a world-class organizational learning culture. One of the 
clearest explanations this researcher has found on the need for training was near the end 
of the book. The author notes three things – the what, the how, and why behind any 
change as the keys to effective learning: 
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“ ….. What the employee does, how they do it, and why they do it to produce a 
product are probably the most important questions and answers ever provided 
by the Company. These are the things that not only make the very culture upon 
which this Company will be built, but the reasons why the customer comes for 
the product and continues to come back over and over again. Knowing this 
baseline allows us to understand where we have been, and what we are doing to 
change the process, as we discover the need for change, hopefully for the 
better….” 
This thinking process dove-tails nicely with the Kirkpatrick model and other articles read about 
training, continuous learning and the need for measuring cost of quality.  
Kirkpatrick’s Four-Level Model for Training & Discussion 
After reading about the Kirkpatrick model [27], it was surprising to learn the first three steps 
(reaction, learning, & knowledge transfer) was a 60-year old evaluation process many 
trainers are actively engaged in. This methodology (Levels I, II, & III) is incorporated by 
our work center where this researcher is employed and used in all its training efforts. 
Results and examples are provided in this paper in Chapter 5. The results are reported 
on training oriented toward individual suppliers, and, not towards the overall supply chain 
performance which is the focus of this paper.  
No training model is of value unless it produces results in some form that is measurable. 
In the article on the Kirkpatrick Model, Level IV results were discussed in that they should 
provide individual performance improvements and thus change company performance. 
However, the article was not specific on how to complete this at an enterprise level or for 
the supply chain. Discussion centered on sales improvement as an example, but this 
researcher thinks the metric of choice should be closer to the supplier. There is a reason 
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behind this thinking which is discussed later but centers on the variables at play in most 
customer sales models. 
Level 1 – Trainee Reaction 
Reaction is an evaluation of student response to the material delivered. This has been a 
normal part of every class taught by the University of Tennessee Center for Industrial 
Services (UT CIS). Our training evaluation form asks the trainee to answer four basic 
questions for reactions provided by the student relative to the training they received: 
• Question: Did the student enjoy and participate in the class? 
• Question: Did the presenter do a good job in presenting the material? 
• Question: Did the registration process and food meet with expectations? 
• Question: Was presenter knowledgeable and did they keep class on-track? 
The reaction questions are based on a Likert scale (1 to 5) with “1” being worst and “5” 
being best.  After each class, the instructor asks for a training evaluation. While some fail 
to submit an evaluation, the number that do submit is 95% or higher. The scores routinely 
average between 4.5 and 5.0 for all classes delivered. Admittedly, the evaluation is 
subjective, but the method is blind, so the student can be openly honest on the evaluation. 
The instructor and the Center use this feedback to improve what is presented, how it is 
presented, and for reporting on performance to our customers (for example – the OEM).  
Level 2 – Trainee Learning  
For the Case Study, this is also a metric measured. Trainee learning is accomplished 
through use of a pre-and post-test given to each student. Certification for the student in 
terms of the body of knowledge taught is demonstrated by a minimum score of “70” for 
their post-test and certificate. The pre-test is the first activity completed by the instructor 
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before the class is started and before any material is presented. The student is without 
access to any materials to gauge their current body of knowledge. At the end of the class, 
an open book, open note post-test is administered to measure the increase in body of 
knowledge. The norm has remained unchanged for all the classes offered. Starting class 
average is in the high 60’s / low 70’s with a post-class average in the mid 90’s. It is not 
uncommon to have multiple students with post-class tests scores of 100%. The median 
and mode normally range from 92 to 95%. 
Examples of Case Study results (Level I & Level II) are shown as part of Chapter 5 
Results. The examples provided are but one of many classes with consistent results in 
terms of class performance. Total number of students in the class assessment in Chapter 
5 was 48 students reporting on our class evaluation form dated January 12, 2016 and is 
typical of results over the years. The reasons these are offered is to show to the reader, 
that the materials, the instructor and student acceptance and learning were all excellent 
feedback on the training. 
Level 3 – Trainee Behavior 
This level is weaker in its ability to gauge trainees in terms of changed behavior but still 
a part of the effort, nonetheless. Obviously, efforts at changing habit or behavior (culture, 
if you will) cannot be fully assured by this last training action. While final exam grading is 
underway (usually around 20 minutes), the students are engaged in a discussion about 
what will change in their organization once they get back to the office.  
They are asked what they will 10tell their supervisors and managers about key class 
takeaways and what they plan to do differently upon return to their plant. One of this 
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researcher’s more memorable moments was about a statement driven home repeatedly 
in all the classes. When we met at his plant sometime after the class was completed, this 
researcher asked if he remembered materials from the classes he attended.  
He saluted me (he was ex-military) and said, “Cross-functional teams, Sir!”  
We all had a good laugh but one of the points driven home was the need for cross-
functional teams in preparation of a PFMEA, root cause analysis (part of 8-D) and the 
holistic containment process the OEM wanted implemented.  Most students talked about 
the work that was in front of them when they returned to their jobs in terms of 
implementing what was learned and the fact that their current systems were lacking on 
many fronts.  Several remarked in their evaluations that they had never had the materials 
presented in a way that showed and demonstrated its true importance. 
While there are no guarantees students ever put anything into practice, implementation 
should become evident over time if they did. To determine whether these companies 
integrated their learning into the supplier’s day-to-day business efforts, a measurement 
must be taken. Over time, the OEM should see a return on this investment in terms of 
reductions in defects and, longer range, reductions in warranty cost from those drops in 
defect rates.  
This dissertation research Case Study explored the results from two supplier databases 
to discover whether there was a statistical correlation in performance results (supplier 
defect reduction) after being trained. Longer term, the OEM’s efforts could be further 
improved by a supplier survey at a point after the training (six to twelve months) to see if 
the company implemented the class information.  
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This assumes suppliers are truthful with themselves and with the survey. The only sure 
way to know with certainty, without a study connecting defects to learning, is some type 
of follow-up audit of the supplier’s management system to determine if the learning was 
integrated into the company’s day-to-day business culture. These two actions (survey or 
audit) would be improvements over the existing model and of significant benefit. It 
provides a way of assuring implementation because the supplier would be aware this 
activity will be a required “down-the-road” element encouraging an increased level of 
implementation. 
Level 4 – Trainee / Company Results 
It is simple to develop a new customer if the product is appealing and at the right price. 
Already stated, the difficult part is in keeping them. Loyalty is harder to keep and maintain 
than it is in acquiring it. Quality is at the core of this issue. Measuring this final level 
(results) was one the OEM had not done in terms of supplier training impacts on defect 
reductions. In some respects, the data collected on defects from the two databases is a 
measure of Level IV results but disconnected from the learning activity. If the number of 
defects drop and there are no correlations to the supplier development training, other 
initiatives could just as easily claim an improvement role. The proposed statistical study 
should see statistical results if there are any. 
To know if the training was meaningful is a statistical model and test of the hypothesis 
that it is not an improvement. If the results are statistically different, it will support the 
decision to reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative that the training is making 
a meaningful change. This is the issue this research addressed. Additionally, it provides 
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a repeatable mechanism any OEM or Tier N supplier can use to gauge developmental 
training in their future.  
In the article by Kirkpatrick, he suggested measuring company sales trends to see if 
training was effective. One can have excellent quality and still have poor or slow sales for 
a variety of reasons (economy for example or pricing) and the results have nothing to do 
with supplier developmental training. A better metric with which to measure and compare 
must be an output closer to the assembly plant and, better yet, prior to the customer sale. 
That metric is supplier defects (discovered by the OEM prior to assembly). Sales trends 
are really a mixture of new and old customers and, though meaningful, the trend is over 
a long duration of time (a decade or more). This research project provides a meaningful 
result (validating the training or not) in less time. If there is no correlation, the implication 
will be that the OEM needs to change some facet of the training or the training process 
to assure learning is more vigorously implemented.  
Public Utilities versus Manufacturing Sector  
This dissertation titled The Nature and Extent of Formal In-plant Skills and Technical 
Training in Selected Public Utility and Manufacturing Companies in the United States [28] 
was a statistically reviewed survey of industry and public utilities relative to the importance 
of training within their respective organizations. The researcher in the above document 
was looking for differences between utilities and manufacturing facilities gleaned from 
85+ mailout surveys related to organizations with greater than 500 employees.  
The researcher looked for statistically meaningful differences between training within the 
following areas:  
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• Investment in training 
• Factors affecting training decisions 
• Cost of training per hour per employee 
• Total number of trainees and man-hours of training 
• Training methods and techniques  
• Location of training facilities 
• Linkages to public education 
• Number of instructors  
• Types of government training support utilized by companies 
One of the author’s more interesting discussion points was a short paragraph related to 
resource development. In it, the author said something relevant to supplier development 
training: 
“….Of particular importance in the concept of human resource development is 
the notion that employee training focuses on the job while employee education 
and development focus on the individual and the organization, respectively….”  
While the statement may seem a bit confusing at first reading, the author connected job-
specific training (for example OJT) with individual resource education relative to doing the 
actual work. The development training prepares individuals for the future and enhances 
the company’s capability by “taking the employee to another level.” For example, an 
engineer attends on-line classes after work to get a degree in business management or 
engineering as future preparation for bringing added value to his / her company.  
While there were reasons this statement was made due to the nature and focus of the 
specific research, my research Case Study did not attempt to distinguish between the two 
types. My research on automotive defects, by the above author’s definition, would be both 
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individual resource, supplier development, and company capability enhancement. The 
students, upon returning to their manufacturing facility, should implement these new skills 
in the day-to-day performance of their work and improve the operational outputs of their 
business (see Figure 2.2 above).  
Some of the author’s findings were relevant to this paper’s research on defect reduction: 
1) Over 90% of responding companies stated there would be a greater 
emphasis and demand for skills and technical training in the next 10 years. 
2) 80% of the responding companies reported the training instructors at their 
facility were responsible for other duties like production, supervision and 
management, safety, engineering and quality control.  
3) Utilities and Manufacturing differed in two areas: 
a. Increasing stability of employment was more important to the 
manufacturing sector than it was the utility sector. 
b. Improvements to work environment safety was more important to the 
utility sector than it was the manufacturing sector. 
 
Focusing on an Employee’s Strengths to Leverage Improvement 
This book, Strengths-Based Leadership, [29] focused on studying the results of over 
20,000 in-depth interviews with senior leaders, involved more than 1,000,000 work teams, 
and 50 years of Gallop polls on the most admired leaders. Included in this study were 
interviews with 10,000 subordinates trying to understand why leaders were followed.  One 
of three key finding in the introduction is relevant to this research paper: 
“The most effective leaders are always investing in strengths. In the workplace, 
when an organization’s leadership fails to focus on individual strengths, the odds 
of an employee being engaged are a dismal 1 in 11 [9%]. But when an 
organization’s leadership focuses on the strength of the employees, the odds 
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soar to almost 3 in 4 [73%]. So, this means when leaders focus on and invest in 
their employee strengths, the odds of each person being engaged goes up eight-
fold….” 
Clearly, individual learning must be preceded by identification of employee strengths and 
playing to those strengths before the teaching / learning cycle is initiated. The paragraph 
ends stating that it not only benefits the company but the employee’s well-being and 
quality of life (providing reasons for the employee to stick around and continue work for 
the company).  
As an example, it would be an unwise attempting to teach differential calculus to a student 
with no background in algebra or geometry due to their lack of necessary skills in 
advanced mathematical topics. However, it would be acceptable to teach the finer points 
of rocket engine design to an aeronautical engineer that has the necessary strengths to 
understand what is being taught. 
Training Development Mistakes 
Juran, in his book Quality Planning & Analysis for Enterprise Quality, [30] made a 
statement saying, “extensive training” was essential to a “broad quality program.” He went 
on to give four reasons why he thought training failures occurred based on his own 
experience. The following is an excerpt from his book: 
1) “Failure to provide training when it will be used.” 
2) “Lack of participation by line managers in designing training.” 
3) “Reliance on the lecture method of training.” 
4) “Poor communication during training.” 
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He explained that too many employers provide the training at their convenience rather 
than the point in time when it is needed. When the time comes for its use, the material 
the student learned is not fresh. The opportunity to apply learning immediately is a great 
way to reinforce and make permanent the training one receives. An example of this could 
include experiential learning during the class – TWI (training within industry) teaches this 
way and so does the Center for Industrial Services that taught the representatives 
assessed in this Case Study. 
Lack of involvement of line managers in training development can leave holes or gaps in 
the training. Much of what people do on a manufacturing line is performance based and 
quality expectations are high. Training design must include line supervisor input to 
prevent important details being left out leading to the potential for employee failure. 
Already mentioned in this paper was the importance of experiential training where not 
only does the employee learn the skill but, where possible, gets the chance to apply it in 
the classroom or work setting and receive feedback on the results.  
Still another book (Kouzes & Posner, 2006) [31] titled “A Leader’s Legacy” has another 
twist concerning the best way to learn. In this book, there was a quote from Peter Drucker. 
Tom Peters, the co-author of “In Search of Excellence,” called Drucker “the creator 
and inventor of modern management.” [32]  
Kouzes and Posner’s book contained this quote from Drucker: 
“People learn the most by teaching others.” 
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A Tried and True Method for Teaching and Learning 
In the book, “Running Today’s Factory”– Lean Manufacturing Overview, [33]  the author 
stated lean training in the United States had its real beginnings with Henry Ford who saw 
cycle time and waste elimination as important improvement elements in manufacturing. 
Ford talked about the ability of his plants to transform iron ore into a car in as little as 81 
hours. The book contained quotes that are relevant to this research paper: 
“The similarities between lean manufacturing and the early Ford system “are so 
impressive that Henry Ford may honestly be considered a pioneer in JIT [Just in 
Time] systems” [Wilson 1996: 30].” 
This statement was followed by a short discussion (2 to 3 paragraphs) on an American 
training process invented by the U.S. Military during WWII called TWI (Training Within 
Industry). TWI job methods include standardized work processes, waste elimination, 
location of tools at points of use, using gravity-fed hoppers, and drop-delivery chutes, with 
the element of continual improvement (all lean principles). The relevant information in the 
book for this research paper were two paragraphs about the methods used to train women 
during WWII with the “manpower” shortage in factories making equipment and supplies 
for the war fighters and its ultimate transition into the Japanese culture after the war was 
over.  
“There were 1.7 million American supervisors from more than 16,000 plants 
trained and certified in the TWI program. These supervisors, in turn, trained over 
10 million factory workers. Almost 90% of the participating companies achieved 
at least a 25% improvement in production and labor efficiency. In 1945, the TWI 




“ ….. In 1945 there was a different crisis in Japan. Japan’s industrial activity had 
been reduced to less than 1/10th of its pre-war level, and the economic base had 
been devastated…… As part of the assistance provided by the Occupational 
forces, TWI was introduced. By 1951 the Allies were relying on textiles, metals, 
and auto industries for supplies during the Korean War…… The following year 
[1952] there were over 1,000,000 certified Japanese supervisors……. In 1990, 
the program was still active with nineteen training organizations licensed by the 
Japanese Ministry of Labor.” 
A quick check of the internet indicates TWI is still very much a part of Japanese 
manufacturing culture in 2019 and ongoing. It is closely tied to the principles of lean 
manufacturing and foundational to a different manufacturing approach. Most people know 
it today as the Toyota Production System (TPS) or some variation of it by other names. 
Though TPS is uniquely Japanese, it has several core principles developed following 
WWII which were integrated into TPS for product quality (one of which was TWI). 
How do we Learn – the Stepwise Process 
The book “Techonomics: The Theory of Industrial Evolution” [34] contained a section on 
the concept of learning that is applicable to anyone working to acquire a skill or improve 
individual or organizational capabilities. This concept is shown in (Figure 2.4) – The Cycle 
of Learning. Within this drawing, the levels of competency and awareness are compared 
on four levels of skill mastery: 
1) Ignorance of skill   3) Proficiency with skill 
2) Awareness of skill   4) Mastery of skill 
As the figure shows, mastery of a skill is the ability to perform competently on an 
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Figure 2.4 – The Cycle of Learning 
about it on a conscious level and having not only the technical skill portion but also the 
experience to go with it. This person should be capable of teaching others. 
The Importance of Avoiding Dysfunctional Systems 
There are some additional takeaways from a book, “We Don’t Make Widgets” – 
Overcoming the Myths that Keep Government from Radically Improving. [35] These 
concepts were statements on change and change management that should be a part of 
every learning experience: 
1) Making a change does not mean you somehow made an improvement. Never 
confuse the two. 
2) Mistakes lead to blame; blame leads to “cover your rear;” “cover your rear” leads 
to the dark side. Honest mistakes are not to be hidden but learned from. 
3) Behind every process problem is usually a “policy” problem. Deming’s stated most 
























a. Who selected the process to be used?  A: Management 
b. Who decided on the process steps?  A: Management 
c. Who approved the process design?  A: Management 
d. Who provided the resources to be used? A: Management 
e. Who provided the process goals?   A: Management 
f. Who decided timing and scheduling?  A: Management 
g. Who trained the employees on the process? A: Management 
h. Who oversees and controls the process? A: Management 
And so on……. 
Many times, government processes are viewed differently than manufacturing. In reality, 
they are much the same (process inputs, employee work, process outputs) where quality 
is just as important to the outcomes. One of the more notable quotes from this book was 
the statement by Scholtes on the impact of bad processes: 
“All of the empowered, motivated, teamed-up, self-directed, incentivized, 
accountable, reengineered, and reinvented people you can muster cannot 
compensate for a dysfunctional system.” 
Scholtes provides a reasonable argument stating that processes that make up a system 
that is old and past its time, improperly engineered, designed, controlled, and/or managed 
will defeat the best intentions of man every time. While training and learning helps the 
people side of things, it does nothing for the process side of things in terms of functionality. 
How Manufacturers can Create a “Win-Win-Win” Scenario 
A research paper, System Perspective on Warranty Problems within a Supply Chain, [36] 
conducted by two Massachusetts Institute of Technology graduate students in 2005, 
obtained surveys and interviews from 100 industry professionals from a single supplier. 
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Their goal was to identify information leading to the root causes of automotive industry 
warranty failures. The survey was statistically analyzed. Survey inputs were submitted by 
both workers on the factory floor and members of management looking for differences in 
their opinions as to warranty failure causes. Surprisingly, it yielded none. Both the workers 
and managers agreed on answers to the questions with no statistical differences. The 
authors of the study placed root causes into five broad categories: 
1) Product development related 
2) Resource related 
3) Supplier related 
4) Warranty organization related 
5) Cultural related 
Under the cultural related category, a singular conclusion was stated: 
“Reactive warranty fire-fighting mode dominates the entire warranty reduction 
process.” 
This comment is quite revealing. It tells us that suppliers are not working proactively to 
reduce defects. It says that the automotive supply chain is in “reactive” mode and that 
there must be a shift in thinking to exit this mode in favor of a “proactive” culture. If 
reactionary methods truly dominate the warranty reduction process and the basic 
recourse for correction has always been supplier site containment, then the “same level 
of thinking that got them there” (Einstein) must change.  
This survey also provided several conclusions on warranty root causes in the other 
categories. It is interesting to note that the recourse of most OEMs when a warranty failure 
occurs is to resort to the reactive protocols available to them in their supplier contracts – 
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namely, that of supplier corrective action and supply site containment. It is reactive in that 
both the producer and the supplier are working to fix the immediate problem (indirect 
involvement). The exploration of these findings was expanded during their interview 
process hoping to explore answers at a deeper level and providing new information to 
address some of the issues.  
The researchers, after further analysis of the interviews, came away with five conclusions: 
1) “People need to change their mind[set] to accept a proactive warranty 
prevention approach. 
2) Unclear accountability on warranty issues. Sales department gives warranty 
targets, but engineering is responsible for warranty corrective actions. 
3) The purchasing department selects supplier components based on price, not 
quality. 
4) Suppliers cannot provide adequate engineering support when product fails 
due to the lack of knowledge and capability.[development training needed] 
5) Warranty needs to be included in the purchasing process. Warranty needs to 
be considered in both terms of cost and case numbers.” 
One of the fundamental themes underlying these conclusions is the need for supply chain 
development. If suppliers can raise the level of quality for the parts and components, they 
manufacture through supplier development training, the OEM, supplier, and end customer 
all benefit. This becomes a “win-win-win” for all the stakeholders involved. It was 
interesting to find one of the causes listed was the lack of knowledge and capability on 
the part of the supplier – a relevant finding for purposes of supplier development training. 
Either the supplier has to get the knowledge to improve its capabilities thru an internal or 
external provider or the OEM’s quality organization has to provide the training.  
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Warranty in European Automotive Sectors 
The report, Global Automotive Warranty Survey Report, [37] was a review of the global 
automotive industry completed by a European automotive consultant agency with multiple 
sponsoring companies. Their objective was identification of barriers preventing reductions 
in automotive warranty cost. The target audience was leaders of the manufacturing sector 
and Tier N supplier warranty oversight groups.  
The effort identified a need for supplier development as one of the issues but did not dwell 
on how to accomplish the effort nor did they explain how to identify results if the output of 
a development effort was successful – the goal of this researcher’s Case Study. The 
report also identified the need for better problem-solving efforts which is also one of the 
training activities in this dissertation Case Study (8-Disciplines of Problem Solving). This 
survey was still another statistical analysis, Q & A approach, for the global automotive 
sector like so many of the others. 
Continuous Learning and its Importance  
A book, The Theory and Practice of Training, [38] discussed the benefits of training and 
becoming a learning organization.  The words from the book explain it nicely: 
“Turning now specifically to training, there are numerous potential benefits to be 
gained by individuals and by organizations from well-planned and effectively 
conducted training programs. Individual trainees can benefit in a number of ways. 
In relation to their current positions, trainees may gain greater intrinsic and 
extrinsic job satisfaction. Intrinsic job satisfaction may come from performing a 
task well and from being able to exercise a new repertoire of skills. Extrinsic job 
satisfaction may be derived from extra earning accrued through improved job 
performance and the enhancement of career and promotion prospects both 
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within and outside the organization to which they belong. Benefits for the 
organization include improved employee work performance and productivity; 
shorter learning time which could lead to less costly training and employees being 
‘online’ more quickly; decrease in wastage; fewer accidents; less absenteeism; 
lower turnover and greater customer and client satisfaction. 
Amongst the many developments that have been introduced to organizations, 
that of becoming a learning organization has taken on a high profile. It has also 
led to confusion about what it actually is and some skepticism as to whether it 
can exist at all. Although it is difficult to define precisely, the description offered 
by Pedler, Boydell, and Burgoyne [1991] encompasses the key sentiments: ‘an 
organization which facilitates the learning of its members and continually 
transforms itself.’ Learning by the organization and by individuals within it is seen 
as critical to its survival and development……” 
Based on this description, the narrative implies organizations that survive the longest or 
manage to have better business performances have, as one of their key cultural 
elements, a business rooted in employee and organizational development and learning. 
The authors of this book see it as “critical to survival and development.” An organization 
cannot grow without the necessary skilled personnel and proper resource utilization that 
comes from the wise application of “lessons learned.” As with any manufacturer, supplier 
development can be viewed as a critical component of the defect or warranty reduction 
process. 
Drivers for Organizational Learning & Performance 
In this article, Global Journal of Management and Business Research, [39] another 
statistical survey was conducted using employees (both male and female) in Pakistan. Of 
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the 95 surveys they sent out, 79 were accepted and analyzed as part of the study. The 
model studied four drivers in organizational performance: 
1) Training design 
2) On-the-Job Training 
3) Delivery Style 
4) Training & Development 
The statistical study concluded all four drivers had a significant impact on organizational 
performance. Once again, the connection between learning and performance is made.  
Plant Improvement as a Result of Training 
This publication, U.S. Manufacturing Skills Gap, Technical Education Effectiveness, [40] 
was a master’s thesis by a Western Kentucky University graduate student who completed 
a statistical study on targeted educational training. The focus of the research was on 
whether employee training had an impact on the Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) for plant 
machinery. The study excluded scheduled or planned maintenance activities but included 
unplanned equipment outages. The method of analysis was the matched-pair t-statistic. 
A group of workers doing a repair but having received no training before the repair work 
was started was baselined with a grading process. The workers then received training 
prior to repair work and graded a second time using the same grading process. This was 
later compared against their earlier baseline performance. In summary, the workers 
performed better in the machine MTTR scoring 26.1 points higher on the repair work after 
training than they did with no training as validated by a two-tailed, single-sample paired t-
test with a 95% confidence level.  
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The grading system used larger scores to indicate better performance. The researcher in 
this study graded on a variety of issues during the repair process including trouble 
shooting, fault diagnostics, machine repair, and time taken to return the machine to full 
production. The differences in the no-training and training scenarios fell within a 
confidence interval of 10.3 to 41.9 points higher for workers who received training before 
the repair work was started. The difference was impressive. On a scale of 0 to 100 
(evaluation scores), the no training scores averaged 40 and the scores with training 
performance before the maintenance work at 66.1. The result was a 65.3% performance 
improvement. 
One of the limitations the researcher pointed out was the small sample size. There was 
concern whether the results could be extrapolated to larger groups. Additionally, one of 
the findings the researcher noted was whether prior maintenance experience had an 
impact on results. Their conclusion was it did not. This conclusion was validated using a 
two-tailed, two sample, t-test difference in means (matched pair difference).  
Excluded from the study were efforts to evaluate the employee’s attitude toward the 
training. That was left to a future study with the thinking it would be useful to know so 
allocation of training dollars could be directed toward the correct individuals (that is, 
individuals interested in learning as opposed to those who were not). Not all individuals 
in this small group were cut out to be maintenance technicians as their scores indicated. 
Two of the nine individuals failed to improve their scores – one remained at their before 
score of 30 while the other stayed at 40 (no change for either worker). The training served 
no purpose for these two; nothing was learned or added to their capabilities prior to the 
repair work.  
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Training and Impact on Aviation Flight Crews 
The following article, Crew Resource Management (CRM), [41] was about improving team 
work in high reliability industries. This effort was initiated in the aviation industry and 
motivated by some of the more serious flight crew errors that resulted in loss of life and 
destruction of property. Two examples were noted in the article. The most infamous one 
was in the Canary Islands where two 747s (KLM – Dutch and an American Pan Am airliner 
in 1977) crashed in a head-on run-way collision with one plane attempting take-off in a 
fog. The accident resulted in the largest single loss of life incident in aviation history with 
583 vacationers dying and loss of both planes. The second was an aircraft engine fire 
where the pilot and copilot shut down a still functioning engine instead of the one that was 
on fire resulting in a crash, loss of life, and loss of the plane. Interestingly, after an analysis 
completed by NASA-Ames, it was concluded 73% of accidents involved some type of 
flight crew error. A change in crew-behavior was needed – especially in areas such as 
accident prevention and emergency management. 
One of the positive outcomes attributed to CRM was an incident involving a DC-10 where 
an explosion of one of engines disabled all three redundant hydraulic systems aboard the 
aircraft. The flight crew managed to land the plane with the help of a DC-10 training 
captain who was a passenger on the flight. They used reverse thrust on the remaining 
engines to navigate and created a landing that resulted in 184 of the 296 people on board 
surviving an otherwise total loss of life incident.  
The flight crew attributed CRM to the success of their efforts on the ill-fated plane. CRM 
is now finding its way into aviation maintenance, air traffic control, merchant navy, the 
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nuclear power industry, medicine and, more recently, the off-shore oil and gas industry. 
This type of crew learning involving high reliability industries is becoming policy and 
practice for industries that can ill afford human error and mistakes that lead to loss of life, 
equipment and environmental damage, or other catastrophic results. 
New Methods - Virtual Training Systems  
VISTRA (Virtual Simulation and Training of Assembly and Service Processes in Digital 
Factories) [42] was a project funded in Europe to investigate whether individual gaming 
experience (people that played video games, past or present) experienced better training 
outcomes as a result of their gaming experience. This was a statistical study that tracked 
the learning experience, time to complete, and the number of errors made during the 
virtual assembly process. There were five different scenarios patterned after processes 
that existed in a German automotive manufacturing environment.  
The results of the statistical experiment showed a learning curve for non-gamers taking 
them longer (averaging an additional 75 seconds) than the gamers to complete their 
training scenarios. Interestingly, the number of mistakes recorded during the exercise 
was identical for both groups indicating non-gamers were just as effective in this area as 
the gamers. They also found one scenario of the five that produced 50% of all the 
mistakes made in the exercise.  
Their conclusions were that virtual training has a place in manufacturing plant learning 
and that even senior workers that have little to no gaming experience can adapt to virtual 
learning. Their initial experiences with this type of training with none-gamers was that the 
worker would experience a longer training cycle until they get accustomed to the virtual 
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training system (VTS). Because of these trials and participant feedback, it was learned 
that additional improvements to the system would be needed to make VTS a viable 
training methodology in the automotive industry. This researcher would not be surprised 
to see virtual learning being used in many learning environments. It is common knowledge 
the U.S. Navy is working on virtual learning to train submarine crews. 
Indirect and Direct Supplier Development 
This article [43] talks about many of the same things this researcher pointed out in the 
introduction and in the background chapter (Chapter 3) concerning the need for 
technological competencies and manufacturing capabilities within a supply chain. The 
article’s objective was to provide insights relative to the effect direct and indirect supplier 
development has on supplier product quality, supplier capabilities, and performance.  
The article begins with a discussion of the three choices available to a buying firm when 
faced with a poorly performing supplier: 
1) They can switch to a different supplier. 
2) They can vertically integrate their business and bring the supplier activity in-house. 
3) They can assist the deficient supplier through a supplier intervention. 
These choices led to a discussion of the two types of intervention (direct and indirect). 
Indirect supplier development involves actions such as assessing the supplier, 
communication of evaluation results, and setting performance goals which the supplier is 
then challenged to meet. It can also involve the use of competing suppliers in a 
competition favoring the supplier that provides the best product and / or service. This 
method was termed in the article as an “influencing strategy” to get better results from the 
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offending supplier. According to the article, influencers (change from a distance) can 
include: 






On the other hand, direct supplier development or intervention is more of a hands-on type 
of approach that includes: 
1) Consultation with the supplier 
2) Education and training programs for the supplier 
3) Temporary personnel transfer to the supplier site during containment or corrective  
action activities 
4) Invitation of supplier personnel to their site to observe the problem 
The article was a statistical study that looked at indirect, direct, or a combination of direct 
and indirect involvement with the mal-performing supplier across a broad range of 
manufacturing and service industries. The study was completed with a survey using 
heads of purchasing, heads of supply chain management and logistics, supplier 
development, procurement and quality managers as the study subjects. 
There were several conclusions drawn from the statistical research. 
1) The average magnitude of supplier product and delivery performance was higher 
than the magnitude of improvement in the supplier’s capabilities. 
2) The two types of supplier development (indirect and direct) have distinct effects on 
the improvement of product and delivery performance and supplier capabilities. 
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3) The results suggest indirect positive effects on supplier product and delivery 
performance as well as supplier capabilities are associated with goal setting theory 
and the earlier mentioned influencing strategies. 
4) Both methods created supplier change with direct involvement being a paradigm 
shift in actions to improve performance and delivery. 
5) Direct involvement of the buyer in the supplier problem allows the supplier to 
upgrade internal capabilities to develop, make and deliver superior products. 
6) However, contrary to expectations, direct supplier involvement did not result in 
upgrades to the supplier’s product and delivery performance. Their conclusion: 
This was thought by the researchers to be time related in terms of implementation. 
This being a lagging indicator and not delivery of instantaneous results. 
7) Both direct and indirect supplier development activities at the same time produce 
a negative impact on supplier product and delivery performance. Conclusion: It 
was thought that both types of intervention create supplier ambiguity and their 
performance deteriorates rather than improves. Buyers should be aware of both 
methods and use them accordingly in their attempts to improve supplier 
performance but never both at the same time. 
8) If the buyer wants immediate improvement, they should avoid direct supplier 
involvement and use indirect methods. If the buyer is more interested in the 
supplier’s capabilities and long-term change, direct methods provide better results.  
There was some concern on the part of the researchers that the small sample size limited 
the power of the statistical tests. This was also a study in German speaking countries and 
may not be translatable to North America or Asia. The conclusions of their study were 
that both direct and indirect supplier development activities have positive effects on 
supplier quality and delivery performance if used separately. It was interesting to note in 
finding #6 related to the importance “time to implement” had on direct supplier 
intervention. It is something that must be accounted for in the defect data. In this 
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researcher’s Case Study, twelve months was allocated for implementation time before 
and after the supplier development training was completed. 
Reference Books for Statistical Studies of Research Data 
Finally, multiple statistical books were used for information on Student-t matched-pair 
comparisons, Sign and Wilcoxan Rank-Sign tests that were part of the research analysis. 
Method is discussed in depth in Chapter 4, but the first four books listed below were 
foundational in terms of methods used. Included in this research Case Study was a 
Design of Experiment (DOE) study along with simulated data generation to study several 
groupings with a small sample size. The fifth book was my source of information for the 
DOE. The following is a list of those reference materials used in this research Case Study: 
a) Elementary Statistics, 2nd Edition[44] 
b) Applied Statistics and Probability for Engineers[45] 
c) Statistics for Business and Economics[46] 
d) Probability and Statistics for Engineers & Scientists[47] 
e) Principles of Experimental Design and Analysis[48]  
The mathematical work for the research was completed in some cases by hand using 
Microsoft Excel as a calculation worksheet with equations that can be found in the above 
statistics books. For efforts on the larger samples, data simulations and DOE (Design of 
Experiment), a software package available to the researcher was used (Sigma XL) which 
is a Microsoft Excel compatible statistical package for calculations which included 





This researcher found a wealth of information on training, learning, and improving an 
organization’s ability to deliver customer product and service. In my searches, there were 
innumerable articles and books written on the importance of this subject (human resource 
development) along with statistical studies to back up their claims of organizational 
improvement.  
While this wealth of statistical information exists on training benefits, virtually all of the 
statistical studies were done via surveys. The article on MTTR performance improvement 
noted in the literature search was the only article (thesis) found looking quantitively at a 
connection between training and maintenance performance results. The master’s thesis 
demonstrates a connection between their research and this dissertation Case Study. 
However, its scope is limited to maintenance repairs in a single plant staying inside the 
confines of their manufacturing facility (this is, intra-plant) and the sample size was less 
than ten. 
The study focused on plant maintenance technicians which, just as easily, could have 
been a Tier N supplier to an OEM. The research is dissimilar to mine in that it looked 
internally at MTTR whereas my research crosses inter-plant boundaries looking at the 
supply chain’s defect rates (Tier 1 level) with a much larger sample size and scope 
(multiple training combinations for 148 manufacturing facilities). The focal points are 
different with supplier defects versus MTTR but a cognitive connection between these 
two is clearly seen.  
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The MTTR thesis was a unique study connecting training to performance demonstrating 
with statistical proof that training done in the right way can advance performance, 
capacity, and knowledge of a human resource. The sense of increased human resource 
capability should extend beyond the interplant boundary and all the way to the end-
customer or buyer. Likewise, the research study completed for direct and indirect 
interventions also point to positive influences in supplier quality and delivery performance 
but cautions the intervention user to be smart in their choice of methods, and never mix 
the two types of interventions together.  
The literature search points out what every trainer intuitively understands – if the company 
does not train, learning is problematic and may never occur. A company must train its 
employees on what they need to know. No training equals no learning and results in no 
performance improvement. This research paper extends training and learning efforts in a 
study of the correlation between supplier development and assembly plant defect rate 
reductions as defined by the OEM’s internal defects rates (PPM) in addition to after the 
vehicle has been in service (3MIS). This research extends the impact of learning into a 
larger part of an OEM’s supply chain and with a larger sample size. This methodology is 
translatable to any industrial manufacturing sectors (OEMs or Tier N suppliers) that 
perform development training and maintain a history of supplier defect rates. There were 
also multiple factoids (small bits of information) that can be pulled from the research noted 
in this chapter. Several of these are included as minor findings in the conclusions found 
in Chapter 6. 
Some the more interesting research results are noteworthy of summarization. They follow 
with short narratives on each one: 
76 
 
1) The Kirkpatrick Model provides very useful suggestions for gauging class quality 
to assure first class delivery, material quality, overall participation, and 
environment. Immediate feedback is important to assure students continue to 
receive consistent training and education. Higher levels of this model point to the 
need for correlating performance to training.  
2)  Research on information related to direct and indirect interventions indicate a 
need for one or the other but not both types of intervention at the same time. The 
intervention is highly dependent on timing and whether the OEM buying supplier 
parts in interested in short- or long-term mitigation. Companies interested in longer 
term relationships with their suppliers can benefit from direct intervention such as 
supplier developmental training. 
3)  World-class organizations must realize the need for a non-ending stream of 
training and employee development by training their most valuable asset. 
4)  Training and continuous learning is key to maintaining a competent workforce at 
any organizational level. Consequently, every manufacturer (regardless of their 
position in the supply chain) needs a robust training and development department 
devoted to workforce improvement and organizational improvement. 
5) Supplier development training (direct intervention) should be a focal point for 
OEMs or other manufacturers who possess a large or extensive supply chain. This, 
by no means, should replace indirect interventions when necessary but, long-term, 
healthy, relations in any chain is built on long-term direct supplier development. 
6) Training is something the instructor does and learning is something the student 
does – they are not the same. Both must be willing (teach & learn respectively). 
7) The is no better way to learn than to “teach” others. 
8) A focus on employee strengths is critical to the learning process. It’s as much about 
getting the right people in the right seats with a willingness to learn and apply their 
learning for the betterment of the organization. 
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9) “Status quo” is the enemy of organizations – “Change” is the real friend. 
Companies and their personnel cannot survive with real change within the 
organization. 
10) Most of the cost of poor quality (COPQ) remains hidden to the observer. This 
hidden cost can be as much as five to seven time the visible costs. 
11) Timing on training is everything. Not too early such that it’s forgotten and not too 
late after the employee needs it. This is not to be completed at the convenience of 
management but just-in-time for the employee to learn and apply it. 
12) More longer range studies are needed for development training on supply chains. 
This researcher found little evidence that it has been done even at a minimal scale. 
The reason behind this is most likely the data is proprietary and closely guarded 
against discovery by others. This researcher was only allowed access to encrypted 































In the Case Study, the OEM assembly plants understood both the reality of the situation 
and a pressing need of longer-term intervention with the poorly performing suppliers and 
wanted to proactively change their methodology where parts with suspected defects are 
eliminated or, certainly as a last resort, always caught by the supplier and never shipped. 
It required a paradigm shift in the supplier’s way of thinking.  
In this case, the OEM decided to be proactive and part of this strategy to lower defects 
was supplier development training (a direct intervention). If this shift towards making 
suppliers more proactive occurs, there should be less potential for defects being made, 
less mistakes by quality control, and improved predictive methods for parts that left the 
supplier and then incorporated into vehicles. Fewer quality issues would then occur at the 
assembly plants. Both the supplier and the OEM win in this scenario and, best of all, the 
warranty cost drops and the customers win as well. Quality engineers can then devote 
their time to automobile continual improvement activities getting out of this reactive mode 
because the suppliers have now shouldered the defect reduction requirement as part of 
their day-to-day work activities. 
Discussed in this chapter, the strategy the manufacturer decided to use was a series of 
supplier development training programs. The goal was to teach the supplier the OEM’s 
way of building higher quality into supplied parts as Deming and Dodge had pointed out. 
These approaches are discussed in the following sections on specific training actions. 
Supplier development training involves using simple strategies that address high 
operational risk or significant process failure modes, coordinate continual improvement 
action and problem solving, and create error proofing mentalities that eliminate and/or 
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reduce process risk. In this way, a supplier addresses the problems before they can occur 
creating a more robust environment in which to work and make parts.  
In this Case Study, the supplier developmental classes were devoted to shifting the 
supplier’s organizational culture away from reactive and toward a proactive posture. The 
training programs were all collaboratively developed by UT CIS and the OEM and its 
Production Quality Engineers. These classes have been delivered to over two thousand 
supplier recipients with the expectation that supplier defects will decline in manufactured 
vehicles. The UT CIS has been delivering supplier development training to Tier I suppliers 
on behalf of the OEM since 2013. The expectation has always been that suppliers would 
implement what they learned and improve the quality of supplier parts and 
subassemblies, but this was never a given (that is, it had not been proven).  
Having witnessed, first hand, the incremental and transformational changes supplier 
developmental training can have on companies when done correctly, the researcher’s 
belief is it will be positive. However, it is with both equal levels of apprehension and 
eagerness that the solution to the original question was posed – that is, a statistical study 
to determine the answer. As with most chains, supplier performances, as a group, vary 
from the very good, to the acceptable, to the not acceptable when it comes to parts quality. 
Some suppliers seem to always “get it right.” They intuitively know what to do in order to 
effectively eliminate defects going to assembly plants. They have implemented robust 
continual improvement strategies for their processes and operations.  
Still other suppliers, for varied reasons, fall short of effective implementation and wind up 
on this opposite extreme and in need of improvement. Still, others land in that middle 
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ground somewhere between the two extremes – not great; not terrible; but certainly, in 
need of improvement. The focus of the supplier developmental training has been and 
continues to be on these latter two groups of suppliers with the expectation that if they 
improve, the overall supply chain improves. When that happens, the OEM, the  customer 
and the supplier are all winners.  
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to explaining the various combinations of training 
that were a part of the developmental training. Note that implementation of the training 
and education by these suppliers is key to positive outcomes in defect reductions. New 
information, not implemented, will result in no improvement. Consequently, this leaves 
the supplier in the same condition as if they had never taken the developmental training 
and a waste of their time and resources.  
Need for Change 
In the very beginning, the OEM was of the realization something needed to be done. The 
producer had a limited number of engineering resources and could only do so much with 
each resource having multiple suppliers sometimes at great distances from the assembly 
plants. Effectively delivering the right developmental information would leave the supplier 
more capable, more knowledgeable, and better prepared to deliver on their quality 
expectations. This effort brought the UT CIS into the equation for creation and delivery of 
developmental materials for these suppliers. There are currently three supplier 
developmental programs in existence: 
A. Process Failure Mode Effects Analysis / Control Planning (PFMEA / CP) 
B. Eight Disciplines of Problem Solving (8-D) 
C. Proactive Containment (Supplier Site Containment – SSC) 
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Performance of suppliers is somewhat of an unknown at the start of every product launch, 
especially if it is a new launch and / or a new supplier. Problems involving a new or existing 
supplier are, oftentimes, discovered only after the OEM is already committed to the 
supplier with a production plan and strategy already deployed. This makes it difficult to 
shift directions in midstream to another supplier without disrupting a launch. Defective 
parts can take months or even years to become noticeable, requiring a statistically 
significant number of parts to fail before it is identified as a problem.  
Vehicles are made of metals, plastics, and a host of other materials – every part can and 
will fail after a period. It would be logical to expect lab-testing to answer many of the failure 
questions and it does. Parts are tested in laboratories to understand life expectancy and 
their failure mode(s). However, lab analysis is not always a perfect predictor of failure 
modes or product life. The environment in which it is used, the part’s condition(s) of use, 
interaction with other subassemblies or components, and, even the users themselves can 
impact a part’s life or which parts are likely to fail first. The truer test comes with parts 
made without defects, incorporated into the vehicle, and performance tested by the 
customer in the field over long periods of time. These outcomes reveal the true nature of 
durability and overall quality as well as create brand and customer loyalty.  
This is not to say lab predictors are unimportant – in fact, quite the opposite. Even similar 
parts with a prior history are, many times, good indicators of future performance. In the 
end, this struggle to be or become a first-rate supplier is, again, a survival of the fittest 
and the suppliers that allocate resources wisely. The truly good ones survive because 
they do the work necessary to be sustainable (consistently low defect rates, on time and 
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at cost). The poor ones disappear because they cannot deliver; and, are replaced with 
other suppliers who may or may not be sustainable over time.  
In the final analysis, the product (transportation vehicles) is only as good as the quality of 
supplier parts received. The supplier development training was initiated to strengthen the 
poorly performing suppliers with the idea it would elevate the overall strength and 
capability of the whole chain starting with suppliers needing the most help.  
One of the most difficult to achieve culture shifts in any organization is changing the 
attitudes of people (especially leaders). People change when they see the importance of 
change and the positive benefits it brings to their day-to-day work effort, their financial 
future, and to satisfying their personal needs. Internal organizational needs are many 
times secondary and come only after the personal needs are met. Whether one 
subscribes to Abraham Maslow’s five hierarchies of needs or Frederick Herzberg’s two 
factor theory on intrinsic and extrinsic needs, personal needs and desires typically carry 
more clout than organizational needs. Within each effort to train personnel, there was an 
attempt to demonstrate how the change being requested benefits both the individual and 
the supplier’s organization. 
The Three Supplier Development Training Programs 
PFMEA / Control Plan 
The training developmental effort was directed toward the issues identified in a supplier 
analysis conducted by the OEM in collaboration with its parts engineers assigned to their 
supply chain. One of their most basic concerns was repeated supplier failures in problem 
prevention before the problem occurred. The engineers were convinced that better 
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anticipation (predictive methods) was necessary to push the suppliers’ culture toward a 
more proactive environment. There were procedures in place on the OEM’s Supplier 
Portal explaining what the Potential Failure Mode effects Analysis (PFMEA) was 
supposed to achieve, but, in many cases, the required assessment mandated by the OEM 
was little more than a required piece of paper the suppliers completed to satisfy a 
customer mandate to create a PFEMA and Control Plan.  
The supplier paperwork requirement was satisfied but the document was never used in 
the manner the OEM expected. Often, the PFMEA Risk Priority Number (Severity x 
Occurrence x Detection) were artificially doctored to achieve a level of risk low enough to 
avoid a perceived need for supplier preventive action. In some cases, new process 
PFMEAs were created from older processes with potential failure modes missed or left 
out completely. Later when a failure occurred, the “lesson learned” was never added to 
the PFMEA nor was it translated horizontally to other similar processes. In still other 
situations, the authors of the document were simply not knowledgeable enough to put a 
good document together (for example – done by one person without cross-functional 
team input) with the document being only as good as the knowledge of that single 
individual. Clearly, these supplier documents were lacking a necessary thoroughness to 
make them effective in lowering defects.  
The first of three training classes was developed and initiated in 2013 with an expectation 
of training poorly preforming suppliers in the correct method to create a PFMEA and its 
use to improve process and product robustness (Quality Planning). The UT CIS had a 
database containing all the suppliers that participated in PFMEA training. The OEM had 
information on the defects that each supplier generated before the PFMEA training was 
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started and after their training was completed. This research study includes an analysis 
of those suppliers that attended PFMEA training in three ways over time: 
1. Those receiving just the PFMEA training (no 8D or Containment). 
2. Those receiving PFMEA training and 8D Problem Solving only (no Containment). 
3. Those receiving PFMEA training and Containment only (no 8-D). 
The study looked at combinations of training that had the potential for making a difference 
in assembly plant defect rates (PPM) and, longer term, with impacts at the 3-MIS level. 
Failure to find any indication of significance leads to one of two conclusions:  
a. The supplier did not implement what they learned, or, 
b. The supplier training module needs to be improved to be more effective. 
8-Disciplines of Problem Solving (8-D) 
Training development efforts were directed next towards a second issue identified in the 
OEM’s supplier analysis conducted by its product quality engineers. A second basic issue 
was with repeated failures on the part of suppliers to permanently correct the problems 
the OEM identified with a supplier part. The OEM engineers were convinced better 
corrective abilities on the part of the supplier would create a more proactive culture.  
Like PFMEA, there were procedures in place to explain how the process for corrective 
action (8 Disciplines of Problem Solving or just 8-D) was to be implemented on the 
Supplier Portal. For many of the poorly performing suppliers, the 8-D effort in determining 
the root causes (process, inspection, and prediction) were inadequate and fell short of 
permanently correcting the problem or their root causes missed altogether and the 
problem returning at a later date.  
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Again, the requirement for the 8-D was satisfied but the document’s prescribed actions 
failed to deliver on a permanent fix. The author of the 8-D document was sometimes not 
knowledgeable enough to pull all the pieces of the document together (again done by one 
person without cross-functional team input) and the result fell short of its intended purpose 
– that is, fix the problem correctly and permanently. Clearly, these documents were also 
lacking the necessary effectiveness to lower part defects.  
Developmental training was initiated in 2014 with the expectation of training the poorly 
preforming suppliers in the right method to create an 8-D and in the document’s use so 
the supplier could improve process robustness, inspection, quality assurance, and 
prediction. Information on the defects these suppliers generated was also known before 
the 8-D training started and after the 8-D training was completed. Similar to the PFMEA 
developmental training, this study included an analysis of those suppliers that attended 
8-D training in three different ways: 
4. Those receiving 8-D training only (no PFMEA or Containment). 
5. Those receiving 8-D training and PFMEA only (no Containment). 
6. Those receiving 8-D training and Containment training only (no PFMEA). 
The research study looked at training combinations that had the potential for making a 
difference in defect generation at the OEM level (PPM) and longer-term impacts to 3-MIS 
results. Here again, failure to find an indication of any significance leads to one of two 
conclusions:  
a. The supplier did not implement what they learned, or, 
b. The supplier training module needs to be improved to be more effective. 
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Containment Training (SSC) 
The final training developmental effort in this research study was directed towards a third 
issue identified in the OEM supplier analysis. Another concern was failure on the part of 
suppliers to utilize any effective internal containment process when they suspected 
problems or made changes to equipment, processes, or people that could potentially 
result in a defective part being made. Containment was mandated by the OEM during 
product launches, process change, or the addition of new personnel to a production line 
but was rarely followed.  
The engineers were convinced better proactive measures in containment would improve 
overall performance. This would require that the supplier set up their own “supplier site 
containment” process using their own internal staff and to attack defects resulting from 
these discoveries. Here again, the change would create a proactive culture and reduce 
defects generated and potentially leaving the supplier site for the OEM assembly plants 
(PPM). Longer term, if done correctly, it was expected to have a positive impact on the 
reduction of defects shown in 3-MIS.  
There were few procedures in place to explain to the supplier how this process was to be 
implemented or when and how it should be used although the indirect process for SSC 
with parts failure was clearly defined. This new process was similar to SSC but completed 
by supplier personnel and not independent third parties. SSC could be put into effect any 
time and any place or places within the supplier’s manufacturing process from receiving, 
to manufacturing, to warehousing, or shipping if they suspected a problem in any of these 
locations. Process defects would then be directed to process and maintenance 
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engineering, quality assurance or site engineering for permanent correction depending 
on the nature of the issue found. 
Training was developed and initiated in 2015 with the expectation of preforming poorly 
suppliers be trained in the correct method of creating their own internal containment 
process and provide a more robust process, better QA inspections, and better predictive 
techniques. The goal of the process was to permanently correct defects uncovered in the 
containment and iteratively improve the manufacturing process to make it more robust 
over time. Like the other two modules, information on the defects each supplier generated 
was also known for the supply chain before the containment training was started and after 
the training was completed. This study included an analysis of those suppliers that 
attended containment training in three ways: 
7. Those receiving Containment training only (not PFMEA nor 8-D). 
8. Those receiving Containment training and PFMEA only (no 8-D). 
9. Those receiving Containment training and 8-D only (no PFMEA). 
This study, like the other two, looked for combinations of training that had the potential 
for making a difference in defect generation at the PPM level and longer-term at the 3-
MIS level. Failure to find any indication of significance leads to one of two conclusions:  
a. The supplier did not implement what they learned, or, 
b. The supplier training module needs to be improved to be more effective. 
Training Including all Three Developed Courses 
The study finally looked at one other training combination - one which should have the 
potential for making the biggest difference in OEM defects (PPM) and longer range at the 
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3-MIS level. This study included an analysis of those suppliers that attended all three 
training events: 
10. Those receiving PFMEA, 8-D, and Containment training (A,B,&C) together. 
Failure to find an indication of significance here leads to one of two conclusions:  
a. The suppliers did not implement what they learned, or, 
b. All three supplier’s training modules needed improvement. 
Proposed Solution 
The question of training and developmental significance was posed originally by the 
OEM’s home office directed to the quality engineering team and OEM supplier 
representatives without finding a satisfactory solution as to whether the training was 
having an impact. This question continued across a period spanning three years. It led to 
some serious discussions within the OEM quality team without resolution.  
This led to thought on the part of this researcher as to how to effectively answer the 
question. What method or methods were needed to provide an answer? Were there 
concepts that were applicable to other producers or to other high level (Tier I or II) 
suppliers with extensive supply chains? As mentioned earlier, the proposal for a solution 
was discussed with the OEM in late 2017 and accepted some two to three weeks later. 
Methods and results follow in the closing chapters of this dissertation.  
This research project evaluated suppliers using OEM defect data to statistically determine 
UT CIS developmental training supply chain impacts. The analysis’ purpose was to 
determine whether these combinations of training classes translated into statistically 




The method to analyze the impact on defects was a statistical analysis of “matched-pair” 
data using standard (off-the-shelf) statistical and mathematical techniques. The statistical 
analysis utilized a 95% confidence level to check for statistical impact between these 
matched-pair average results one year prior, before supplier training took place, and, one 
year following, after the supplier training was completed for the various combinations. 
Some questions that had to be assessed before a statistical study could be completed 
had to do with the following: 
1) What approach would be used if the data was nonparametric? 
2) If the data are normal, does the encryption process make a difference? 
3) If the data are nonparametric, does the encryption process make a difference?  
4) What is to be done with samples that are too small to produce meaningful 
information? 
Without answers to these questions, the statistical study could be meaningless. 
UT CIS Supplier Development Hypothesis 
Eq’n #1: Case Study Null hypothesis: “No statistical Effect on Defects” 
Ho →  𝜇TR < 0 where;  𝜇b – 𝜇a = 𝜇TR   
Eq’n #2: Case Study Alternate hypothesis: “Statistical Effect on Defects” 
Ha →  𝜇TR  > 0 indicating a positive correlation; defect reduction 
𝜇b represents the average PPM / 3-MIS defect level before training was started; 
𝜇a represents the average PPM / 3-MIS defect level after training was completed;  
and,  
𝜇TR represents the difference in the two averages (a matched pair difference). 
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The  analysis was conducted on both defect databases, at the assembly plant (PPM) and 
after the car was in customer service (3MIS). Three analysis were performed for each 
group of training to determine statistical relevance (correlation) between training and 
defect reductions. Specifically, the T-distribution, the Wilcoxan Rank-Sign and the Sign 
test were used to study he data for defect correlations. This is detailed and discussed 




























The data provided by the OEM contained a supplier identity – Supplier 1, Supplier 2, 
……., Supplier 147, Supplier 148. The identities of each supplier are known only to the 
OEM which prevents a level of bias from entering the research study (many of these 
suppliers, the researcher knew personally). Each supplier’s defect data was averaged 
twelve months before their company received their first supplier development training 
producing a mean defect rate. The researcher has designated this data as “𝜇b” where “b” 
represents supplier 1, 2, 3, …., 146, 147, through 148 represents the number of suppliers 
in the combination sample before training. Following the training period (explained 
below), a similar twelve-month average defect rate was collected after the training was 
completed. For each supplier, that rate has been designated as “𝜇a” or “mean a” for this 
same set of suppliers after training was completed. Two sets of data were available for 
each supplier. Defects discovered before OEM assembly (PPM) and defects after the 
vehicle was in service (3MIS). 
The two defect rates are labeled for purposes of this research as PPM data and 3MIS 
data for convenience. PPM data represent parts per million defects discovered at the 
OEM assembly plant site and not incorporated into the vehicle while the 3-MIS data are 
parts per million defects not discovered and assembled into the vehicle. The 3MIS data 
is collected after the vehicle has been in service for three months or more that normally 
leads to a customer warranty claim and repair assuming the vehicle part failure occurred 
within the OEM warranty period (see Figure 1.1).  Between the two sets of data, there is 
a training-period where suppliers receive developmental training and no defect data is 




     Begin    Time Period = 62 months      End 
 
 
Figure 4.1 – Timeline for Research Study 
 
 
which a supplier sent one or more of their technical representatives to a class including 
the last month in which the same supplier sent one or more representatives to a class.  
The window for the research study looks like (Figure 4.1)  and covers the time-span of 
June 2013 to August 2017 (over four years). It should be noted that the “training period” 
varied for each supplier and is not necessarily the same length of time.  
It is the difference in these two values (𝜇b – 𝜇a) that is of primary interest to this research 
and to which the researcher has designated “𝜇TR” as the difference between the before 
and after training averages for both PPM and 3MIS. Each supplier in the Case Study now 
has two matched-pair differences. The research then looked at the data statistically for 
two results: 
1) The mean difference of each matched pair (𝜇TR) is “zero” or “negative.” 𝜇TR < 0 
2) The mean difference of each matched pair (𝜇TR) is “positive.” 𝜇TR > 0 
In the original hypothesis shown in the Chapter 3, the null hypothesis is the difference 
between the matched pairs is equal or less than zero – that is, there is no positive 
correlation in the 𝜇TR difference. If this is the case, there will be no statistical evidence 
Training Period 12 Months Prior 12 Months After 
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indicating that the effect of the training produced meaningful results. To reject the null 
hypothesis in favor of the alternate, the p-value of the analysis must be less than the 
alpha-value chosen for the statistical test or 5%. Values less than 0.05 provide evidence 
the alternate hypothesis should be accepted over the null and that the training had a 
significant positive correlation on defect reductions.  
Explained in a different way, there should be enough statistical evidence to suggest the 
difference is not equal to or less than zero (p-values less than 0.05 rejects the null 
hypothesis). Consequently, the mean or median will be greater than zero. A simple 
analysis of the data for positive and negative results produce a strong indication as to 
whether the differences in matched pairs are positive or not. This is discussed further in 
the Chapter 5 results section. Also, an example of this type of analysis will be shown. It 
should be noted the t-statistic hinges on the data being normal and that there are enough 
matched-pairs to approach a normal distribution to make the assessment an effective tool 
( > 30, typically). If the data are not normal, attempts will be made to normalize it – for 
example, use of inversion, square root or logarithmic normalization techniques. 
If a majority of the differences are negative, then the defect rate after the training will be 
higher than the before result and the answer to the analysis will be the training is having 
a reverse impact (not improving but making the situation worse) and would be an 
unexpected result. If there is no statistically significant difference in the number of 
positives and negatives, the researcher must fail to reject the null and there is insufficient 
evidence to conclude there is a correlated relation between supplier development training 
and defect reduction. 
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Normal or close to normal data is not guaranteed and, if not, nonparametric methods can 
be used to assess the OEM data. The researcher’s methods of choice after having 
considered multiple alternatives settled on two nonparametric tools – the “Sign Test” and 
the “Wilcoxan Ranked-Sign test” (WRS) as candidates for analysis of nonparametric data. 
Of the two tests, WRS is the more robust of the two and chosen for several reasons: 
1) The Sign test is mostly used as an initial analysis followed by WRS. 
2) WRS is a nonparametric test that cares little about the distribution. 
3) WRS can be used as a one sample test analyzing matched-pair data like the 
parametric Student-t distribution. Same applies to the Sign test. 
4) WRS presents a way to normalize otherwise nonparametric data through a 
process of ranking them from smallest to largest, giving them a positive or negative 
value based on the difference and then allowing the data to be analyzed as a 
normal set of data to provide a result. 
5) WRS excludes any matched-pair data that equals zero and addresses only the 
matched-pair sets that are greater or less than zero for the comparison. 
6) WRS looks at the median which is, comparatively speaking, usually a better 
indicator of central tendency for data that is not normal versus mean. 
7) WRS is robust with significant power. 
Research Planning 
Planning for this research and analysis included six basic steps or actions: 
a) Assess the impact that data encryption (Y = MX + b) has on the data, if any.  
b) Determine how data would be created and delivered to the researcher. 
c) Consider other questions posed by researcher’s faculty committee and OEM. 
d) Consider the confidence level for null hypothesis rejection. 
e) Consider the power for acceptance of the alternate hypothesis. 
f) Conduct the actual research and reporting the results. 
These are discussed in the following sections with detailed results provided in Chapter 5. 
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Data Encryption Assessment – “b” Value 
A concern arose during the analysis planning process as to the effect the value “b” would 
have on the result. The researcher considered a small value near zero for the before and 
after defect averages (an example: 1 ppm). The question the researcher explored was 
whether adding “b” to the value of “M” times “X” would shift these small values such that 
the difference might be greater than zero, the result be positive, and counted as part of a 
positive correlation rather than negative. A simple mathematical exercise was used to 
show the concern was unfounded. The proof may be found in Chapter 5 – Results. 
Data Encryption Assessment – “M” Value 
Mentioned in the introduction was the intention of the OEM to make the actual defect 
rates for each supplier blind to the researcher in the same way as the supplier name by 
using a multiplier and the numerical add-on in the form Y= MX + b. The actual defect data 
was encrypted with a value of “M” unknown to the researcher or to competition should 
they read this manuscript. This choice served a singular purpose. That purpose was to 
prevent prying eyes (competitors) from knowing the actual defect rates. It provided for a 
double-blind research study in which both the supplier name and actual defect rates were 
unknown. From that point, the work became a simple treatment of data. All could be 
converted back to a specific supplier actual defect rate should the OEM desire. This 
approach is valid only if the numerical adjustments of the data by “M” do not impact 
statistical outcomes. In looking at the data, two situations were possible: 
1. Normal data treatable with the Student-t distribution for paired data. 
2. Data is nonparametric and treatable with Non-parametric methods. 
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Consequently, the researcher evaluated the impact of this transformation process for both 
parametric (normal data) and nonparametric (non-normal data). The encryption concern 
was unfounded through an analysis of hypothetical data (both parametric and 
nonparametric) using a “M” value of the researcher’s choosing and assessing the data as 
to what impact it had on the results. These results may also be found in Chapter 5. 
Data Creation and Delivery 
Each data base on parts discovered defective at the OEM assembly plants (PPM) and 
parts defective after the vehicle was in service (3MIS) were listed by supplier code, 
company names and their monthly supplier PPM and 3MIS levels. The only difficulty was 
in cleaning (preparing) the UT CIS database containing the suppliers that attended the 
classes. There were several issues with this database having been created by multiple 
clerical staff over sixty-two months and the general way in which the data was compiled. 
The information had to be re-organized and cleaned up for the OEM staff to use the 
information to lookup supplier defect results and report results back to the researcher.  
With the attendance data in hand from the UT CIS, the OEM provided the encrypted 
defect data back to the researcher within a matter of weeks and the analysis portion of 
the project was underway. The encrypted data was returned to the researcher in a format 
shown below in (Table 4.1). It was determined the data would be studied using three 
methods (Student-t Distribution, Sign Test, and the Wilcoxan Ranked-Sign Test).  
All total 148 separate and unique suppliers became a part of this Case Study. The data 
labeled “Avg PPM Before” are the defects discovered at the assembly plant for each 
supplier  taking one or  a combination of these  classes (12 months  prior to their training 
99 
 





Avg PPM Before 
(adjusted) 
Avg 3-MIS Before 
(adjusted) 
Avg PPM After 
(adjusted) 
Avg 3-MIS After 
(adjusted) 
Supplier 1 A 94.67332485 255.4851447 13.72186785 109.612008 
Supplier 2 A 7.00000000 7.00000000 9.68380725 7.00000000 
Supplier 3 A 8.40859525 22.17605417 7.00000000 16.06986280 
Supplier 4 A 61.33050710 39.64772814 139.02139424 7.00000000 
 
 
Supplier 146 C 15.12285021 7.63210247 38.70620363 8.40070010 
Supplier 147 C 81.80016151 297.86527315 26.29718213 243.29727755 
Supplier 148 C 7.00000000 333.42130116 64.24535359 383.822334135 
 
start) The data labeled “Avg PPM After” are the defects discovered at the assembly plant 
for each supplier taking one or a combination of these classes (12 months following their 
training completion). Similarly, the SP3MIS defect data is for the 3 months in service data 
(3MIS) provided by OEM distributors for their before and after results. In all four cases, 
“Adjusted” means the actual data was encrypted using the “Y = MX + b” process with the 
values known only to the OEM. Analysis results may be found in Chapter 5. 
Consideration of the “Alpha” and “Beta” Levels  
There are two kinds of risk associated with any statistical evaluation of data – one is the 
alpha (α) risk and the other the beta (β) risk. The alpha risk was chosen early in the 
analysis process as 5%. Interpreted, this means that for the researcher or reader, there 
is a 5% risk the researcher failed to accept the null when the null hypothesis was the 
correct choice. This is sometimes called the producer’s risk or a Type I Error. Subtracting 
the Type I risk from one provides the user with a confidence level of being right. In the 
case with alpha = 5%, the researcher has a 95% confidence of accepting the null 
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hypothesis when the null is the correct choice or its rejection in favor of the alternate when 
the null is false.  A value of 5% is a common choice in statistics. It is rare to choose an 
alpha value greater than 5%. The researcher wanted this alpha value low and the 
confidence level high. 
The beta risk is sort of an opposite to alpha and is called a Type II error or consumer or 
buyer’s risk. Beta risk is the probability that the researcher accepts the null hypothesis 
when in fact the null hypothesis was the wrong choice, and/or the alternate hypothesis 
was the correct choice. Like the alpha risk, the beta risk is also desired to be as low as 
possible. Subtracting the beta risk from one provides the power of the statistical study 
and, like the confidence level, the researcher also wanted the power as high as possible. 
Most statistical research considers a beta risk of 20% or lower an acceptable risk. 
Therefore, it is desired that power be greater than 80%, if possible. Both alpha and beta 
risk are shown in (Figure 4.2). 
Both alpha and beta risk are managed, in most cases, by assuring there is an adequate 
sample size. Larger is better but there can be size limitations, based on resources – 
timing, personnel, money, equipment changes, etc. Usually, a sample size greater than 
30 keeps the beta risk at an acceptable level. There are conditions where larger samples 
are more appropriate – for example – true outliers that must be included in the data.  
The higher the confidence level desired, the smaller the alpha risk value must be. In cases 
of one-sided test and parametric data, the researcher is looking for p-values less than 
5%. As the alpha value drops, the greater the degree of confidence in making the right 
choice on null acceptance or rejection. So, an alpha value of 1% represents a 99%  
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Decision or Hypothesis               Ho True                        Ha True 
 Accept Null, Ho: 
 
 Fail to Accept Null, Ho: 
 
Type I Error: Supporting the Alternate hypothesis when the Null is true 
Type II Error: Not Supporting the Alternate hypothesis when the alternate is true 
Figure 4.2 – Alpha and Beta Risk for this Research Study [49] 
confidence level. As the sample size increases the beta risk drops and the power rises. 
(Figure 4.3) is a graphical representation of the alpha and beta risks depicted in (Figure  
4.2). 
The higher the confidence level desired, the smaller the alpha risk value must be. In cases 
of one-sided test and parametric data, the researcher is looking for p-values less than 
5%. As the alpha value drops, the greater the degree of confidence in making the right 
choice on null acceptance or rejection. So, an alpha value of 1% represents a 99% 
confidence level. As the sample size increases the beta risk drops and the power rises. 
(Figure 4.3) is a graphical representation of the alpha and beta risks depicted in (Figure  
4.2). An explanation is appropriate for this graph to explain the alpha and beta risk present 
in a statistical analysis. 
 
OK 










Type II Error 
Buyer Risk 
β < 10% 
 
Type I Error 
Producer Risk 





Figure 4.3 – Graphical Representation of Alpha & Beta Risks [49] 
The normal expectation is that the sample collected has a mean of µ0 and for the Type I 
Error to be avoided, the mean of a sample (X-bar 1) must lie beyond or to the left of the 
one-tailed significance level boundary line – marked in red. If the sample is like X-bar 2 
(to the right of the boundary) then the null cannot be rejected (must be accepted). Thus, 
rejecting the null (or said a different way – supporting the alternate) when the null is true 
would be a Type I Error. The opposite is true of the β risk. Assuming the actual sample is 
µ1, the value of X-bar 2 must lie outside or to the right of the boundary value set for µ0 for 
the Type II Error to be avoided. If the sample is like X-bar 2 and the alternate is true, the 
null is rejected (cannot be accepted) in favor of the alternate. Thus, rejecting the alternate 
(or said a different way – supporting the null) when the alternate is true would be a Type 
II Error.  
Power was also calculated and graphed in (Figure 4.4) for a t-statistic. The blue line 




Figure 4.4 – Power for T-Statistic with Different Sample Sizes [50] 
line (lower line) is the graph for a 2-sided t-statistic with alpha level of 5%. Effect size is 
the relationship between the two variables on a numerical scale – usually 0.3, 0.5, or 1.0. 
A weak effect size could be 0.3 or less, a medium effect 0.5 and a strong effect size 1.0 
or greater. The value chosen in this case was 0.5 due to the relationship between the 
matched pairs being unknown. There is a relationship between the two values (before 
and after) so it is not low. But since the effect is not truly known, the value of 1.0 was not 
chosen either. The effect size does have an impact on the power just as sample size 
does. With unknow effect size, it is common to select this mid-point like 0.5 as the value 
for the power calculation.  
As can be seen from (Figure 4.4), the power grows more rapidly for the one-sided than 
the two-sided test. A sample size minimum in the range of 26 to 34 is an appropriate 
sample size for the t-statistic power to be greater than 80%. If the effect size were raised 
to 0.8, the sample size decreases to as low as 14 data points to achieve a power greater 
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than 80%. These results fall in line with the general rule of thumb on sampling protocols 
for statistical analysis, that is, a sample size equal than or greater than 30. 
The following comparison was found in a brief study published on the internet. The title 
of the article was “How to choose between t-test or non-parametric test e.g. Wilcoxon in 
small samples.” [51] Within this short article was a comment about the power of the two 
tests compared to each other: 
"Wilcoxon tests have about 95% of the power of a t-test if the data really are 
normal, and are often far more powerful if the data is not, so just use a Wilcoxon" 
is sometimes heard, but if the 95% only applies to large n, this is flawed reasoning 
for smaller samples.”  
While power is highly dependent on sample size and this is the case with the actual 
research data, this left the researcher with a level of discomfort if the sample size is small 
– that is much less than 30. If the data is nonparametric, many researchers have stated 
the Wilcoxan Rank-Sign test has significantly lower power.  
While power is not difficult to calculate for the t-statistic matched-pair data, it is much 
more difficult for the Wilcoxan Rank-Sign test. Unfortunately, about the only way to 
estimate the power for the Wilcoxan Rank-Sign test is through statistical modeling 
programs such as Monte-Carlo simulations where a simulation test is run multiple times 
and the number of successful results divided by scenario test runs provides a ratio which 
is the test power value. 
 This researcher looked for studies that had been completed where the t-statistic and the 
Wilcoxan Rank-Sign test had been compared and found the following information in a 
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Table 4.2 – Relative Frequencies of Null Hypothesis Acceptance (Power) 
Sample 
Size 
t-statistic Test Sign Test Wilcoxan RS Test 
5 0.9560 0.8900 0.9020 
10 0.9760 0.8600 0.8980 
15 0.9820 0.8500 0.8840 
20 0.9660 0.7980 0.8020 
30 0.9860 0.6640 0.7780 
40 0.9540 0.5100 0.6040 
Average 0.9720 0.7620 0.8113 
 
journal of mathematics. The normal distribution results are shown in (Table 4.2) [52] below. 
What they discovered in their research was that for small samples the relative power of 
the t-statistic, sign test and Wilcoxan Rank-Sign tests, compare favorably for normal 
distributions but as the sample size grows, there is some divergence in the power of each 
test. Within this study, the researchers compared the t-statistic, sign test, and Wilcoxan 
Rank-Sign test using 500 Monte Carlo simulation runs at a 5% significance level. The 
researchers compared their data generated for normal, gamma, exponential and uniform 
distributions but only normal is shown here. Distribution comparisons were averaged for 
each study and their conclusions recorded. There is less difference as the size becomes 
smaller, but a smaller sample size increases the likelihood of a Type I Error.  
The option is to either increase the sample size or adjust the alpha. One weakness in this 
data was a short-sightedness on the part of the researchers in stopping at just 40. 
However, they were, admittedly, looking at small sample sizes. The research would have 
been more interesting had they inserted a sample size of 100 or more and tested the 
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results just for the sake of comparison. Of note are the drops in power for Sign and 
Wilcoxan Rank-Sign tests. Literature says to increase power, one must increase the 
sample size. It would be interesting to see these values at 100 or more. 
This becomes somewhat of a balancing act between alpha and beta values in assuring 
the confidence of statistical results reported. Within this study the researchers also looked 
at the alpha values from the same Monte-Carlo runs for a normal distribution and is shown 
in (Table 4-3). [52] As for making a Type I Error, the researchers reported there is relatively 
little difference between the three methods. The averages rounded to two decimal places 
are identical (all were ~ 0.04). 
In conclusion, the effort to analyze the research data is highly dependent upon whether 
the data are normal or can be normalized. If so, the t-test will be used for statistical 
significance. If normal data does not exist and normalization attempts fail, the Sign and 
Wilcoxan Rank-Sign tests will provide the analysis for significance. As it turns out, this 
researcher was able to use all three in the analysis to produce some meaningful results. 
The researchers in this paper went on to conclude the following: 
“….Meanwhile, the t-test is the most suitable test when the underlying distribution 
is normal and when the sample size is large for any distributions as reported in 
Tables 1 – 8 [only two of the eight are shown here]. However, the two 
nonparametric tests [sign test and Wilcoxan Rank-Sign] are indeed alternative 
tests to t-test when the assumption of normality is not met.”  [52] 
Discussion of T-Distribution with Matched-Pair Method  
The Student-t distribution is a statistical distribution that approaches a normal distribution 
with sample sizes larger than 30. Within the alternatives for the Student-t distribution is a  
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Table 4.3 – Relative Frequencies of Null Hypothesis Rejection (Alpha) 
Sample 
Size 
t-statistic Test Sign Test Wilcoxan RS Test 
5 0.0400 0.0280 0.0480 
10 0.0440 0.0320 0.0480 
15 0.0440 0.0460 0.0460 
20 0.0435 0.0420 0.0400 
30 0.0380 0.0360 0.0360 
40 0.0340 0.0380 0.0340 
Average 0.0406 0.0370 0.0420 
method for matched-pair data. If the data are normal, these matched-pair (before average 
– after average) can be used in a statistical test for significance. The process evaluates 
the data to determine if the mean of the data is less than or equal to zero (null hypothesis). 
If there is statistical evidence there are sufficient results greater than zero, then the 
calculated statistic must be greater than the critical t-statistic.  
It is the intent of the researcher to use this distribution strategy to analyze whether there 
is enough evidence to show a difference between the matched pairs for each supplier 
taking specific training combinations. If there is a statistically large number of positive 
results where the t-statistic is greater than critical, there is statistical evidence that the 
training programs are having an impact and that the suppliers are implementing what they 
learned during the training sessions. An example of this t-Statistic is shown in (Figure 4.5) 
using data for suppliers taking all three classes. In this statistical calculation, the three 
values of “zero” were excluded from the degrees of freedom for the calculation of the 
observed and critical statistic. 
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Discussion of Wilcoxan Rank-Sign Matched-Pair Method  
Mentioned earlier, after some extensive reviews of various analysis possibilities, the 
researcher settled on using the nonparametric Wilcoxan Rank-Sign Test as one of the 
tests for significance. There were multiple reasons for this choice (see abstract) but most 
importantly: 
1. In the event there are ties (and there are several of these within the data), the result 
of the before and after difference (𝜇TR) is zero, the test ignores (or excludes) zero 
value results and compares only matched pair negatives against matched pair 
positives for significance. 
2. The test is simple to do (much like the Student-t distribution) and provides a 
meaningful statistical analysis for the data. 
3. The test is a non-parametric test and it matters not what the distribution is. It will 
work on both normal and non-normal data. 
It should be noted that in the Wilcoxan Rank Sign test, medians are compared to see if 
they are less than or equal to zero (the null). The alternate hypothesis looks at the median 
and whether it is greater than zero. In normal data, the mean and the median are equal. 
In the case of non-parametric data, it is not a requirement the mean and median equal 
each other. In fact, they are almost never equal. 
Recalling from the previous section that the matched pair data will be either positive, 
negative, or zero, the Wilcoxan Rank-Sign test ignores the zero values and statistically 
compares positive differences against the negative ones. The mechanism whereby this 
calculation (Wilcoxan Rank-Sign) is made is shown on (Table 4.6) where the number of 
positive results is statistically compared to the number of negative results with any zero 








training defect rate is lower than the rate before the training. If the results are opposite 
after training (that is, negative), this indicates after training average results are higher 
than before supplier training. Should the study show more negatives, then there will be 
no statistical correlation of note between defects and training and a high probability the 
supplier failed to implement any of the training received in the training sessions. 
Incidentally, the result of the Wilcoxan Rank-Sign test provides a normal distribution of 
the rankings as can be seen in (Figure 4.7). 
If the results show an indication of statistically more positives than negatives, then we 
have a meaningful study correlation and it being implemented at the supplier level. In the 
case of the examples (both the Student-t and Wilcoxan Rank-Sign), it can be seen there 
were three (3) zero results excluded in the Student-t and two zero results in the Wilcoxan 
Rank-Sign. 
Discussion of Sign Test for Matched-Pair Data 
While the sign test can supply statistical evidence of correlation in this research study, 
book literature states the sign test is usually a quick test to see if there is a relationship. 
Like the Wilcoxan Rank Sign test, the sign test will also accept matched-pair data. The 
test uses the binomial distribution to calculate their probability. If the number of positives 
signs statistically outweigh the number of negatives, then the p-value must be less than 
the alpha value selected – for the research Case Study, 0.05.  
As a check of the Wilcoxan Rank-Sign test, the nonparametric Sign Test will also be run 
and reported as part of the results. This test, like the Wilcoxan Rank-Sign, can be used 




Figure 4.7 – Normality Plot of ABC Rank-Sign Data 
 
confidence level, a sample with only eight data points could only have one negative value 
in order to claim rejection of the null hypothesis in favor of the alternate (that is, mean 
greater than zero).  
Of note in this process is the fact that the Sign test adds the probability of each negative 
values in a cumulative way to get the actual probability (discrete probability calculations). 
An example of this binomial calculation is shown below in (Table 4.4). Equation #3 shows 
the results of the probability calculation of there being 2 or less negatives in a data set of 
eight. The assumption is there is an equally likely number of positive and negatives for 
acceptance of the null. Equation #4 is the binomial calculation method where n represents 
negative values. The value of 0.1445 is greater than 0.05 so the null cannot be rejected, 
and six positives are not statistically sufficient to claim a significant positive correlation for  
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Table 4.4 – Binomial Prediction Example  
Binomial Prediction for a Sample with 8 Data Points 





P (x<2) P (x<3) P (x<4) P (x<5) P (x<6) P (x<7) P (x<8) 
0.39% 3.13% 10.40% 21.88% 27.34% 21.88% 10.40% 3.13% 0.39% 
0.39% 3.52% 14.45% 36.33% 63.67% 85.55% 96.48% 99.61% 100.00% 
Eq’n #3: Binomial Prediction Example for Sign Test 
P (x < 2)  =  P (x < 0) + P (x < 1) + P (x < 2)  = 0.39 + 3.13 + 10.94 = 14.45%  
Eq’n #4: Binomial Distribution Equation 
     n 
P(X<n) =∑ xCn (0.5)n (0.5)x-n  where: x is the sample size; and, n is the negative result 
              i=0 
such a small sample. That value could have only one negative or less to reject the null. 
The probability is calculated using the binomial distribution equation (see Equation #4): 
Normalization for Research Analysis 
Should the results be nonparametric, normalization of data will be attempted for the 
Student-t distribution as needed. The three normalization techniques most used in 
statistics are the logarithmic, square root and inversion techniques. If these attempts 
prove unsatisfactory, the Sign and Wilcoxan Rank-Sign test will be used for data statistical 
correlation. Evidence of these three analyses will be compared to their appropriate critical 
values and logged as results found in Chapter 5.  
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Faculty Committee Considerations 
Some of the data combinations had a small sample size (one was 6 entries). This brought 
into question their ability to provide meaningful statistical results. This was discussed with 
my faculty committee chair (Dr. Andrew Yu) as to alternatives in determining if the data 
could be modified in some way to extract useful information from the OEM data file that 
was provided. As a result, the research conducted on the data included data simulations 
to increase sample precision and give the data some semblance of normality before 
applying the tests noted above (Student-t distribution assumes parametric data as a 
given). The Sign and Wilcoxan Rank-Sign tests will work on parametric data as well as 
nonparametric data, so all three tests were eventually used in the analysis. Data 
simulation is addressed in more detail below. 
Also, a question raised by the OEM as well as one of my faculty advisors was whether 
there were combinations of training more effective than others. Data simulation was also 
used to see if some combinations of training were somehow better than others. Finally, 
the faculty chair requested I consider a DOE (Design of Experiment) on the original data 
to extract more information from the databases pulling further information, if possible, 
from the data analysis. The approach to these data simulations and DOE are discussed 
in this chapter and the research results may be found in Chapter 5. 
Data Simulation 
Since four of the seven combinations in the data set had insufficient sample sizes, it was 
suggested that the researcher try data simulations to expand the information and 
determine whether meaningful information could be found. The researcher had available 
the average and standard deviation for each data grouping. This information is provided 
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in (Table 4.5 and 4.6). An equation found in Microsoft Excel to create a random number 
run in excel was used to generate the normal data simulation: 
 Eq’n #5: Simulation Generator for Normalized Data 
= NORMINV(Rand(0,1), X-bar, Std. Dev.) 
The method for creating a simulated data base was simple. All that was needed was a 
random number generator, the mean, and standard deviation for each grouping of original 
data. Results were produced by using Microsoft Excel’s ability to generate a normal set 
of data by choosing a random number between zero and one to represent a data point 
percentile. For example, 0.250 would represent the 25th percentile of normal data (left to 
right) and the value chosen for that percentile would reflect the parts per million difference 
(positive or negative) for that percentile based on mean and standard deviation.  
This generator was then used to create as many data points as needed for the simulation. 
One of the concerns the researcher had as a result of the study of the actual data was its 
sensitivity relative to sample size. Starting with a small sample of fifteen, the data was 
observed in terms of its p-value output versus the sample size (that is, was it the same 
each time). The researcher noted a tendency of the data to produce different statistical 
results that gave positive and, at other times, negative results. Results can be found in 
Chapter 5 and was expanded for clarity compared to an earlier version of this dissertation.  
The normalized data provided results finally stopped varying giving repeatable p-values 
for each test even when a data run was recalculated. As this was a simulation of 500 data  
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Table 4.5 – Mean & Standard Deviation for each Data Combination – PPM 
OEM PLANT PPM PPM PPM PPM PPM PPM PPM 
Code ABC BC AC AB C B A 
Mean 41.82 3.11 57.25 35.97 15.96 200.63 20.46 
Std. Deviation 117.00 371.16 147.67 109.87 67.72 860.67 123.66 
 
Table 4.6 – Mean & Standard Deviation for each Data Combination – 3MIS 
3 Months in 
Service 
3MIS 3MIS 3MIS 3MIS 3MIS 3MIS 3MIS 
Code ABC BC AC AB C B A 
Mean -26.13 -16.78 62.96 244.65 -10.19 133.37 30.71 
Std. Deviation 330.40 124.13 245.40 998.54 97.42 674.78 148.58 
 
points and was easy to generate with little calculation time, the researcher settled on this 
amount for each grouping using its actual data means and standard deviations. Results 
may also be found in Chapter 5 for the simulation runs. 
Effective Class Combinations 
One of the questions asked during the preliminary development work with the OEM and 
by my faculty chairman was are there certain class combinations that deliver better results 
than others? This was answered with another data simulation run in which an attempt to 
compare the combination of classes with each other to see if there were any significant 
ones that stood out. The method of choice was to use a larger 1,000 data-point simulation 
run to get even higher precision and to use the One-Way ANOVA and Welch F-statistic 
tests to determine differences in the combinations.  
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Both methods are F-statistic tests and use mean sum of squares to test combinations 
against a critical F-statistic value based of degrees of freedom. Significance would 
indicate that at least one or more of the groupings (combinations) is different. The One- 
Way ANOVA then compares each combination with the other to determine which one(s) 
are statistically different. The software provides a box plot of the confidence intervals for 
the means.  
The other option (Welch F-statistic test) assumes unequal variances within the data from 
the beginning of the test. This package, like the One-Way ANOVA test also compares the 
combinations with each other and provides a box-plot graph of the confidence intervals. 
Both statistical packages were available in the Sigma XL software and were used on the 
simulation run. Report on the results of these two analyses may be found in Chapter 5. 
Design of Experiment (DOE) on Original Data 
One additional effort was undertaken at the suggestion of the researcher’s faculty chair 
consisting of a design of experiment (DOE) conducted on the original data to determine 
if other useful information could be discovered. The researcher chose a 23 full factorial 
design using the three classes (A, B, and C) as generators for the interactions (AB, AC, 
BC & ABC) with six replicates of the data pulled at random from the original data base.  
The researcher, in looking at the original data decided to ignore values with a difference 
of zero and exclude them from the design – only positive and negative values were 
included as part of the DOE. Reasoning behind this was a reverse logic in the sense of 
what would the results be if the data points were all zeroes? If that were so, the sum of  
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Table 4.7 – Generator for 23 Factorial Design 
Factorial Effect for OEM & 3-MIS Data 
Treatment I A B AB C AC BC ABC 
I – – + – – + + – 
a + + – – – – + + 
b + – + – – + – + 
ab + + + + – – – – 
c + – – + + – – + 
ac + + – – + + – – 
bc + – + – + – + – 
abc + + + + + + + + 
squares used in the F-statistic would be meaningless. (Table 4.7) shows the generators 
for the interaction effects (AB, AC, BC, & ABC). In order to exclude zero difference values, 
the maximum number of replicates possible was six, related to group AC (PPM) where 
there were only eight data entries with two zero values resulting in six positive / negative 
values. Therefore, six replicates were chosen for both the PPM and 3MIS data. For the 
specific combination of AC, 100% of the non-zero data was used for combination AC. 
One issue arose in the selection of candidate sample data for the identity (I).  
For the identity replicates for A, B, and C, a means of getting the data was needed. This 
was not anticipated during the original design for data extraction and encryption from the 
company databases. All suppliers in the databases have been exposed to one or more 
classes. Without information for the identity group, a full factorial design would not be 
possible to execute. Logically thinking through the methodology, there seems to be a 
solution to generate the needed data. These three classes should pull from data where 
suppliers did not take a class but should also be poorly performing suppliers. 
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Suppliers that took classes and did not implement what was taught can be likened to the 
suppliers that failed to show reductions in defect rates from either database (PPM or 3MIS 
data) and therefore have negative results on their defect rates. This would be the same 
as not taking a class. This makes a lot of intuitive sense as many suppliers that attended 
these classes were poorly performing suppliers anyway – meaning they were generating 
negative values on the matched-pair differences over time.  
The original data was resorted from smallest to largest and zero and positive values 
excluded. Using a random number generator for datapoint selection, six values were 
extracted for the identity in each group and the results analyzed using the F-Statistic 
algorithm for correlation effect by comparing mean sum of squares divided by the mean 
square error to generate the observed F-statistic “Fo” and comparing it against the critical 
statistic which is 4.08 for each grouping for F1,40 degrees of freedom. Results of the effort 
are discussed in greater detail and found in Chapter 5. 
Zero Difference on Several Data Points 
As part of this chapter, there is a final discussion point that impacts the outcome of this 
research. Several data points from the original data sets for PPM and 3MIS when the 
before and after averages were obtained provided a value of zero in the difference. 
Specifically, 35 of the 148 data points for PPM (23.7%) and 13 of the 148 data points for 
3MIS (8.9%) provide zero values. These numbers were all low and all identical.  
Each had a value of 7.000000 and remained unchanged before and after training was 
completed – that is, the before and the after results were the same. This condition implies 
that if nonparametric methods are used for the data analysis, a significant percentage 
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(16.2%) of all the initial raw data (48 of 296 match-pairs of data) will be culled from the 
analysis process due to the nature of the analysis method. The Wilcoxan Rank-Sign and 
Sign tests both have to ignore zero differences for matched-pair data.  
Assuming manufacturers attending class implemented what they learned, this information 
needs to be accounted for. In these forty-eight cases, the supplier is doing a great job 
both before and after training. There is zero change in their condition. There is even a 
possibility the training may have prevented a negative result. As a consequence, the data 
needs to be accounted for in some way. These zero values are included as part of a 
preliminary mathematical analysis on percentage improvement for each data grouping 
but is not a part of the statistical study. Each zero value was accounted for as part of a 
percentage improvement and compared to suppliers that showed a decline in 
performance. This analysis is included as a separate set of tables, graphs, and the results 




























Despite the easy methods that were used, the work was far more difficult to statistically 
translate into meaningful information than originally thought. From the very beginning of 
the analytical work when OEM data was received by the researcher, normality was far 
from a given. Within several of the combination differences, there were multiple outliers 
(both positive and negative results) with their relative distance as much as 50 to 300 
hundred times some of the more normal or usual values common to the data. One would 
normally question these outliers, but they were real and a consequence of two factors:  
1) They are, in part, a reflection of the multiplier effect of “M” used in encrypting 
the data making them larger than they actually are.  
2) They reflect actual supplier performance.  
Some suppliers in the database did not perform as expected – the OEM’s past history 
predicted there would be data outliers – this is common in suppliers struggling with 
product quality so large defect changes are not surprising (as much as 1 to 3% of the 
larger supplier base). The options are to cull them from the research or keep them. This 
researcher chose to keep them as part of the data. Data simulations helped lessen the 
effects for these outliers so they could be managed. 
Normality plots, histograms and statistical information confirmed what was already visible 
in the data. The researcher looked at each data combination and the data were decidedly 
nonparametric (that is, not normal). Histograms showed the data typically skewed to the 
right in most cases but not all. It should be mentioned in the overall analysis of the training 
classes coded “B,” “C,” and “BC” are the shorter running classes of the three with PFMEA 
/ CP launched in 2013, 8D / PS in 2014 and Containment in the year that followed (2015). 
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Consequently, fewer individuals have taken some of these classes (Containment for 
example) versus the older classes involving PFMEA & 8-D (A & B respectively). This 
impacted sample sizes for several combinations.  
One of the needs in this research was to assure data encryption would not, in some way, 
negatively impact the research results. There are many examples in statistics of using 
algorithms to normalize data, for example inversion, square root, or logarithm. The data 
is squeezed to a smaller range with a different mean and standard deviation. This 
changes the data, but it is easy to recover the original data point by reversing the process. 
These methods are analogous to using a multiplier to change data (in our case, the 
multiplier for data encryption labeled M). 
Variation and thus standard deviation are larger as a consequence, and the mean is 
shifted on the x-axis by whatever the original mean times the multiplier was. Research 
was conducted to identify whether this multiplier and add-on of the form Y = MX + b would 
change the data preventing its recovery back to the original data maintained by the OEM’s 
headquarters. Whether results of the data were normal or nonparametric, there was no 
difficulty in re-acquiring the original data.  
These findings were demonstrated for a normal distribution and also for a distribution that 
was nonparametric. In each case, the data was recoverable back to the original values 
before encryption. The conclusion of the study was that linear data encryption, while it 
changes the values of the mean and standard deviation or variation, does not change the 
relative distances between each data point in the set. Consequently, the researcher is 
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satisfied that the application of the encryption technique does not impact the statistical 
study results. Details of the assessment are found within this chapter.   
Statistical analysis was completed on the data. Knowing the data was non-parametric, 
the Student-t test was performed on the data anyway to see what results could be seen. 
The combinations, initially looked at in the original data, were as follows: 
1) Suppliers taking only the PFMEA / Control Plan class – Coded A 
2) Suppliers taking only the 8-D / Problem Solving class – Coded B 
3) Suppliers taking only the Containment class – Coded C 
4) Suppliers taking the PFMEA / CP & 8D / PS classes – Coded AB 
5) Suppliers taking the PFMEA / CP & Containment classes – Coded AC 
6) Suppliers taking the 8D / PS & Containment classes – Coded BC 
7) Suppliers taking all three of the classes for their site – Coded ABC 
As predicted, the data was decidedly nonparametric as demonstrated by histogram and 
Anderson-Darling (A-D) tests. An example of this type of information on normality plots 
can be seen in the Appendix – see (Figures AF-5.1 and AF-5.2). The first is the histogram 
for PPM and the second for 3MIS. Statistical data can also be found there as well for 
these two histograms (see AF-5.22 and -5.23). 
There were samples that only had nine and fewer data points which were incapable, in 
terms of test power and confidence level, of obtaining meaningful information. A sample 
greater than 25 to 30 would have been better but this was all the data existing for these 
combinations with the smallest being 6 and the largest being 17 (AC, BC, B, & C). The 
smallest sample for the remainder of the combinations was 25 with the largest being 36 
(A, B, & ABC). 
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The data was looked at in a variety of ways attempting to extract useful information. As 
the data was decidedly nonparametric, a decision was made to go ahead and run the 
Sign and the Wilcoxan Rank-Sign tests as part of the study for the nonparametric data 
even if the data for the groupings could be normalized for the t-distribution. As it turned 
out, data normalization attempts produced a mixed result – most of the larger samples 
could not be completely normalized with a few of the data points falling outside the 
normality plot confidence limits. The results were much improved, but the data was still 
slightly nonparametric but acceptable.  
The plots for normalization of all the data can be found in the appendix for combinations 
coded A, B, C, AB, AC, BC, and ABC – see normality plots Figures AF-5.3 through AF-
5.16 for each normalization. Normalization for these plots was a logarithmic reduction. 
Since the normalization results were much improved, the t-distribution outputs were 
calculated for these combinations and displayed as part of the results in this chapter. The 
larger group sizes using the nonparametric tests produced results and also corroborated 
what earlier analysis tended to show.  
Despite the difficulties encountered in data normalization and based on the results of the 
nonparametric statistical trials, the results indicate there is a positive correlation between 
suppliers receiving training and reduced defect rates both at the assembly plant (PPM) 
and after the car was sold (3MIS).  There also appears to be a correlation between certain 
training combinations that are more meaningful than others. 
Already mentioned, the combinations coded B, C, AC, and BC were too small to produce 
a meaningful result (all non-positive correlations) even though the sample size for B 
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(3MIS) was larger at 17. These four groups were tested, and results documented for the 
initial data file and for simulated and DOE activities. In fact, all four of these groupings 
yielded a null finding in the initial data analysis – that is, no correlation between a class 
or classes and reduction in defects for either PPM or 3MIS data. This was expected. 
Within the study, a data simulation was run to look at these four combinations to see 
whether any meaningful information could be extracted from the simulation run. The run 
was for 500 data points with the hope of normalizing the data with a sufficient sample size 
in order to extract information. The Student-t distribution, the Sign and Wilcoxan Rank-
Sign test were all applied to the simulated data after enlarging the sample. Three of the  
four combinations (B, C, AC, and BC) of the smaller sample combinations produced some 
usable information; actually, all of them did though one was a negative correlation. 
However, most of the combinations showed positive correlations through data simulation.  
With little to no data for four of these combinations, there was no way to compare the 
seven combinations for best combination due to lack of size in these four (B, C, AC, and 
BC). Also, none of the sample sizes for these training combinations were the same which 
would have been good for comparison purposes. A decision was made to use data 
simulation to also determine whether some training combinations were better than others.  
A desire to make any differences stand out resulted in an enlargement of the sample size 
from 500 to 1,000 using the same means and standard deviations for the various 
combinations as in the prior simulation run. The analysis for differences was completed 
using two F-Statistic related analysis methods – the Welch ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) 
and the One-Way ANOVA to see if any of the combinations produced better results than 
others. All tests run on each combination also provided an Anderson-Darling normality 
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result and indicated the sample size produced normalized data to allow the above two 
tests to be conducted. 
The Welch ANOVA provided numeric and graphical representations of each combination 
that was identical to the One-Way ANOVA. The Welch test provided both an analysis of 
means as well as an analysis of medians for the simulation while the One-Way ANOVA 
provided a similar analysis but excluded the median. These are shown graphically in the 
results section of this chapter. The results showed two combinations each for the PPM 
and the 3MIS data that gave better results - for PPM data – combinations B & AC; and 
for 3MIS – combinations B & AB.  
One combination common to both the PPM and 3 MIS data was the class encoded as B 
(8-D / Problem Solving) and appeared to be the largest difference for all combinations. 
The other notable result was the two-class combination (AC & AB) with a common course 
in both (A = PFEMA / Control Plan). Again, of note to the reader is the fact that classes 
“A” and “B” are the two longest running classes of the three. This would suggest two 
classes (A & B) have had more effect on defect reduction for the supply chain. 
Additionally, both these are oriented toward process risk reduction, control and 
permanent problem correction.  
On the one hand, class “A” (PFMEA/CP) is 100% risk-management oriented and 
designed to reduce and control or eliminate defects through “error proofing” or “Poka-
Yokes” applied to a process. Done correctly over time, the use of this tool can 
systematically eliminate workplace defects. Likewise, class “B” (8-D / Problem Solving) is 
50 – 65% risk-management oriented in the sense that of the eight disciplines in 8-D, there 
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are at least five devoted to risk reduction and elimination. These being root cause 
analysis, permanent countermeasures, countermeasure validation, prevention activities, 
and follow-up to prevention activities. Intuitively, we would expect these two classes to 
produce bigger impacts and this was confirmed using the above two tests. Additionally, 
both the Welch and One-way ANOVA produced comparable results for each class of 
defects (PPM & 3MIS) so there was no disagreement between the two tests. 
Comparison of the actual data to simulated data runs for correlation of defects to training 
produced comparable results for the combinations A, AB, and ABC (the remaining three 
combinations) with one exception. The course combination ABC (all three classes) for the 
3MIS data were negative on their p-value for all three tests. Remembering that the original 
data tests were performed on normalization of data, the Student-t test indicated no 
significance. However, the Sign and Wilcoxan Rank-Sign test both gave borderline results 
with p-values of 0.0610 and 0.0714 respectively but, still, a negative correlation – greater 
than 0.05. In the simulated data, all three tests showed a negative correlation with 
definitive p-values above 0.05 and not borderline.  
Summarized, all larger sample sizes agree in both simulated and actual sample data test. 
Of the remaining small sample combinations (B, C, AC, & BC) all gave negative 
correlations in the original data but several positive correlations in simulated data – (both 
PPM & 3MIS data for “B”), (PPM data for “C”),  (both PPM & 3MIS for “AC”). The 
remainder (“C” for 3MIS and “BC” for PPM & 3MIS) gave negative correlations. It appears 
differences behind these results were that the simulation increased the data precision 
and information available for the analysis. This narrowed the confidence interval allowing 
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the researcher to infer some positive correlations for several of these combinations rather 
than a conclusion of no correlation. 
One additional study, a DOE (Design of Experiment), was completed on the original data 
to find additional meaningful information. The DOE was a full factorial, two level, 6 
replicate study of the original data with the information selected from the original database 
utilizing a random number generator for each data point in the six replicants. The results 
were analyzed using the F-statistic for meaningful correlations and found that Class A 
(PFMEA / CP) showed a significant correlation for both PPM and 3MIS Data. More detail 
is included in the results section of this chapter.  
Finally, as was mentioned earlier in Chapter 2, some Case Study results are offered on 
Kirkpatrick Model metrics used to monitor trainer, trainee and class environment during 
the training delivery. The reasoning behind offering these results was to serve as 
evidence that negative correlations are not a result of inappropriate or inadequate 
materials being delivered, nor was the instructor or the environment inadequate for 
message delivery. For any message to be delivered, there must be willing students, 
knowledgeable instructors, and an acceptable environment. In all cases, student 
feedback was measured and produced consistent marks in terms of class evaluation.  
This abstract has included a high-level overview of each research effort completed in this 
study. They are summarized below and discussed in detail in the remainder of this 
chapter. 
1) Study of the impact of encryption on the statistical study of data (M & b).  
2) A high level mathematical / graphical / trending look at the original data. 
3) A study of simulation runs and their impact on the data simulation. 
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4) Statistical analysis and results of simulation study for the four small samples.  
5) Statistical analysis and results of simulation study of all seven combinations. 
6) Statistical analysis and results of the original data. 
7) A comparison of large sample combinations against 500 data point simulation.  
8) A DOE study of the original data. 
9) Level I & II results from the Kirkpatrick Model training results. 
Analysis Results for Study of “b” on Statistical Outcomes 
When the decision was made by the OEM to encrypt the data, it was agreed the value 
“M” and “b” would be positive numbers. A quick test of the encoding format shows the “b” 
value does not change the result. In fact, the addition of “b” for matched-pair data served 
no purpose in the encryption process. The following explanation and Equation #5 show 
why: 
Let D1 = difference in the matched-pair data for supplier “1” in the database 
Let Yb = encrypted average of 12-month average before training for supplier 1 
Let Ya =  encrypted average of 12-month average after training for supplier 1 
Let Xb = actual 12-month average before training (supplier actual rate), supplier 1 
Let Xa = actual 12-month average after training (supplier actual rate), supplier 1 
Let M = the encryption value greater than “0” and known only by the Manufacturer  
Let b = the add-on value chosen by the producer and known only by the producer 
Accordingly, the difference in the matched-pair data would be: 
Eq’n #6: Proof of Drop-out of “Add-on” from Encryption 
D1 = Yb – Ya = (MXb + b) – (MXa + b) = MXb + b – MXa – b = M (Xb – Xa) = MµTR  
The value of “b” for the encryption process was never needed and superfluous to the encryption 
effort. In matched-pair data, the value of “b” disappears from Equation #5 by being added as part 
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of the training defect rate before and, then, subtracted as part of the after-training value yielding 
a result impacted only by “M.” If the value of D1 is negative, the difference in the actual data (𝜇TR) 
for defects is negative and the multiplier “M” only makes the value smaller. A negative value 
means larger defects rates are occurring after the training. The reverse is true if the difference is 
positive making the average before the training larger. This result (adding b) would apply whether 
the data were parametric or nonparametric and of no consequence to the Case Study results. 
If the difference is “0,” then the before and after training values are identical (unchanged). There 
were several of these found in the data. The impact on the Student-t distribution is that the value 
would count as part of the null hypothesis in the calculations where the mean < zero. If the 
Wilcoxan Sign-Rank test is used, these values are culled from the analysis process so only the 
positive results are compared to the negatives for an actionable statistical result. In the case of 
the sign test, the binomial calculation includes the zero values recalling the work shown in (Table 
4.6). 
Encryption Process, Impact of “M” on Normal Data 
As we learned from the analysis of “b” in the data encryption process, we are left with the 
simple algorithm which is a linear positive-constant times the original data. In statistical 
circles, this practice is known by a different name called “Data-Scaling.” This practice  is 
used in biology and in other business sectors where the data scale does not fit statistical 
comparison needs.  
Examples could include a data set for flatness of a part which is measured in + 1/1,000 
of an inch and the engineer multiples the entire data base by 1,000 to get the data in 
whole numbers rather than working in fractions. Another example would be two engineers 
taking temperature data on two different process batches and one reports their results in 
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Centigrade while the other reports results on a Fahrenheit scale. Compared, they would 
produce dramatically different results. However, if the Centigrade values are multiplied by 
1.8 and the value 32 added to them, both are now on the same scale and statistically 
comparable. As a final example, suppose both temperatures were recorded in Centigrade 
scale and the researcher wanted them in Fahrenheit, you would convert both to degrees 
Fahrenheit and then do the analysis.  
According to an article researched on this subject, if the transformation (re-scaling or 
encryption in this paper’s case) does not alter the ranks of the data (that is relative 
positions to each other), the results are known as monotonic transformations. The re-
scaling in the case of the OEM research on encryption impact was to apply the multiplier 
to the whole of the data base thus creating re-scaled values. According to the article: 
“Transforming a variable re-scales it. A transformation can be any mathematical 
operation applied to data. A de-transformation reverses or inverts that process. 
Although an infinite variety of transformations are possible, the most important 
transformations are applied to all values. Those that do not alter the ranks of the 
data are known as monotonic transformations. The transformation is linear if 
plotting the transformed data against the untransformed data produces a straight 
line. Linear transformations are mainly used to ease data handling or display…” 
[53] 
In the cases of both the normal data and the nonparametric encryption studies, both data 
bases are “monotonic transformations.”  These can be seen in (Figure 5.1 and 5.2) for 
the normal and nonparametric data sets, respectively. For purposes of the OEM research, 








Figure 5.2 – Monotonic Graph, Encrypted & Unencrypted, Non-parametric  
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security.” The article speaks to the need to de-transform data back to its original state  
after analysis is completed for obvious reasons (back to real data; not encrypted).  
As the value of “M” does not affect the rank of each converted data point relative to others 
in the data set and the relative distances between each data point was unaltered by the 
value of M (monotonic graph slope), they also do not affect the statistical outcomes of the 
study results. If encrypted outcomes are statistically significant, they can be converted 
back to unencrypted values. 
Mathematically, for both the Student-t and the normal distribution upon the Wilcoxan 
Rank-Sign (WRS) test is derived, the value of “M” drops from the calculation for the 
observed t-statistic and for z-scores on the WRS tests. The governing equation for the t-
statistic (observed or calculated) is as follows: 
Eq’n #7: Governing Equation for Calculated t-Statistic 
to = (n)1/2 (Xi - µ) / S;  where: 
to = observed test statistic 
n = number of data points 
Di = value of the data point; and, X is the average of all Di matched-pair data 
µ = zero, null hypothesis; mean is < 0 
S = standard deviation of the sample 
Proof of the drop-out can be seen with a following example. Albeit a smaller sample, it 
will work for any sample size. Suppose a small sample “R” is created of size ten (10). 
Within the sample “R” we place the following numbers such that R = {4, 3, 6, 4, 3, 5, 4, 5, 
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4, 6}  and we now want to calculate the t-statistic to determine if the average of the data 
is greater than zero. Simple observation of the data set shows this to be true (all values 
are greater than zero). If the t-statistic is applied to this set of data, we obtain the following 
results shown in (Table 5.1). Also shown in the table is the scaling product as a function 
of “M = 2.00.” 
This simple calculation shows a calculated statistic that is sufficiently greater than the 
critical statistic for nine degrees of freedom and a 5% alpha level (t-Table, tc = 1.833). 
Since the value of to > tc , we can conclude that the average, X, is greater than zero. 
Exploring further, we can check for a similar result of the scaled value of Di and to 
establish a pattern for this scaling process as proof of the drop-out for the value of M. 
(Table 5.2) shows the results of the scaled original data set which is shown in the last 
column of the table.   
A pattern appears in the data for the scaling factor. In the case of (Table 5.2), each value 
of Di is a multiple of the value of M. In the case of our example, it is a multiple of 2.00. It 
is easy to see two times the original mean of 4.4 yields the new mean (8.8) in our scaled 
example. Further, we can see that the new standard deviation is a product of 2.00 and 
the original standard deviation (that is, 2 times 1.075 yields 2.150). Finally, if the variance 
of the original data (10.4) is multiplied by two-squared (22), the result of the scaled 
variance is produced (41.6).  
The pattern for M becomes visible in (Table 5.2). The final column in (Table5.2) removes 
the value of M from the original data and represents it algebraically as M=2.00. The last 
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Table 5.1 – Student-t statistic for Small Sample Test – Original Data 
M = 2.00 
n = 10 
µ = 0 
Di Di – X  (Di – X)2 (Ri)(M) 
3 -1.4 1.96 6 
3 -1.4 1.96 6 
4 -0.4 0.16 8 
4 -0.4 0.16 8 
4 -0.4 0.16 8 
4 -0.4 0.16 8 
5 0.6 0.36 10 
5 0.6 0.36 10 
6 1.6 2.56 12 
6 1.6 2.56 12 
∑ = 44 Variance = 10.40 ∑ = 88 
X = 4.4 Std. Dev. = 1.075 X =  8.8 
to = (n)1/2 (X - µ) / S = (10)1/2 (4.4 - 0) / 1.075 to = 12.944 
 
 
Table 5.2 – Student-t statistic for Small Sample Test – Scaled Data 
M = 2.00 
n = 10 
µ = 0  
Di Di – X  (Xi – X)2 (Ri)(M) 
6 -2.8 7.84 3 M 
6 -2.8 7.84 3 M 
8 -0.8 0.64 4 M 
8 -0.8 0.64 4 M 
8 -0.8 0.64 4 M 
8 -0.8 0.64 4 M 
10 1.2 1.44 5 M 
10 1.2 1.44 5 M 
12 3.2 10.24 6 M 
12 3.2 10.24 6 M 
∑ = 88 Variance = 41.6 44 M 
X = 8.8 Std. Dev. = 2.150 4.4 M 




of the three tables (Table 5.3) shows conclusively what transpires with the value of M 
when it is algebraically and mathematically tracked separately throughout the calculation 
used to determine the observed t-statistic. 
As can be seen in the above equation used to arrive at the observed statistic of 12.944, 
the value of M is present in both the numerator and denominator, cancel each other 
algebraically, and drop from the calculation. This analysis provides proof that regardless 
of the value of M in scaling, it has no impact on the calculated statistic. Since the non-
parametric data was also monotonic, the same outcome will occur for  the WRS test. 
A similar calculation can be repeated for the z-score used in calculating the probability for 
WRS. Like the t-statistic, the value of “M” is embedded in both the numerator and 
denominator and cancel in the same way. Consequently,  the value of “M” does not impact 
the results of the calculated z-score. In the special case where M = 1.00, the encrypted 
and unencrypted value for either would be identical and a non-issue.  
The Sign test assumes an equal number of positive and negative differences and the 
value of “M” plays no role in this calculation so, it too, is not impacted by the encryption 
process. Therefore, the expectations of any calculation done using these three statistical 
tests on the data should produce identical encrypted or unencrypted results. We can see 
in the above three tables the t-statistic is the same for all three results (12.944). Similar 
results are also visible in two additional studies that follow where Student-t and WRS test 
outcomes produced independent identical encrypted and unencrypted results using a 
much larger data set where the sample size was 144 data points. Though the values are 
different for different tests, the test itself produces an identical outcome. 
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Table 5.3 – Review of Statistical Pattern for Drop-out of “M” 
M = 2.00 
n = 10 
µ = 0  
Di Di – X  (Di – X)2 
 
3 M - 1.4 M 1.96 M2 
3 M - 1.4 M 1.96 M2 
4 M - 0.4 M 0.16 M2 
4 M - 0.4 M 0.16 M2 
4 M - 0.4 M 0.16 M2 
4 M - 0.4 M 0.16 M2 
5 M + 0.6 M 0.36 M2 
5 M + 0.6 M 0.36 M2 
6 M + 1.6 M 2.56 M2 
6 M + 1.6 M 2.56 M2 
∑ = 44 M Variance = 10.4 M2 
X = 4.4 M Std. Dev. = 1.075 M 
to = (n)1/2 (X - µ) / S = (10)1/2 (4.4 M - 0) / 1.075 M to = 12.944 
This final demonstration of no impact takes a much larger known normal data set and 
adjusts it by a different value “M” of my choosing. The data should remain normal, the 
variation will again be changed because of the multiplier, but relative distance (one data 
point to the other) is still unchanged and the results will be identical for each test along 
with data demonstrating similar properties as shown in the earlier example. 
Choice of this normal data came from a file, generated by the researcher and known to 
be statistically normal. The file consisted of 144 data points and is a close approximation 
to the actual OEM data file received (148 suppliers). A portion of this file is shown in a 
table with an adjusted (encrypted) result. The adjusted data is rounded to three decimal 
points for ease of manipulation. My choice of “M” was the numerical value 3.1417 (not π 
but close) – this was simply another arbitrary number chosen by the researcher. 
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The entire parametric data (normal) file used in this analysis can be found in (Table AT-
5.1) in the appendix. A small portion of the encryption process is shown in (Table 5.4) 
below using the value of “M” selected by the researcher and ignoring the value of “b” as 
it is no longer applicable to the work. The actual data is shown as values of “X” and would 
represent the difference in defect rate averages as in the Case Study data – these are 
the values taken from (Table AT-5.1). Each value of “Y” is the encrypted results but using 
the arbitrary multiplier, “M = 3.1417.” Looking at the normal data and the encrypted data 
shows similar but uniquely different value sets.  
The question is, “Does the change represent a difference?” If we were measuring the 
variance, there would be a difference. The base of the encrypted data is wider and with 
greater variance because of the multiplier “M.” However, as part of the Student-t analysis, 
the focal point was on the mean of the data and not the variance although variance and 
standard deviation play a role in the analytical calculations for the Student-t. (Table 5.4) 
values of “X” will represent data points before difference encryption and subtraction. The 
data was plotted to check for its normality and graphed as a histogram. Looking at 
(Figures AF-5.17) (unencrypted normal data) and AF-5.18 (encrypted normal data), found 
in the Appendix, it would be impossible to tell the difference between the two if the 
horizontal axis legend on each graph were removed. As can be seen in the two plots of 
data, both are highly normalized. The question becomes, “Does the encrypted data give 
a different result compared to the original data?” 
By deliberate design, all values in the 144 data points were chosen to be greater than 
zero to provide a mean known to be greater than zero for each point. We would expect   
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Table 5.4 – Normal Data File – Generated by Researcher 
X = Actual Data 
Difference 
Modifier 





M = 3.1417 
  






































Note: “b” is ignored since it is included as part of the subtraction difference to obtain the 
value of “X” and drops from the equation. 
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any analysis by the Student-t distribution for matched-pair data to provide a similar result 
assuming the  encryption process has no impact. All  the encryption process does is shift 
the entire data set to the right by a value of 3.1417 and widen the base of the histogram 
(increased variance and standard deviation). 
We can look at normality of the data through descriptive statistics analysis. The math and 
the histograms for these analyses were done using Sigma-XL. They can also be 
completed by-hand, but the effort would be time consuming and subject to error. Also, the 
size of the sample mandated the use of computer system software for the analysis and 
calculations. 
Looking at (Figures AF-5.17 and 5.18) (Appendix), both figures show a similar histogram 
profile. (Figure AF-5.23) for (Figure AF-5.17) and (Figure AF-5.24) for (Figure 5.18) also 
provide identical results with a p-value (0.1355) indicating both are normal data. As 
expected, the statistics provided a different mean, standard deviation, and average 
square error but the data in both cases (encrypted or not) is still normal. Applying the one-
sample t-test to both the normal and the encrypted data, we get the following results 
shown in (Table 5.5) below. The differences are translatable if the value of “M” is known. 
Information about the data can easily be converted from unencrypted to encrypted values 
and reversed if needed. Note that the counts are the same. The mean in the unencrypted 
data can easily be converted to the mean in the encrypted data, remembering the value 
of “b” does not factor into the conversion (it dropped out during the difference calculation). 
The standard deviation for the unencrypted data (22) can be converted to the encrypted 
data also by simply multiplying by 3.1417. The t-statistic for both is greater than 40 
(identical in both instances, 40.198)  providing excellent evidence  that both distributions 
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Table 5.5 – Comparison Data for Normal and Encrypted Data 
1-Sample t-Test – Unencrypted & Encrypted Data 
Test Information 
Ho: Mean (MU) = 0 
Ha: Mean (MU) > 0 
Results Unencrypted Encrypted 
Count (N) 144 144 
Mean 22 69.117 
Std. Deviation 6.568 20.663 
SE Mean 0.547297 1.719 
T (calculated) 40.198 40.198 
p-value (1 sided) 0.0000 0.0000 
LC (1-sided, 95%) 23.298 73.197 
 
Y = (3.1417) (22) = 69.117 
are not equal to zero and the encryption does not change the t-statistic result. We also 
know from the fact the data was chosen with positive values for all points in the sample 
there is 100% confidence that the mean will be greater than zero for both the unencrypted 
normal data (23.30) and the encrypted data (73.20) – rounded to 2 decimal places (there 
are small rounding errors in the calculations). Even the encrypted value for the confidence 
interval can be calculated by multiplying by 3.1417 times the unencrypted data to obtain 
the results in the confidence interval values: 
  Ye = (23.30) (3.1417) = 73.20 
One can reverse the encrypted data points back to their original normal value by dividing 
the result by “M = 3.1417”.  
Yu = (73.20) / (3.1417) = 23.30  
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The conclusion drawn from this exercise is that encryption changes made on the OEM 
defect data will have no impact on the statistical analysis process if the data are normally 
distributed. If the encryption multiplier is known, the data can be manipulated back and 
forth between the encrypted and unencrypted data without loss of statistical confidence 
in the result.  
Encryption Process, Impact of “M” on Nonparametric Data 
This same question relative to nonparametric data was also assessed – that is, what if 
the data are not normal? Will nonparametric analysis hold for either case (encrypted or 
not)? Continuing with the same line of thinking as the normal data, a new data set using 
144 modified data points that were not normally distributed was created. The 
nonparametric data had significant outliers in the data (similar to our Case Study data 
set) making it nonparametric – highly skewed. Additionally, included within this set are 
multiple negative values that, interpreted for this research, implies the difference in the 
after result is greater than the before result, thus a negative value. The nonparametric 
data set can be found in (Table AT-5.2) of the appendix. 
While it may be possible to normalize this data, it is not a requirement for this research 
activity. It must be nonparametric for both unencrypted and encrypted data. Like the 
normal data impact study, the histogram plots were made for both the nonencrypted data 
(Figure AF-5.25) and the encrypted data (Figure AF-5.26). Using the same value for “M” 
as was done to the normal data and recalling “b” drops out during the subtraction 
difference process the encryption was completed and compared similarly as for the 
normal data. These two figures (AF-5.25 and 5.26) may be found in the Appendix as well.  
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As expected, the normality plots were decidedly nonparametric with obvious outliers in 
the data compared with the earlier results for the normal data. Like the earlier example, 
the nonencrypted data was also plotted as histograms with statistics along with the 
encrypted data and statistics for comparison. Just as with the normal data, the same 
results can be obtained using the Y = MX adjustments to get the other data. Again, the 
counts were the same. The mean in the unencrypted data (94.84) can be easily converted 
to the mean in the encrypted data (297.96): 
 Y = (3.1417) (94.84) = 297.96 
Note that the Anderson Darling test for both sets of data (Figures AT-5.25 and AT-5.26) 
produced identical test results indicating nonparametric data; that is, the p-value is less 
than 0.05 (actual = 0.0000) and indicated data is not normal using the hypothesis test 
(Ho: Normal data versus; Ha: Data are not Normal). 
In this data set, not all results in the data (unencrypted or encrypted) were greater than 
zero. As the data is decidedly nonparametric, the Student-t distribution was not used. In 
this scenario, the Wilcoxan Rank-Sign (WRS) test was used to evaluate both positive and 
negative values for a disposition on the median. There were no zero values within the 
test, again by design. Using the same approach as the normal data test 𝜇b – 𝜇a = 𝜇TR  and 
assigning the difference between the two means as the training result (that is, the value 
of each of the 144 data points times its ‘M” value), the Wilcoxan Rank-Sign test was 
performed on unencrypted and encrypted data. 
The non-parametric Wilcoxan Rank-Sign test is a pseudo-normality test in which the data 
is converted to a positive or negative rank ignoring all values equal to zero. The WRS test 
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first takes data and orders the absolute value of each data point from the smallest value 
to its largest. In cases where the same value appears more than once, (for example; in a 
situation where an identical value is recorded for two data points, say a value of 50 and 
50 in rank positions of 25 and 26) the values of each are assigned a rank-value of 25.5 
((25 + 26) / 2 = 25.5) and then given back the sign of the original data point (whether it be 
positive or negative) before the ranking.  
All positive values and all negative values are then tabulated and the probability of the 
positive value outweighing the negative value is calculated (W-statistic). If the probability 
is less than 0.05, the researcher abandons the null in favor of the alternate hypothesis 
meaning the median is greater than zero. Within the software, the median can be a one-
sided test for the alternate hypothesis and chosen as greater than zero or less than zero 
before the test is performed. 
The rearrangement of data (that is, the Rank-Sign) then becomes somewhat of a normal 
distribution and can be plotted as a normal distribution. Within this test, there has been 
some past user confusion as to what the test checks for. Remembering the data is 
nonparametric, the “Rank-Sign” result is normal in the sense that the researcher could 
calculate a rank order mean and it would plot as normal data (see Figure 4.5). However, 
it makes no sense to address the mean at this situation. The mean of the rank order has 
no special meaning other than to indicate what the average rank is. One could track 
backwards from the mean rank and correlate it to a value in the nonparametric data but 
there is an equal possibility it could be positive or negative. Therefore, this tactic has no 
logic. It makes more sense to look at the median and let the software tell the researcher 
whether there is a statistical majority of positive or negative values in the rank. 
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Since the data was nonparametric, outliers skew the mean result in an unwanted way 
and can potentially provide a false positive result. Therefore, the median (which the test 
calculates) is a much better approximation for central tendency. From what this 
researcher gathered, the confusion among test users is in trying to answer exactly what 
the test is looking at (mean or median). You can look at the mean of the rank as it is 
normalized (no logic) or look at the test median (this researcher’s understanding of the 
test’s actual intent). This explanation clarifies what the Wilcoxan Rank-Sign (WRS) test 
actually does. 
Executing the WRS test on the unencrypted and encrypted data files produced identical 
results. The rank-order should be the same with a corresponding exactness in result. The 
only difference in this case is the relative distance between each data point (multiplied by 
3.1417). (Table 5.6) below provides the results of the WRS test on both nonencrypted 
and encrypted data. Of note is the fact that the Wilcoxan statistic (value = 8,078) is the 
same for each as they should be – there is no difference in the rank order and sign for 
each set. Note also the one-sided test p-values are both less than 0.05 (actual = 0.0000) 
resulting in a decision to reject the null hypothesis in favor of the alternate.  
It is easy to conclude this test will produce an analysis of nonparametric data that, in many 
ways, is as strong as the t-statistic for normal data. In this case, analysis using the WRS 
test, the researcher abandons the null hypothesis in favor of the alternate – that is, the 
median is greater than zero. Said another way, the result shows the difference is a 
decided reduction in defects (represented by the median). Consequently, encrypting the 
defect rates does not alter the data relative to statistical results using the Wilcoxan Rank-
Sign test. The Sign test was not checked – but one would expect similar results. 
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Table 5.6 – WRS Test for Nonparametric Data Impact Study 
1-Sample Wilcoxan Rank-Sign Test  – Study of Nonparametric Data 
Test Information 
Ho: Mean (MU) = 0 
Ha: Mean (MU) > 0 
Results Unencrypted Encrypted 
Count (N) 144 144 
Count for Test 144 144 
Median 20.5 64.405 
Wilcoxan Statistic 8,078 8,078 
p-value (1-sided) 0.0000 0.0000 
Regardless of the method (t-statistic or Wilcoxan Rank-Sign), the researcher can be 
confident in reporting the experimental results. Based on the studies just completed using 
different encryption values, both normal data and nonparametric data are not impacted 
by the multiplier. There were study three conclusions of note: 
1) Encryption of normal data analyzed by using the t-statistic or t-distribution is 
unaffected by the multiplier “M” and the researcher can conclude no negative 
impact on process statistical results in terms of research outcomes.  
2) Encryption of nonparametric data analyzed by using the Wilcoxan Rank Sign test 
is unaffected by the multiplier “M” and the researcher can conclude there no 
negative impact on process results in terms of research outcomes.  
3) The value of “b” was never needed for the encryption process for matched-pair 
data – a minor error on the part of this researcher. The value of “b” disappears in 
the subtraction process. Future analysis of this nature should eliminate the “b” 
element of the encryption process. 
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Results of High-Level Data Review 
Initially, a high-level look at the data combinations was completed looking for meaningful 
information that would provide some level of insight into the data without a great deal of 
mathematical computation. The findings of this review are shown below but some 
description of method is needed before discussing and showing results. These findings 
were also statistically assessed using data simulations as a statistical means of showing 
relationships and a statistical analysis and DOE as well performed on the original data. 
In the data, one of three supplier results have occurred while looking at the matched pair 
differences of the 12-month average before and after the completed training: 
1) The supplier shows a performance improvement – a reduction in defects. 
2) The supplier shows no change or shift in defects – reduction rate is unchanged. 
3) The supplier shows a performance decline – an actual increase in defects. 
A zero value reflects no or zero change in defect rates. This can be seen in 16.2% of the 
data provided where the data points all show the same value of seven (7.000000) before 
and after the training providing a “zero” in the matched-pair difference. These values are 
excluded by the Sign test and by the Wilcoxan Rank-Sign tests.  
The only way these data points can be zero in their difference is for these suppliers to 
have had a zero-defect rate both before and after training. When b is then added to zero, 
the result is seven exactly.  This result is an indication the value of “b” is seven. 
Eq’n #8: Derived earlier during analysis of “b” impact   D1 = M (Xb – Xa)  
Eq’n #9: Equation #5 rearranged        (Xb – Xa) = D1 / M  
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It is a given that “M” was a positive value – agreed before generating the data the 
researcher received. If the before and after match-pair difference “D1” is zero, the only 
way this result can be true is for “Xb – Xa” to equal zero. Therefore, the only way to get 
this result is for the values of both “Xb” and “Xa” defect values to be zero – otherwise, the 
value of ”D1” would be either a positive or negative outcome. 
Consequently, no meaningful change is shown in these data points. However, to the 
benefit of the OEM, no increase in low defect rates (that is, results equal to zero) from 
these suppliers is at least one desirable state or condition. Looked at another way, these 
are some of the better suppliers within the supply chain and they are doing well both 
before training and after. These suppliers are “holding their own” while incorporating new 
information into their manufacturing culture.  
Consequently, these zero difference values should be accounted for and included in 
some way along with reductions in the high-level review. In the high-level mathematical 
development of these numbers, they are tracked separately but combined as part of the 
percentage for improvement or no change. These are positive performance results much 
like the positive differences even though the result, in each case, is zero.  
Some of the results in the matched pair differences are negative. The companies that 
experience gains in their defect rates over time are the suppliers that need further 
investigation as to why their rates are rising rather than falling. At least one explanation 
is they attended but failed to implement what was taught in the class – the most likely 
scenario. The cause behind this is unknown but can be cultural or resource related.  
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The results, at a high-level, provided confirmation that the supplier development training 
is having a positive impact on defect reductions. The results imply 7 in every 10 suppliers 
are on the right track while the remaining 3 in 10 are experiencing negative results. In 
each case, training combinations are greater than 50% with one combination approaching 
80% - all good news for the OEM and UT CIS. This was a simple set of observations and 
with some of the smaller sample groupings having only a limited amount of data to support 
their claim. The numbers are reflected in (Tables 5.7 and 5.8) respectively for PPM and 
3MIS data. These groups will be explored further using statistical analysis and simulations 
to provide additional information.  
The implications of a gain in defect outcomes (negative differences) is an indictment of 
the supplier in terms of their failure to implement what was taught in class. The supplier’s 
defect rates after training is higher than the average before training was started. This is 
counter-intuitive. Had they implemented what they were taught, improvements should be 
visible like the other suppliers. The OEM should explore with these suppliers what is 
happening at their locations and why defects have risen rather than declined.  
Looking at the data further, another discovery was made related to the length of time each 
of the training interventions have been implemented. There is supporting evidence that 
the training  classes  with a longer history in  supplier development  are producing a  
greater impact in terms of percentage improvements for defect rates. Likewise, shorter 
history programs are showing the least improvement.   
The data was graphed for just the groups A, B, and C with results shown for both PPM 
and 3MIS data. As evident from the graphs, there is supporting evidence that PFMEA  
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Table 5.7 – Percentage of Improvement / No Change for PPM data 
Code 










AC only, not B 25.0% 37.5% 37.5% 62.5% 
BC only, not A 0.0% 33.3% 66.7% 66.7% 
C only, not A&B 27.3% 36.4% 36.4% 63.6% 
B only, not A&C 36.8% 42.1% 21.1% 57.9% 
AB only, not C 24.2% 36.4% 39.4% 63.6% 
AB, AC, or BC 20.0% 36.0% 44.0% 64.0% 
A, B, or C 31.9% 30.4% 37.7% 69.6% 
ABC (all) 10.3% 27.6% 62.1% 72.4% 
A only, not B&C 30.8% 23.1% 46.2% 76.9% 
A, B, C, AB, AC, BE, or 
ABC 
23.6% 31.8% 44.6% 68.2% 
 
Table 5.8 – Percentage of Improvement / No Change for 3MIS data 
Code 










AC only, not B 0.0% 37.5% 62.5% 62.5% 
BC only, not A 22.2% 22.2% 55.6% 77.8% 
C only, not A&B 9.1% 45.5% 45.5% 54.5% 
B only, not A&C 10.5% 42.1% 47.4% 57.9% 
AB only, not C 9.1% 33.3% 57.6% 66.7% 
AB, AC, or BC 10.0% 32.0% 58.0% 68.0% 
A, B, or C 8.7% 31.9% 59.4% 68.1% 
ABC (all) 6.9% 31.0% 62.1% 69.0% 
A only, not B&C 7.7% 23.1% 69.2% 76.9% 
A, B, C, AB, AC, BE, or 
ABC 
8.8% 31.8% 59.5% 68.2% 
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shows improvement with 8D / PS and Containment training programs having a lower 
improvement impact. The first (Figure 5.3) is PPM data (defects found at the OEM 
assembly plant) versus the defects found after the vehicle was sold (3MIS) – (Figure 5.4). 
Whether this is the nature of the class (what is being taught) or due to having been in 
existence a lesser time (“B” by one year and “C” by two years) is not known. What is 
known is there are fewer supplier representatives having gone through the last course 
(C) compared to the PFMEA and 8-D courses (A & B).  
Longer term, one might infer the “shorter-history” class combinations may be capable of 
producing similarly effective results to PFMEA / CP but that is not currently evident in the 
data using this analytical technique. In both the PPM and the 3MIS data, the same trend 
is seen but with 8-D (group B) reversed with containment (group C) training. In the PPM 
case, the order is A, C, then B, whereas, in the 3MIS data, the order is A, B, then C. The 
researcher attempted to determine why this was reversed. Intuitively, if time is the reason, 
one would expect A, B, and then C in that order due to the dates the classes were 
launched (each a year apart). That’s not the case in both databases so a different reason  
was sought. It is possible the cause lies more with the suppliers that took the courses. 
What was discovered in the reversal analysis was the two combinations (B and C) are 
both a part of the sample combinations with smaller data sets, so the data simulations 
would be better indicators of meaningful results. The combination of “B” (8-D / Problem 
Solving) had the larger mean value by an order of magnitude compared to C. The results 
themselves are simple supplier ratios showing improvement including a number of 






Figure 5.3 – Training Program Run Time versus % Improvement – PPM Data 
 
 




In looking at the data, it was noticed in the “B” and “C” combinations there were more 
suppliers with unchanged defect rates for the PPM data than existed for 3MIS. This 
resulted in the reversal of the data values. This reversal is related to suppliers that took 
the classes so there may be a duel cause at work here (time and supplier).  
Looking at the data for B and C separately, both are just a few percentage points different 
from each other, so the reversal would appear of little importance. In both cases for the 
PPM and the 3MIS data, combination “A” (PFMEA / Control Plan) is superior to the other 
two in terms of performance by a significant amount (10 to 20 percentage points). The 
simulation run and DOE discussed later in the chapter supports this conclusion as well. 
Interestingly, class “A” is by far the longest running class of the three by more than a year 
compared to “B” and more than two years compared to “C”.  
This additional year would give suppliers a larger time window in which to implement 
efforts using PFMEA / CP as a predictive tool improving their error proofing activities. 
Consequently, this should provide more time to lower defect rates. Or, alternatively, the 
supplier will experience no change since the supplier was already at zero. This reversal 
anomaly in the data seems to be satisfactorily explained. The simulation studies are 
included in a separate section of their own which follow. 
Data Simulation Study for Normality 
The simulation generator for normality was investigated as to the cause of why some 
results were nonparametric. It would make sense that an equation designed to generate 
normal data curves should do just that. Simulations were tried at 25, 50, 75, 100, 125, 
150, 250, 500, 800, 1000, 1200, 1400, 1500, 1750, 2000, and 3000 using the PPM data 
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(mean and standard deviation) for ABC, BC, AC, AB, C, B, and A and the Anderson-
Darling normality tests run on each group to determine normality.  
All did not produce normal data distribution curves with p-values greater than 5%. Again, 
the underlying assumption for the test is Ho: Distribution is Normal and Ha: Distribution 
is nonparametric or not normal. The researcher’s initial thinking was the data outliers from 
the original data set was causing the failures but as the sample sizes grew larger and 
larger, the nonparametric curves continued to appear even with sample sizes as high as 
1,750 points. All total there were 105 tests completed for normality with only 5 showing 
nonparametric behavior. The results can be found in Table 5.9 for Anderson-Darling 
normality checks. Thinking through this, the normality generator also has a confidence 
level (assumed to be 95%) for generating a normal distribution curve so it should be no 
surprise that some may be nonparametric as the simulation started with nonparametric 
data in every grouping.  
Conclusions are that increasing the sample size for each combination will increase the 
precision of the results. Precision is the ability of the statistical study to detect smaller and 
smaller data differences. This prevents the researcher from making a Type I Error -
rejecting the null when the null is true. However, this action does not provide for the result 
being investigated (that is, correlation to developmental training).  
The researcher then went through set of simulation runs with the data but used just the 
T-statistic test and the Wilcoxan Rank-Sign tests for training correlation p-values. Results 
showed samples less than 75 data points had variation in their p-values but as the sample 
size grew, this became less an issue. When the sample size got to 500, consistent results   
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Table 5.9 – Simulation Study, p-values for Test Runs 
Simulation Study 
PPM PPM PPM PPM PPM PPM PPM 
ABC BC AC AB C B A 
Sample Size; N=25 0.379 0.950 0.918 0.502 0.902 0.457 0.115 
Sample Size; N=50 0.878 0.536 0.550 0.254 0.567 0.734 0.330 
Sample Size; N=75 0.406 0.665 0.989 0.922 0.570 0.542 0.746 
Sample Size; N=100 0.763 0.717 0.261 0.341 0.232 0.108 0.238 
Sample Size; N=125 0.196 0.451 0.030 0.431 0.890 0.871 0.860 
Sample Size; N=150 0.505 0.818 0.531 0.941 0.604 0.186 0.551 
Sample Size; N=250 0.847 0.363 0.486 0.199 0.919 0.551 0.082 
Sample Size; N=500 0.740 0.204 0.615 0.814 0.641 0.037 0.315 
Sample Size; N=800 0.327 0.416 0.794 0.088 0.221 0.656 0.951 
Sample Size; N=1,000 0.698 0.660 0.395 0.880 0.009 0.146 0.678 
Sample Size; N=1,200 0.319 0.075 0.260 0.843 0.527 0.918 0.998 
Sample Size; N=1,400 0.586 0.771 0.135 0.957 0.928 0.435 0.620 
Sample Size; N=1,500 0.316 0.979 0.420 0.966 0.828 0.400 0.599 
Sample Size; N=1,750 0.891 0.245 0.117 0.561 0.020 0.546 0.043 
Sample Size; N=2,000 0.718 0.942 0.810 0.553 0.535 0.213 0.180 
Sample Size; N=3,000 0.613 0.643 0.785 0.674 0.740 0.549 0.296 
 
Notes: 
Number of Samples, Nonparametric    5         A-D Ho: Graphs are normal 
Number of Samples, Parametric  100         A-D Ha: Graphs are nonparametric 
Total number of Samples Tested  105 
Percentage of Samples nonparametric = (5 / 105) (100) = 4.8% 




appeared in terms of the p-values for the test statistic in both the T-test and the Wilcoxan 
Rank-Sign (all were 0.0000 with the exception of BC which showed no correlation). The 
results are shown below in (Table 5.10 and 5.11). It should be noted that the sample run 
for the actual statistics reported for the correlations in the next section are a different 
simulation run and also included the Sign Test as part of the study.  
Data Simulation for Smaller Sample Groups 
Statistically the better indicators for the actual data seemed to be the nonparametric tests 
– the Sign and Wilcoxan Rank-Sign Test. However, the Wilcoxan method ignores zero 
difference values in the matched-pair data so statistical results are, in some ways, less 
meaningful since it excludes a significant piece (16.2%) of the data. If the zero differences 
are ignored, this lowers the number of data points in the sample and, consequently, can  
lower the power of the test. The smaller groups were explored through data simulation. 
As it was simple and easy to do, the larger group sizes were included as well. There was 
an additional reason to include them and discussed later. Consequently, the data 
simulations that were completed included combinations A, B, C, AB, AC, BC, & ABC (all 
seven combinations). The findings for these simulations are shown later for the PPM and 
3MIS data respectively. It was not surprising to see no meaningful information extracted 
from the original groups with the small sample size. For example, the smallest group had 
a sample size of six. For that sample to be statistically significant, all suppliers within this 
group would have to post reductions for a positive correlation and that was not the case 
with the data. The research interest here was to determine what the data would show if 




Table 5.10 – p-values for T-distribution Assessment for Correlation 
P-values for T-
Distribution 
PPM PPM PPM PPM PPM PPM PPM 
ABC BC AC AB C B A 
Sample Size; 
N=15 
0.0004 0.7627 0.0069 0.0008 0.0246 0.1232 0.7436 
Sample Size; 
N=25 
0.0010 0.5772 0.0312 0.0060 0.0501 0.1862 0.3227 
Sample Size; 
N=50 
0.0001 0.0279 0.0064 0.0035 0.0141 0.1492 0.0984 
Sample Size; 
N=75 
0.0010 0.0776 0.0002 0.0019 0.0012 0.0361 0.0352 
Sample Size; 
N=100 
0.0002 0.1403 0.0000 0.0016 0.0007 0.0036 0.0177 
Sample Size; 
N=125 
0.0003 0.1637 0.0000 0.0001 0.0003 0.0034 0.0088 
Sample Size; 
N=150 
0.0000 0.2609 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0037 0.0121 
Sample Size; 
N=250 
0.0000 0.6120 0.0000 0.0000 0.0019 0.0002 0.0017 
Sample Size; 
N=500 
0.0000 0.3969 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Table 5.11 – p-values for Wilcoxan Rank-Sign Assessment for Correlation 
P-values for T-
Distribution 
PPM PPM PPM PPM PPM PPM PPM 
ABC BC AC AB C B A 
Sample Size; 
N=15 
0.0004 0.7627 0.0069 0.0008 0.0246 0.1232 0.7436 
Sample Size; 
N=25 
0.0010 0.5772 0.0312 0.0060 0.0501 0.1862 0.3227 
Sample Size; 
N=50 
0.0001 0.0279 0.0064 0.0035 0.0141 0.1492 0.0984 
Sample Size; 
N=75 
0.0010 0.0776 0.0002 0.0019 0.0012 0.0361 0.0352 
Sample Size; 
N=100 
0.0002 0.1403 0.0000 0.0016 0.0007 0.0036 0.0177 
Sample Size; 
N=125 
0.0003 0.1637 0.0000 0.0001 0.0003 0.0034 0.0088 
Sample Size; 
N=150 
0.0000 0.2609 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0037 0.0121 
Sample Size; 
N=250 
0.0000 0.6120 0.0000 0.0000 0.0019 0.0002 0.0017 
Sample Size; 
N=500 
0.0000 0.3969 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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The data simulations provided some interesting results as (Tables 5.12 and 5.13) 
indicate. Of all seven combinations (A, B, C, AB, AC, BC, & ABC) for both the PPM and 
3MIS data only four failed to show a correlation between training and defect reduction. In 
total, forty–two statistical tests were run on these combinations (Student-t, Sign, and 
Wilcoxan Rank Sign) for each set of classes (a total of 7 combinations times 3 tests per 
combination times 2 databases equaling 42 tests results).  
In the simulations, if one test showed a positive correlation, all the test performed on the 
combination showed the same outcome. If the result was no correlation, all three 
confirmed the combination in the set to be no correlation. However, most of the 
combinations showed a positive significance and correlation. As can be seen from the 
data, the only simulated set that did not provide a positive result for the PPM data was 
the combination “BC” while the remaining six combinations (A, B, C, AB, AC, and ABC) 
provided a correlation as denoted by their p-values – all were less than 0.05. Within the 
3MIS data, three combinations provided no correlation with their alpha values being 
greater than 0.05 (C, BC, and ABC). All these combinations delivered a p-value from a 
low of 0.9172 to a high of 1.0000. The normality of these simulations was also checked, 
and, as expected from a 500-point simulation, the data was normal.  
Some of the explanation behind the negative correlations for the BC grouping can be 
explained in  that the mean for  the PPM data was very  near zero with  a large standard 
deviation (3.11, 371.16 respectively) while the means for the 3MIS data with no 
correlations (three separate groups) were actually negative values with significant 
standard deviations. Group B had a small negative and sizable standard deviation (-
16.78, 124.13). Likewise, group ABC in 3MIS had a similar condition with a more negative 
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Table 5.12 – Simulated p-value Results for PPM & 3MIS Data, N=500 
Summary of Simulation Runs 
for each Data Combination 
Data Simulation Results; N = 500 
PPM 
Matched 
Pair –     
p- value 










3MIS      
Matched 
Pair –     
p- value 










Data Set Description Code 
PFMEA/CP (only) A 0.0246 0.0178 0.0031 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 
8-D Problem Solving B 0.0000 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0065 
Containment C 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.9893 0.9172 0.9827 
PFMEA/CP & 8-D PS AB 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
PFMEA/CP & Containment AC 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
8-D PS & Containment BC 0.4685 0.2512 0.6299 1.0000 0.9510 1.0000 
Attended all 3 Trg. Events ABC 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9045 0.9027 1.0000 
 
Table 5.13 – Significance Results for PPM & 3MIS Data, N=500 
Summary of Simulation Runs 
for each Data Combination 
Significant YES or NO 
PPM        
T-Test 






3MIS      
T-Test 






Data Set Description Code 
PFMEA/CP (only) A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
8-D Problem Solving B Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Containment C Yes Yes Yes No No No 
PFMEA/CP & 8-D PS AB Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
PFMEA/CP & Containment AC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
8-D PS & Containment BC No No No No No No 
Attended all 3 Trg. Events ABC Yes Yes Yes No No No 
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mean and larger standard deviation (-26.13, 330.40). Finally, group C for 3MIS also had 
a similar negative mean compared to B, but with a smaller standard deviation (-10.19, 
97.42).  
It is not surprising these combinations failed to deliver a useful correlation (a normal data 
profile based on these values is highly likely to create a mean less than or equal to zero 
so the researcher cannot reject null in these cases; therefore Ho < 0). Additionally, groups 
ABC, BC, and C also had small sample sizes (C = 10 and BC = 7 and for 3MIS; BC = 9 
for PPM) and ABC was also small equaling 27 for 3MIS. Sample size along with mean 
and standard deviation caused these negative correlations. The negative or near zero 
means are the biggest contributor to this effect. More actual data will be needed for these 
combinations to determine their true effect.  
Information gained from this simulation run did provide some insight into the four sample 
combinations with insufficient data and also helped resolve an issue with one of the larger 
samples of actual data that produced borderline results in the original review. Of the four 
combinations with insufficient sample size (B, C, AC, and BC), combination “BC” failed to 
correlate to improved defect rate for either PPM or 3MIS in the original data. The same 
result existed for “C” and “ABC” combinations in 3MIS data as well.  
The rest showed positive correlations – most of the combinations indicate significant 
correlations to lower defect rates for the supplier for both PPM (six of the seven 
combinations) and for 3MIS (four of the seven combinations). Noteworthy in this data are 
combinations that are longer running in terms of class launch. Also, noteworthy, is the 
fact 3MIS data lags producer data by 15 – 17 months so this may be an additional reason 
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for the non-correlations in 3MIS data. This was not accounted for in the initial research 
design.  
The combination of “BC” for PPM data is the lone outlier to these combinations with a 
negative correlation. Interestingly, this combination has also had the shortest time for 
implementation compared to the others and with less data. Combinations of “AB,” “ABC,” 
and “AC” have in common the PFMEA / CP class (A) that is the longest running class. 
This does not, however explain the shortest running class “C” and the positive correlation 
of PPM data and the negative correlation for the 3MIS data. PPM data for group C did 
however have a positive mean relative to the negative mean in the 3MIS data. This is at 
least part of the explanation for the difference.  
Another possibility is the time lag difference mentioned earlier. The explanation may lie 
in the fact that the data collected on defect rates at the assembly plant is immediate – if 
there is a defect, the supplier knows within twenty-four hours there is a problem and must 
work to correct it whereas 3MIS data takes much longer to see in terms of the results. 
This may explain why there are more negative correlations in the 3MIS data – an 
insufficient amount of time has elapsed for the information to be generated – accounting 
for an additional 15 to 17 months elapsed time before the 3MIS data is averaged may 
produce similar results for the PPM data. 
 For the 3MIS data that had positive results, they have a common element. They are in 
combination with “A” (the longest running class) which adds an extra year back to the 
time window or B (second longest running class). If the defect rates are down at the 
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supplier site, the producer may start to see results late in calendar year 2018 or early 
2019 – past the time window of this Case Study. 
In summary, the simulated data provided insights into the results that would otherwise 
have not been known to the researcher. From these results, it can be concluded that time 
plays an important part as to when to assess reductions. The 3MIS analysis becomes 
more difficult to assess as it depends a great deal on sales and marketing in terms of how 
fast vehicles move off dealers’ car lots. In fact, the better indicator may simply be 
correlations between PPM rates and supplier training while ignoring 3MIS data because 
it removes the additional time lag from consideration. If these numbers are low and remain 
that way, the producer should expect declines sometime in the future for the 3MIS data 
after the vehicle is purchased by its owner.  
Simulation Study for Determination of “Best Combinations” 
The question of whether there were better classes or class combinations than others was 
also investigated with a second data simulation. To improve the precision of the result 
and provide sufficient sample size to narrow the confidence interval of the data, a 
simulation of size 1,000 was run. The simulation started with the same means and 
standard deviation for each combination as for the 500 data point simulation. 
Mathematically,  it just took a little longer on computer computation time.  
Combinations with higher differences in means and median were found in the data - they 
are shown below. The researcher ran two tests – the Welch ANOVA (Analysis of 
Variance) and One-Way ANOVA test on the data. The Welch ANOVA gave results on 
both the mean and median with confidence intervals for each combination and the one-
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way ANOVA gave results on just the mean with confidence intervals. Again, all three 
results (Welch ANOVA for mean and the One-Way ANOVA for mean provided the same 
information in terms of combinations that were providing better results. (Figures 5.5 
through 5.10) (next two pages) provide the results of the ANOVA studies.  
As can be seen in the graphs, each class of data (PPM and 3MIS) have at least two 
groups that provide a better result in terms of larger defect reductions. It  is important to 
note that each class of data (PPM and 3MIS) are different but with a result that points to 
time-related outcomes. (Figures 5.5, 5.7, and 5.9) (PPM data) all provide two groups that 
are above the rest in terms of performance with defect reductions (AC & B) for PPM.  
The One-Way ANOVA for the PPM data failed to produce as much separation for “AC” 
as did the Welch ANOVA test, but the graph still shows a significant piece of the 
confidence interval above the others, so it was included as a desirable combination. 
(Figures 5.6, 5.8, and 5.10) (3MIS data) also provided two groups that are above the rest 
in terms of performance with greater defect reductions (AB & B). Considering the results, 
they both (PPM & 3MIS) have the common class of 8-D Problem Solving (B) and they 
have one common element of PFMEA (A) in the double class combination (AB & AC).  
This result infers the two longer running programs are having the largest impact on 
improvement (reductions) for defect rates found at the assembly plant and for defect rates 
after the car is sold – 3MIS.  
This is not surprising; the effect the manufacturer is looking for does not appear 




Figure 5.5 – PPM (Welch ANOVA) 
 
 
Figure 5.6 – 3MIS (Welch ANOVA) 
 
 
































change in any organization is as much about training and learning as it is about the will 
to change and  move to a different level of  understanding.  The data tells the researcher 
that some organizations have been unwilling to change (a relative minority). Still others 
appear to have changed (the majority). Making a “culture shift” would be a more 
appropriate descriptor. Suppliers and the OEM must view slow-change as part of this 
long-term objective. This change is a transformation leading to lower defects in future 
years. The transition is already visible statistically. 
Review of the Results of the Original Data 
The original data is presented last rather than first because it was the least revealing. 
There is evidence in the actual data of correlations between defect reductions and the 
supplier related training events that have been conducted across this span of time (2013 
to 2017). However, four of the original combinations failed to show any correlation due to 
their sample size.  
The remaining three combinations provided another line of thought for investigation 
during the data simulations for the larger samples. If the simulated data was the same for 
the original large samples as the simulated data, inference can be made relative to the 
small sample results discussed earlier. In other words, if the simulation for the larger 
samples agreed with the original data analysis, it is acceptable to infer the correlations 
yielded by the small sample simulation were significantly different as compared to the 
original data analysis. The results of these tests on original data are show in (Tables 5.14 




Table 5.14 – p-Values; T-Test, Sign & WRS Studies – Original Data 
p-values for Tests PPM PPM PPM 3MIS 3MIS 3MIS 













PFMEA/CP 0.1454 0.6563 0.2008 0.1521 0.3633 0.2206 
8-D PS & Containment 0.1960 0.2539 0.3178 0.2495 0.2266 0.1763 
Containment 0.3884 0.6367 0.4168 0.1136 0.6230 0.3417 
8-D Problem Solving 0.1960 0.3877 0.5468 0.2495 0.5958 0.3525 
PFMEA/CP 0.1151 0.0416 0.0524 0.0559 0.0013 0.0053 
PFMEA/CP & 8-D PS 0.0314 0.5000 0.1130 0.1485 0.1002 0.0385 
Attended all Three 0.0267 0.0378 0.0347 0.2860 0.0610 0.0714 
 
All Suppliers with 2 of 3 
Training Events 
0.0275 0.3179 0.0465 0.0922 0.0362 0.0135 
All Suppliers with 1 of 3 
Training Events 
0.1890 0.2329 0.1192 0.0320 0.0083 0.0107 
All Training in Any 
Combination 
0.0080 0.0450 0.0040 0.0140 0.0003 0.0172 
 
Table 5.15 – Indicators for t-test, Sign and WRS – Original Data 
p-values for 
Tests 


















PFMEA/CP No No No No No No SSTS SSTS 
8-D PS & 
Containment 
No No No No No No SSTS SSTS 
Containment No No No No No No SSTS SSTS 
8-D Problem 
Solving 
No No No No No No SSTS SSTS 
PFMEA/CP No Yes BL BL Yes Yes Yes =1 Yes = 1 
PFMEA/CP & 
8-D PS 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes =1 Yes =1 
Attended all 
Three 
Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes =3 No 
    
All Suppliers 
with 2 of 3 
Training Events 
Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 
 
Yes =2 Yes =2 
All Suppliers 
with 1 of 3 
Training Events 
No No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes =3 
All Training in 
Any 
Combination 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes =3 Yes =3 
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The same three test (Student-t, Sign, and Wilcoxan Rank-Sign tests) were run on the 
data after an attempt to normalize the data so the Student-t distribution could be used. 
The normalization improved the result of the student-t distribution and did not impact the 
other two tests as they are nonparametric tests and are not affected by distribution 
normality. Note these studies are one-tailed significance test where the null hypothesis is 
that the mean or median is equal or less than zero and the alternate hypothesis is that 
the mean or the median is greater than zero.  
Recall from the earlier discussion the median value is a better indicator for skewed left or 
skewed right data than the mean. The seven combinations are the same seven that were 
under consideration in all the previous sections of this chapter (A, B, C, AB, AC, BC, & 
ABC). In the initial effort to see correlations, over half the data was not expected to yield 
a usable result. Consequently, the researcher looked at other data combinations to see 
whether other groupings yielded any significant results. The researcher looked at three 
additional groupings shown below the horizontal orange line in the figures: 
1) The data block of suppliers with double classes (AB, AC, or BC) taken.  
2) The data block of suppliers with just single classes (A, B, or C) taken. 
3) The entire data block (all 148 suppliers) as a single group. 
These combinations produced correlations as well but are not included as part of the data 
simulations which considered just the original seven combinations. They also are not 
reported as part of the conclusions. Upon review of the larger groups (all singles, all 
doubles, and the whole data base) – only  suppliers taking a single  class for the supplier 
PPM data failed to produce a positive correlation. One of the conclusions from this effort 
with the larger combinations of data was larger samples tend to produce results inferring 
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positive correlations. This was confirmed in the 500-sample data simulation providing 
information that inferred correlation on six of seven PPM and four of seven for the 3MIS 
groupings.  
Mentioned earlier, four combinations failed to show any correlation with reductions for 
either the PPM or the 3MIS PPM data (B, C, AC, and BC). Of the remainder (A, AB, and 
ABC), there were mixed results. There were some correlations, with one, two or three of 
the tests showing positive results. In a few cases, results in (Table 5.14) were borderline 
with the p-values just barely over 0.0500. These appear in (Table 5.15) as borderline (BL) 
– highlighted in yellow.  
In (Table 5.14), there are an equal number of negative to positive correlations (8 to 8) – 
counting the other two values 0.0610 and 0.0714 as too high to label as borderline and 
marked negative. The initial strategy was to use any of the three-test showing a positive 
correlation as reason to infer a connection between training and defect reduction. If this 
premise is used, the combination “ABC” for 3MIS data showed a negative correlation as 
shown in (Table 5.16).  
Using the data for the 500-run simulation, the results of both analyses can now be 
compared. In the original data, the reader can see no correlation in (Table 5.16) for B, C, 
AC, and BC but in the simulated run five of the eight for PPM and 3MIS show a correlated 
result. In the larger samples for the A, AB, and ABC we see the correlations to be the 
same with the original data showing fewer correlations with for the three tests. Exclusive 
of the four groupings with insufficient data size, the conclusions from the review of tests 
on the actual data are there are correlations between training and defect reduction on  
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PPM 3MIS PPM 3MIS 
Data Set Description Code Finding Finding Finding Finding 
8-D Problem Solving B No = 3 No = 3 Yes = 3 Yes = 3 
Containment C No = 3 No = 3 Yes = 3 No = 3 
PFMEA/CP & Containment AC No = 3 No = 3 Yes = 3 Yes = 3 
8-D PS & Containment BC No = 3 No = 3 No = 3 No = 3 
PFMEA/CP A Yes = 1 Yes = 2 Yes = 3 Yes = 3 
PFMEA/CP & 8-D PS AB Yes = 1 Yes = 1 Yes = 3 Yes = 3 
Attended all 3 Events ABC Yes = 3 No = 3 Yes = 3 No = 3 
three of the three combinations – PPM data (A, AB, and ABC) and for two of the three 
combinations for  3MIS data (A, AB, and ABC).  Only the  combination  of ABC  for 3MIS 
data showed a negative correlation of the three combinations which has already been 
explained in an earlier section. 
Comparing Actual to Simulated Data 
A comparison was made between the groupings with small sample sizes (four) and the 
larger samples (three) for the combinations of A, B, C, AB, AC, BC, and ABC. The results 
are shown in Table 5.16 above. The first four on the left were the sample groupings in the 
original data that were too small. Data simulation expanded their size and allowed an 
inference of a positive correlation for three of four for PPM supplier data and two of four 
for the 3MIS data. For the larger samples – both the actual and simulated data agreed.  
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Conclusions reached from this comparison are that if the three larger samples (A, AB, 
and ABC) agree with each other, then it is not a stretch in the mathematical sense to infer 
the four combinations with insufficient sample size producing a different result for the 
simulated run can be accepted as a positive correlation as well.  
The researcher can now infer that of the seven PPM combinations and the seven 3MIS 
combinations, 71.4% (10 of 14) of the training combinations produced a favorable result 
in the reduction of supplier defects either onsite or three months after the car was sold to 
the customer. These results agree well with the earlier high-level look at the data 
indicating 7 in 10 had implemented the training and education.  
Of the four smaller samples, the ones showing the negative correlations are also the ones 
having the later class launch dates and having starting means for the simulations that 
were negative or very close to zero. C also has the least amount of time since launch and 
the combination BC as well with the B portion of the combination only being older by one 
year. The reason behind why C has a positive correlation for PPM data and for 3MIS has 
a negative correlation was explored. This grouping was also of a small sample size in the 
original data. For both the PPM and 3MIS groupings, 3MIS data had a negative mean but 
with a standard deviation within 30 points of the PPM data but PPM data had a positive 
mean. For data simulation, this can account for why the positive correlation shows up for 
OEM site defects (PPM) and a negative correlation occurred for the 3MIS data.  
It is the only group and class in the fourteen that was different. If time since development 
and launch has a significant connection to the data results, this also likely impacts the 
results. This combination should be revisited as the database grows. 
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DOE Experiment - Actual Case Study Results 
The DOE testing of the original data produced one significant result for both the PPM data 
and the 3MIS data. Class “A” (PFMEA / CP) shown in Tables 5.17 and 5.18 below for the 
DOE results showed a significant correlation between the class and defect reductions at 
the assembly plant (PPM) and after the vehicle was in service (3MIS). The observed 
statistic (4.344 and 14.094 respectively), in both cases, exceeded the critical F-statistic 
value (4.080). Consequently, there is enough evidence to infer Class A is having a 
significant impact on defect reduction in both instances (PPM & 3MIS data). No additional 
significant correlations were noted in the DOE study. 
Note: The DOE with 6 replicates (two level full factorial) has an assumption in the data 
that was discussed briefly in Chapter 4. Not anticipating a DOE analysis of data, the 
researcher did not ask nor look for data on similar suppliers that took no classes. A 
discussion with the creator of the OEM database (Mr. J. Graves) indicated this would be 
time consuming and difficult to go back and generate so an alternative was needed for 
the negative values (see Table 4.9) of A, B, and C – that is, no classes taken.  
The basic assumption here was many of the suppliers had been requested to attend these 
classes because their supplier ratings were poor. Said differently, this is an indication 
their performance results on defects were rising as opposed to declining. Therefore, the 
matched pair differences would be negative rather than positive. A decision to randomly 
sample negative findings for matched pair differences (non-implementers) would be the 
same as not taking a class. Consequently, this is a significant underlying assumption for 




Table 5.17 – DOE Assessment of PPM Original Data 
Parameter SS d.f. MS Fo Fc Significant 
A 205125 1 205125 5.541 4.08 Yes 
B 9 1 9 0.000 4.08 No 
AB 12332 1 12332 0.333 4.08 No 
C 64478 1 64478 1.742 4.08 No 
AC 5026 1 5026 0.136 4.08 No 
BC 1994 1 1994 0.054 4.08 No 
ABC 68533 1 68533 1.851 4.08 No 
Error 1480875 40 37022 
 
Total 1838373 47  
 
 
Table 5.18 – DOE Assessment of 3MIS Original Data 
Parameter SS d.f. MS Fo Fc Significant 
A 639596 1 639596 17.276 4.08 Yes 
B 3611 1 3611 0.098 4.08 No 
AB 21338 1 21338 0.576 4.08 No 
C 115398 1 115398 3.117 4.08 No 
AC 3714 1 3714 0.100 4.08 No 
BC 13751 1 13751 0.371 4.08 No 
ABC 4501 1 4501 0.122 4.08 No 
Error 463419 40 11585 
 





Kirkpatrick Model, Level I and Level II Results 
Class performance metrics have been consistently good for classes spanning the training 
period from 2013 to 2017 and beyond. At the end of each class, the students are asked 
to provide a class assessment (evaluation). The evaluation does not require a student’s 
name so the evaluation is anonymous, and individuals can be candid about the class and 
usually are. Only one class is shown as part of this dissertation, but the information 
provided by this class is nominal for results throughout the entirety of supplier training.  
The student evaluation is completed on a scale of 1 to 5 (Likert scale with 5 being 
excellent, 4 being good to above average, 3 being average, 2 being below average and 
1 being unsatisfactory. It’s extremely common to see the evaluations for a specific 
evaluation category to be 90% or greater for four’s and five’s (above average to excellent). 
These results are shown in (Figure 5.11 through 5.16). The Likert score is calculated for 
each graph with the exception of student comments. Scores of 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, 4.6, and 4.6, 
respectively, were obtained with an average overall rating of 4.6. The number of students 
submitting evaluations for this class was 48.  
Test Scores can also be found in (Figures 5.17 & 5.18). Norms for the before and after 
test scores have routinely been in the high 60’s to low 70’s and low to mid 90’s, 
respectively since the inception of the training efforts by UT CIS. It is also not uncommon 
for students to score 100% of the final test. This provides an excellent indication the 
material was understood and learned. Outliers, as seen in the boxplot (Figure 5.18) are 
those students having no experience with the subject matter before class; however,  all 
passed the course after the material was delivered and the final was taken so a significant 







































Based on the cumulative results of these research studies, the researcher is confident 
the data analysis has shown a significant correlation between training and defect rate 
reduction at the assembly plant (PPM) and after the vehicle is sold to the customer (3MIS) 
for the 148 suppliers contained in the data set. This change on the part of the suppliers 
represents a significant culture shift away from their past “reactive’ posture and towards 
a more “proactive” stance in quality. The long-range OEM goal is being realized.  
For those suppliers not showing improvements, further work between OEM and supplier 
is needed to understand the implementation barriers standing in the way of what they 
learned. A probable cause was postulated in the body of this document but not verified. 
Data from the classroom indicates the material was understood by the supplier. However, 
lack of implementation is not necessarily the fault of the student.  
This failure should be directed towards each supplier’s corporate management. Either 
they decided on a conscious level not to implement the classroom materials or they lacked 
implementation resources. In either case, this was a supplier management decision and 






























1) The encryption process used by the OEM to maintain data security for its organization 
does not impact the results and outcomes of the research study. The data encryption 
process can be reversed, and the original data returned to its actual values if the 
encryption algorithm values (M and b) are known. 
2) Data simulation of the three larger sample combinations agree with the statistical 
study of the original data analysis so the four small sample simulation results can be 
accepted as a valid inference of correlations to defect reductions even though the 
original data analysis did not indicate a correlation. 
3) There is statistical evidence inferring six of seven combinations (exclusive of classes 
coded BC) are having a positive correlation on defect reductions discovered for the 
assembly plants (PPM level) – that is, the results of the supplier development training 
reduced defects the OEM received directly from these 148 suppliers studied. These 
findings were discussed in detail in the previous chapter, Chapter 5. 
4) There is statistical evidence inferring that of the seven combinations, four have shown 
positive correlation (exclusive of classes coded C, BC, and ABC) and are having a 
positive impact on defect reductions after the vehicle is sold to the customer (3-MIS) 
– that is, the results of the supplier development training reduced OEM 3MIS defects 
from the 148 suppliers studied. Likewise, detailed findings were discussed in Chapter 
5. 
5) The longer running classes (PFMEA and 8-D – Class A & B respectively) are providing 
better performance results than containment. Containment (Class C) is the shortest 
running class and, with the added time lag of 3MIS data (15–17 months or more till 
sold), shows poorer performance compared to PFMEA & 8-D.  
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6) There is mathematical evidence that 70 to 80% of the suppliers taking the training 
classes are implementing what they learned over the course of time and that the 
majority of them are deploying the OEM’s developmental training.  
7) The best combinations for performance are classes involving PFMEA and 8-D (A and 
B) leading to an indication that development training is highly time-related. This does 
not mean the Containment training class does not belong as part of the developmental 
training. The implication is simply the shortest running of the three classes has yet to 
produce any statistical evidence of correlation. 
8) The DOE (6 random replicates) taken from the original data showed a positive data 
correlation for Class A (PFMEA & CP) compared to defect reductions found at the 
OEM and with defects after the vehicle is in service (3MIS). None of the other 
combinations showed a positive correlation. Note: the correlation assumes the 
suppliers with defects trending upward or on the rise rather than in decline correlates 
to no classes taken (no data was collected for companies before the training initiative 
































1) The reason underlying why the 20 to 30% of supplier non-implementers have failed 
to implement their training is unknown and should be explored as part of the future 
work for the OEM quality team members. The most likely cause as to why it is not 
implemented is the shop “cultural environment.” However, this theory has not been 
verified or validated. 
2) A follow-up survey of all suppliers taking the developmental training should be 
considered to gauge the level of implementation for each supplier relative to the 
classes that their plant participated in. This would also create a sense of urgency 
the OEM places on developmental training and reinforce the need for more 
extensive implementation. 
3) It would be an interesting exercise to compare supplier overall scorecard scores 
with those suppliers not implementing training. This suggested exercise was never 
an objective of the original research, but the hypothesis might be (Ho: non-
implementers = high scores) with the alternative (Ha: non-implementers = low 
scores) with the OEM determining the acceptable lower bound for the high score 
before it is started and how the overall score is viewed over time. There is very 
likely a correlation between the two. This type of control (low scores) could be used 
as a supplier mandate for completion of these courses and other future classes or, 
if serious enough, for removing the supplier from the supply chain. 
4) The researcher sees no reason why future assessments cannot include multi-part 
providers (suppliers). Each part provided should be a stand-alone assessment and 
treated the same as the single part provider. It would be a measure of horizontal 





5) There are indications that treating 3MIS data the same way the assembly plant 
defect data was treated was an incorrect choice in initial planning. The PPM data 
and the 3MIS PPM data are offset by as much as a year or more. There is an 
additional time lag to vehicle sales after production and this should have been 
accounted for and should be included in the next iteration of this analysis. 
6) The longer running classes tend to show a correlation suggesting longer planning 
horizons are needed to see these correlation effects. The shorter the class training 
window, the greater the evidence of non-correlation. 
7) The fact that student numbers taking the Containment class are far fewer 
compared to those that participated in the PFMEA and 8-D classes provides one 
plausible reason as to why there may be a lack of correlation evidence. This should 
be revisited later as the student numbers taking this class grows in order to 
determine if it too provides a meaningful correlation in defect reduction results. 
8) As a year has elapsed since the beginning of this statistical analysis, the assembly 
plant may just be starting to see defect reductions from suppliers taking the 
Containment training. This should be verified at some point. 
9) Future studies of this nature should ignore the “b” add-on to the encryption 
algorithm for matched-pair data sets as it eliminates itself in the subtraction 
process to obtain the matched-pair difference. This was an unanticipated twist in 
the data during the analytical steps and the fault of the researcher for not seeing it 
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Figure AF-5.2 – 3MIS – Histogram for “A” – Original Data – Nonparametric 
 
Note: For Statistical Normality Plots, see AF-5.22 & 5.23  
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Normalization Attempts for Original Data 
 
Figure AF-5.3 – PPM – Combo “A” 
 
 




Normalization Attempts for Original Data (CONTINUED) 
 
Figure AF-5.5 – PPM – Combo “B” 
 
 




Normalization Attempts for Original Data (CONTINUED) 
 
Figure AF-5.7 – PPM – Combo “C” 
 
 





Normalization Attempts for Original Data (CONTINUED) 
 









Normalization Attempts for Original Data (CONTINUED) 
 








Normalization Attempts for Original Data (CONTINUED) 
 








Normalization Attempts for Original Data (CONTINUED) 
 









Figure AF-5.17 – Histogram – Plot of Normal Data before Encryption 
 
 
Figure AF-5.18 – Histogram – Plot of Normal Data after Encryption 
 




Figure AF-5.19 – Histogram – Plot of Nonparametric Data before Encryption 
 
 
Figure AF-5.20 – Histogram – Plot of Nonparametric Data before Encryption 
 



















Figure AF-5.23 – Statistical Data on Normal Unencrypted Data File 
 
 
   




Do Not Reject Ho 
Ho: Parametric 
Ha: Nonparametric 




Figure AF-5.25 – Statistical Data on Nonparametric Unencrypted Data File 
 
 
   










Table AT-5.1 – Normalized Data used for Encryption Impact Study  
Data File, Normal Data; Encryption Impact Study 
6 18 28 36 12 20 30 22 18 10 34 28 
14 22 14 20 24 28 10 22 28 32 18 18 
18 16 32 26 34 18 20 32 16 24 30 22 
28 24 20 22 20 14 28 26 12 28 26 20 
22 34 26 18 30 8 24 22 34 24 14 28 
12 24 22 14 26 22 18 30 12 32 16 24 
14 332 24 30 20 26 10 22 18 22 30 26 
20 26 8 28 22 18 24 26 20 14 24 16 
18 28 30 20 12 16 22 28 26 16 26 22 
16 20 22 16 26 32 24 16 20 22 20 18 
10 24 20 38 18 14 16 12 24 36 24 26 
20 30 26 16 22 24 18 24 14 22 30 20 
Note: This data file has all positive numbers; no zero values; no negative numbers 
Table AT-5.2 – Nonparametric Data used for Encryption Impact Study 
Data File, Nonparametric Data; Encryption Impact Study 
145 73 163 -4 -3 72 111 38 57 6 8 19 
6 7 206 -2 5042 2840 21 72 138 6 -1 55 
33 -64 11 31 170 2 79 437 129 26 -336 50 
242 1816 -76 223 16 133 6 -13 10 -373 2 127 
20 -19 112 2 33 5 6 -1633 -13 35 31 -133 
123 403 -2 -2 5 -114 14 144 2 39 64 54 
29 8 2 -121 405 32 -2 -23 428 2844 23 23 
24 -4 133 13 -2 -44 -2 -61 21 22 -283 67 
5 187 -387 -107 44 17 4 -315 -6 37 43 89 
2 3 17 -3 326 132 160 558 -346 15 15 22 
-137 -3 483 2 1 7 74 326 -55 98 63 34 
129 110 10 42 35 135 -3 37 1 46 17 -12 
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